
POPULATION CHALLENGES, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION an REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH in TURKEY and the EUROPEAN UN Issues and Policy Implications

> International Conference Organised by the Turkish Fa Health and Planning Founda 11-12 October, 2004

POPULATION CHALLENGES, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION and REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH in TURKEY and the EUROPEAN UNION: Issues and Policy Implications





TURKISH FAMILY HEALTH & PLANNING FOUNDATION

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FOREWORD by Yaşar Yaşer, Executive Director

The International Conference on Population, Migration and Reproductive Health, on 11-12 October, 2004, organised by the Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation (TAP Foundation) was a fact finding activity to explore the interrelated issues of population, migration and reproductive health in Turkey and in the European Union and policy implications related to them. On the eve of Turkey's accession negotiations, the organisers believe that the conference is timely, because population, migration and reproductive health needed to be discussed within a multidisciplinary platform and with a scientific perspective.

Additionally, another purpose of the conference was to enrich the knowledge of the politicians, policy makers and opinion leaders and to help them attain realistic perspectives on these issues both in Turkey and in the EU countries.

Population

Turkey's population was13.6 million in 1927 according to the census, which was performed 4 years after the establishment of the Republic. Beginning with the 1935 census, subsequent population censuses were undertaken at 5-year intervals, until the decennial system was adopted after 1990 and implemented by the 2000 census. Quinquennial and other national surveys, such as those by Hacettepe University from 1968 onwards expanded our information and filled gaps between censuses, the latest being the 2003 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. Papers based on the latter provided detailed information for discussion in the conference.

Since the founding of the Republic, the country's population has more than quadrupled and is currently approximately 70 million. The growth rate peaked at 2.8 percent per year during the 1950s. It is currently about 1.3 percent and continuing to decline. Fertility in Turkey is now very close to replacement level, not as low as in Europe but moving in that direction. The number of children and youth (0-14) in the population is now almost constant. Since fertility continues to decline, as it happened in Europe, those numbers will actually diminish in time. The momentum of growth imparted to the population by those earlier years of high fertility continues affecting the labour force and the elderly strongly.

The total population will reach a maximum of anywhere from 85 to 95 million by 2050 depending largely on how much further fertility falls. There is considerable scope in the eastern most provinces of the country and rural Anatolia. Urban population fertility may well continue to decline as it is already below is replacement in many cities. Of course the future in this regard is not certain, but it seems likely that an end to population growth and steady increases of aging will become major issues by the middle of this century.

Owing to the history of high fertility, population momentum has already given Turkey a particularly large population in the main working ages. In 2000, this cohort of population was 35 million men and women aged 20-60. It will continue to grow and projections indicate that working age population of may stabilise at a level of 50 million men and women by 2020 or so. Its abundance is of particular interest to Europe, and is often called a "window of opportunity" for both Turkey and Europe. The European economy can tap Turkey for labour force of the requisite skills to maintain its own economic growth, and to maintain a balance between the productive population that supports older population by way of taxes. Those who emigrate from Turkey in the new century are often skilled workers. Turkey's own industrialisation and participation in new fields of production—including high tech—makes this possible. The educational system in Turkey is improving and additional advances in this regard can also be expected in the future.

European population dynamics are dominated by international migration. Population aging, which became very significant in Europe, is long recognised by demographers and it has finally burst into political and public consciousness. Extended longevity coupled with reduced and below-replacement fertility for the last three decades has caused a transition towards a much older population, and demographers believe that this structural change will last for at least several decades. This change in demographic trends, which is called the "second demographic transition" will characterise the whole outlook on issues of population policy. It is now too late for the working age population of local origin to be much affected by changes in fertility and mortality in the short or medium run. Therefore, net immigration involving people of many origins already accounts for the main population changes in European countries. Demographic aging is a very significant issue for the European Union.

Migration

One of the most important issues of our day is the management of international migration. The emerging trends in migration from, to and through Turkey present new challenges for policy makers. Starting with labour migration towards Western Europe in the 1960s, Turkey has long been known as a labour -sending country. Later, however, Turkish workers' emigration to Western Europe has been largely replaced by population movements to other countries. A new trend of inflows of population to Turkey from neighbouring countries is also observed during the last decade. Turkey has always been both an emigration as well as an immigration country. However, over the last decade or so the nature of immigration into Turkey has changed significantly. In particular the questions of asylum, permanent immigration, and irregular transit migration are having an important impact on Turkish policy.

Turkey's position in the international migration scene seems to have changed. Turkey has now become both a country of immigration and emigration. In this conference, a number of papers tackled the issues of population movements from and to Turkey, new trends in migration and related policies within the EU.

The new migratory flows are much different from those of the early years. New types of employment regimes, such as contract labour movements; "offshore employment," and circular migration have replaced the conventional type of migration of the 1960s. And there are major changes in "who" emigrates.

As the countries of the EU try to develop restrictive migration policies to prevent, or at least try to weaken the influx of foreign labour, they formulate at the same time selective migration criteria under the pressure of employers to close the labour gap occurring in specific sectors and to create sufficient labour supply. Almost all the EU countries are taking measures that encourage immigration by simplifying the procedures. The aim, of course, is to attract highly skilled professionals from third-world countries to benefit their economies.

Along with the problems of migration, there is the problem of integration of the immigrants which is an important part of the process. EU countries need to have explicit policies which intend to influence such integration processes.

Reproductive Health

New trends of policy came out in the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. Reproductive health is not merely an health issue, but also closely related to the patterns of sexuality, reproductive choices, and family structures in historical perspectives. Issues of current life styles, reproductive choices, and sexuality as affected by physiological, social and economic variables were discussed during the conference. The diverse programs and competencies of numerous organisations in the fields of human rights, women's issues, poverty eradication and development, education and youth, although not directly involved in health, contribute in one way or another to improvements of reproductive health. The Cairo Conference stressed the involvement of NGOs and recommended that NGOs be involved in designing and monitoring reproductive health programs; it urged governments to work with them, support them, and make good use of their knowledge and expertise.

Conclusion

Aging of European population is a significant problem. The fertility rate has fallen since 1965 while life expectancy has increased. With current demographic trends, Europe's population cannot sustain itself and would decrease sharply if immigration were stopped or severely restricted. New member states with lower fertility rates than the rest of EU make the continent's age structure even older. The problem of the EU's aging population results with shrinking markets, less taxable income and lower revenues from social contributions. This means more working years, higher taxes, less pensions for a shorter period of time. According to a recent UN study, "the EU would need an average of 6.1 million immigrants a year from 2015 to 2040 to maintain a ratio of three working-age adults for each retiree." To maintain the European social model, the EU needs to increase its labour productivity and its employment rates quickly and substantially.

The consensus in Turkey is that Turkey's young, dynamic and qualified human resource is the social insurance of Europe. This thought is shared by many European as well. A Turkey engaged in the EU accession process will benefit from higher economic development as well as better and more European education. Consequently, the human capital in Turkey capital will be upgraded to meet Europe's standards and needs.

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

POPULATION CHALLENGES, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION and REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH in TURKEY and the EUROPEAN UNION: Issues and Policy Implications

Istanbul, 11-12 October 2004

Conference Coordinator: Yasar Yaser 11 October 2004, Monday

Morning Session

09.00-09.30 Registration

09.30-11.10 Welcoming speeches

Baran Tuncer, Chairman, Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation

Marco Hennis Consul General of Holland, for Ambassador Sjoerd I.H. Gosses (For the present EU Presidency)

Kunio Waki Deputy Executive Director, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

Brunson McKinley, Director General, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Geneva Ambassador Murat E. Sungar Secretary General, European Union Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Halim Mete Representative, Turkish Unions of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TOBB)

11.10-11.30 Tea break

Session I: Turkish and European Population Perspectives and Population Change

- Chair:Kaya Erdem, Former Speaker of the House, Former Vice-Premier,Member of the Board, Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation
- 11.30-12:10 The Population of Turkey at the Turn of the XXI. Century: Past trends, Current State and Future Prospects
 Attila Hancioglu- Banu Ergocmen - Turgay Ünalan
 Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies (HIPS)
- 12:10-12:30 Population Since 1990: New Developments, Old Trends, Uncertain Futures David Coleman, Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Oxford
- 12.30-13.00 Discussion
- 13.00-14.00 Lunch

Session II: Population Dynamics and Reproductive Health

Chair: Ayse Akin , (OB/GYN), Faculty of Medicine, Hacettepe University

- 14.00-14.20 Fertility regulation in Europe : the Contraception-Abortion Trade Off and Its Health Implications John Cleland, Director, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Centre for Population Studies
- 14.40-14.55 Women's Health & Reproductive Health Care Within the Framework of the 2003 Population & Health Survey of Turkey Arzu Koseli, Ministry of Health, Mother-Child Health and Family Planning Directorate (MCHFP)
- 14.55-15.10 Reproductive Health Services in Turkey, with 2003

Ibrahim Acıkalın, Ministry of Health, Mother-Child Health and Family Planning Directorate (MCHFP)

 15.10-15.25 The Role of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the Development of Reproductive Health Nurcan Muftuoglu, Deputy-Executive Director Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation

15.25-15.40 Discussion

15.40-16.00 Tea Break

Session III: International Migration and Turkey

- Chair: Sabahat Tezcan, Director, Institute of Population Studies, Hacettepe University
- 16.00-16.20 International Migration and Turkey: Changing Trends Serim Timur, Co-ordinator, Network for Migration Research in Turkey (TUGA)
- 16.20-16.40 Migration from Turkey to Europe : a Dabate of the Past, Present and Future Within the Context of Turkey's EU Membership Ahmet Icduygu, Department of International Relations, Koc University
- 16.40-17.00 Irregular Migration and Turkey Sema Erder, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Marmara University.
- 17.00-17.30 Discussion

18.00-20.00 Reception

12 October 2004, Tuesday

Session IV: New Migration Trends and the Economic Dimension

Chair: Peter Schatzer, Director of Regional Office of International Organisation for Migration, (IOM) Rome

- 09.30-09.50 Population Trends and Policy Implications for Immigration Policies Miroslav Macura Chief, Population Activities Unit, UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
- 09.50-10.10 Growth and Imigration Senarios: Turkey EU Refik Erzan, The Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University
- 10.10-10.30 Demand for Highly Skilled Workforce in the European Union and New Migration Arrangements: The German Example Gulay Toksoz, Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University
- 10.30-10.50 The Changing Structure of The Turkish External Emigration Mumtaz Peker, Retired Academician

10.50-11.10 Discussion

11.10-11.30 Tea Break

Session V: International Migration and EU Policies

Chair:	Brunson McKinley, Director General of International Organisation for
	Migration (IOM), Geneva
11.30-11.50	Turkey's Pre-Accession and Immigrant Issues
	Kemal Kirisci, Department of Political Science and International Relations
	Bogazici University

- 11.50-12.10 EU Population Ageing : Challenges and policy responses Constantinos Fotakis General Directorate of Employment and Social Affairs, European Commission, Brussels
- 12.10-12.30 Integration Processes of Migrants in the European Union and Policies Relating to Integration. Rinus Penninx, Director, Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the Universiteit van Amsterdam

12.30-13.00 Discussion

13.00-14.00 Lunch

Session VI: Political Dimensions of Population, Migration and Reproductive Health Issues in Europe

Chair: Nuri Colakoglu, Media Co-ordinator of Dogan Publishing Holding, Member of the Board, Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation

14.00-14.40 General Evaluation and Policies Tarhan Erdem, Former Member of Parliament Nermin Abadan-Unat, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Bogazici University Bahadır Kaleagasi, TUSIAD – Turkish Industry & Business Association Representative to the EU and UNICE, Brussels

14.40-16.00 Policies Concerning Population and Migration

Canan Aritman, Turkish National Assembly, Population & Development Gr. Mehmet Ceylan, Turkish National Assembly, Population and Development Gr. Gaye Erbatur, Turkish National Assembly, Population and Development Gr. Alim Tunc, Turkish National Assembly, Population and Development Gr.

Media Representatives: Mehmet Barlas, Sabah Zeynep Gogus, Hurriyet Meral Tamer, Milliyet

Foreign Media Representitatives: Cem Dalaman, RBB Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg, multikulti/ Türkische Redaktion Wolfgang Molitor, Stuttgarter Nachrichte Utku Pazarkaya, Redaktion Süd West Rundfunk - International Cem Sey, Deutsche Welle- Radio, Türkische Redaktion, TAZ daily political newspaper

Observers:

Aikan Akanov, Deputy Minister of Health, Kazakhstan Juma Durdy Bairamov, Director, National Institute on the State Statistics and Information, Turkmenistan Osmanakun Ibraimov, Secretary of the State of the Kyrgyz Republic Asomiddin Kamilov, Deputy Minister of Health, Uzbekistan Galina Saidova, Deputy Minister of Economics, Uzbekistan

OPENING REMARKS

by Baran Tuncer, Chairman of the Board

I would like to welcome you today to this conference organised by our Foundation on "Population Challenges, International Migration and Reproductive Health in Turkey and the European Union".

The Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation, established nearly twenty years ago has been active in the areas of family health, reproductive health, and family planning. It has also been closely interested in the areas of demographic change and population dynamics.

We have realised that the issues surrounding population and international migration have not been sufficiently explored in the context of Turkey's accession to the European Union. We wanted to help close this void since unsubstantiated claims are being made both here and abroad, and there is also a great deal of misinformation. Claims are being made that Turkey's population is growing rapidly and that Turkish workers will invade Europe once the opportunity arises.

We wanted to provide a forum for experts from Turkey and Europe to discuss these issues in depth to help illuminate the public. We thought this was extremely important at this historic juncture where decisions are being taken regarding the future of Turkish-European relations. We will be very happy if we can make a small contribution to this dialogue.

At the outset, I would like to make a few observations. The population growth in Turkey has declined considerably recently. Today, the annual population growth rate is below 1.5 percent, and is expected to further go down in the coming years. This we know, mainly because the survey results conducted by the Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies indicate that total fertility was 2.2 in 2003. This means that on average women are giving birth to 2.2 children in her reproductive life. This is very

close to replacement level.

However, this does not mean a stagnant population for Turkey in the near future. There is built in momentum because those women entering the child bearing age were already born when population growth rates were much higher than now. Therefore, decline in population growth will not be abrupt, but gradual.

On the other hand, according to data at hand, the 0-14 year age group will stop growing in the coming years. However, the working age group, in this context the 20-54 age cohort will continue to grow strongly in the next 30 years. This means that the dependency ratio will decline in relative terms. This is a window of opportunity for Turkey which will stay open for a while. While it lasts, there will an abundance of working age population which, if used effectively, can be a major source of economic growth.

This could also be a window of opportunity for the EU countries. Turkey will not always be a country with a high population growth and with a large working age population ready to take jobs in European markets. This is important in view of population trends in Europe. It is well known that the European population is ageing. Birth rates are declining rapidly as families opt for fewer children. At the same time, life expectancy has been on the rise. Within the next five to ten years all EU countries will face declining populations. These trends cannot be reversed in the near future.

These trends will have major consequences. With fewer people in the labour force, GDP growth cannot help but stall. Also, an ageing population will strain the resources available for pension and health expenditures.

On paper, one can think of various ways to compensate for the drawbacks of an ageing population. Accelerated productivity growth, extension of the retirement age, increased premiums can alleviate the potential problem. Realistically, however, these measures are not easy to implement.

Therefore, EU countries with declining populations have very difficult choices. The most realistic alternative seems to be for these countries to encourage migrant workers. Even though migration cannot reverse the trend of ageing, migrant workers can help provide the needed labour, and additional tax revenue needed to maintain the existing social security system.

Moreover, there is already a shortage of skilled labour in many EU countries, while

the local labour is reluctant to take manial jobs. In particular, migration of skilled labour to these countries is a windfall gain. EU countries would benefit from their skills without contributing to their training. Labour- exporting countries would bear the cost of training them, without directly benefiting from their service.

There continues to be a bias against migration in Western Europe, including migration from Turkey. I won't go into the reasons for this bias. I am sure experts in this field will explore this. The question of whether EU countries need migration is not relevant any more. Clearly the need is there. The relevant question is from which sources the EU will try to satisfy the demand for labour and under which circumstances. Turkey is in a position to meet this demand with its skilled and hardworking labour force.

I would like to thank those institutions and individuals who contributed to the realisation of this event. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, European Union Commission, Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (TOBB), The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and Hacettepe University-Institute of Population Studies have all contributed.

I would like to thank the distinguished academicians and experts who are participating in the Conference, and their sponsoring agencies. I also would like to extend my greetings to participants from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

I am looking forward to a stimulating, fruitful and successful conference.

Thank you all very much.

by Marco Hennis Consul General of Holland, for Ambassador Sjoerd I. H. Gosses (For the present EU Presidency)

We come from rather small country. If we are asked to say something, we always tend to look how we can add value. Because, we are not big enough to automatically attract attention and we are not small enough to neglect immediately. So when we say something we want to make a point.

I would like to talk about myself before and then go on with the meeting agenda and the EU. I know IOM and UNFPA from previous postings. I have been posted to the Bosna-Herzigowina for 3 years, just after the war between the years 1997-2000. And I spent 1 year as head of our Dutch mission, in the embassy, in Afghanistan, Kabul. In there again IOM and UNFPA were very much at present and have a much more extenuated role to play then they have here. They

I know from the grassroots level what it means to live in a country where migration, population growth, health problems what they do mean. I have faded memories of these times there and I still cherish it. I have watched television yesterday carefully to know what happens in the first election in Afghanistan. That was an impolite introduction, I am sorry but I would like to add one more element because that will make the bridge easier towards my position now.

In between the Bosna-Herzigowina and Afghanistan I was for my government the coordinator for the accession negotiations for 12 countries in enlargement process in the Netherlands. I have lived the negotiation chapters with the 12 countries and there is now 2 countries that legging behind. But I have been very much involved in this process of discussing and thinking about integration and I have come to the conclusion that this is very much a start of a process in these countries where they still have a way, not long, to be fully integrated and harmonised and where we will finally grow all together. You can imagine that I will follow the discussion in this country where I have just started. So, I am not really a knowledgeable person to talk about Turkey. But I have seen many elements now that reminds me the talks with the bigger countries like Poland. I know the topic today is migration. It is very much population dynamics and I would come to the last part that European integration part. I would like to say that when you talk about population, migration then it is good to know where this country stands visa vie European Union (EU). Recently, as we all know that report have been published by the European Commission and I would highly recommend you to read it. Because I have very much come under impression that many people will just take the news from the newspapers or talk to other people without actually taking time to print those pages of 130 but to print the executive summary is extremely interesting. If you bare with me I would like to make an advertisement for the EU Commission's work. It's web site address is www.europe.eu.int I would very much recommend you to read it. I do hope we will all read it from both sides as the basis for the further discussions. Because it fives an adequate field for where we stand and where Turkey stands. Many of the elements that are in-depth report affect the very much discussion here. It is about economic situation. It is about statistics where we will base our thesis on. I do hope you will find the time to get it from the web and read it, and this is my plea, with a constructive, basic attitude. By simply waving it you will not get anywhere, I can simply tell you what I have learnt from previous negotiations that this is really adequate stuff and you can really understand the situation we are in. Because together we have to do this European Integration and coming back to the places where I have been posted before, for example Afghanistan and Bosna-Herzigowina; just for the reason of stability, European Integration is the only alternative of growing together and learning from each other.

I wish you all a very good meeting. I do hope that much more adequate information on population, on migration and on integration will help building a better insight in what we are doing actually together, just getting adequate picture of Turkey and the European Union. I wish you a very good conference.

Thank you very much.

by Mr. Kunio Waki UNFPA Deputy Executive Director

Introduction

Excellencies, distinguished delegates, and colleagues,

It is a great honour for me to be with you for this important conference to discuss international migration and population issues.

It is a particular pleasure to be here in Turkey to discuss these issues. Istanbul has always represented a nexus of movement and exchange. The current discussions on Turkey's accession to the European Union are but a further example of a hopeful future for the citizens of Turkey.

I would like to make a few, brief remarks.

- First, on migration as a whole and its links to ICPD;
- Second, on how the UN and UNFPA in particular are responding to the issues;
- And, third, some of the key principles I believe we need to bear in mind as we move forward together.

I will be focusing on general issues, as time does not permit me to go into detail, and I recognize considerable knowledge on Turkey among the other speakers and participants. But let me take the opportunity to introduce UNFPA's Country Representative for Turkey, Anne-Birgitte Albrectsen. Anne-Birgitte, I know, is working with you on these issues in the framework of UNFPA's country programme.

1. Issues in migration, population and reproductive health.

International migration is not a new phenomenon. Human beings have been on the move since prehistoric times. The magnitude of international migration flows, however, in the 1990s placed the issue much higher on the international agenda. The volume

and diversity of current migration flows clearly demonstrate that international migration can no longer be considered peripheral to the mainstream of population policy.

Contemporary patterns of movement are significantly more complex than those in the past, not only because of the sheer numbers of migrants, but also because the flows are now truly global. Furthermore, today's migrants come from a broad spectrum of cultural, economic and social backgrounds. Women, once considered passive players who accompanied or joined migrating husbands, are now playing an increasing role in their own right in international migration.

With the decline in fertility and mortality in many parts of the world, migration has taken on increased significance, becoming an important component of population dynamics in many countries. Population decline, largely a result of below-replacement fertility, and population ageing have already emerged as significant concerns in many countries and their effects are expected to exacerbate in the future.

Researchers and policy makers have speculated as to the possible role of migration to offset these two demographic trends. However, the idea of replacement migration, or admitting international migrants to offset declines in population size, declines in the working age population and ageing of the population, has evoked considerable controversy. It remains to be seen whether Governments can, or will, consider replacement migration as a viable option.

From an economic perspective, international migration, just like internal migration, can play a positive role in balancing out opportunities and enhancing economic returns to migrants and the host country. On the other hand, the social, psychological and cultural repercussions remain a legitimate concern.

International migration was one of the important issues to emerge from the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 and it was on the agenda of every major international conference since then.

The ICPD reminded us that, to be effective, international migration policies must take into account the economic constraints of the receiving country, the impact of migration on the host society and the effects of migration on countries of origin. ICPD spelled out three overall objectives in this area:

- (1) to address the root causes of migration, especially those related to poverty;
- (2) to encourage more cooperation and dialogue between countries of origin and countries of destination in order to maximize the benefits of migration to those

concerned and increase the likelihood that migration has positive consequences for the development of both sending and receiving countries, and

(3) to facilitate the reintegration process of returning migrants.

2. How the UN and UNFPA are responding

As part of UNFPA's follow-up to ICPD, UNFPA conducted a Global Survey. The survey shows that 73 per cent of developing countries that responded had taken some action to influence international migration. These measures included adoption of policies; formulation of plans, strategies or programmes; the enactment of laws and legislation; efforts to enforce conventions; and the establishment of various coordination mechanisms.

A Global Commission on International Migration was launched by the United Nations Secretary-General in December 2003 to provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to migration issues. As you may know, the Commission's mandate is to place international migration on the global agenda; to analyze gaps in current policy approaches to migration and examine interlinkages with other issues; and to present recommendations to the UN Secretary-General and other stakeholders on how to strengthen national, regional and global governance of international migration.

UNFPA is proud to be a partner with other organizations in the International Migration Policy Programme (IMP) that was launched in 1998 to strengthen the migration management capacity of Governments and to foster regional and international cooperation towards orderly migration and the protection of migrants.

By the end of 2003, 15 regional meetings had been organized including in Central and Eastern Europe. Since 2002, the IMP has been tracking the impact of these regional meetings with its Country Reporting System which monitors progress and obstacles to achieving implementation of IMP recommendations and developments in such areas as training, legislation and cooperation.

Tomorrow, October 12, together with the IMP, UNFPA will officially launch the joint publication, *Meeting the Challenges of Migration: Progress Since the ICPD*, at a Round Table on International Migration and Development that is being convened in New York in the context of the tenth anniversary of the ICPD. The Round Table will explore some of the important implications of international migration, especially those related to poverty and development, demographic dynamics and governments' capacity in

migration policy and management. It will also address the major migration challenges ahead.

This year is a significant one for the UNFPA office in Turkey, as we begin our preparations for the next five-year country programme. How we can work with our national partners to address population dynamics, migration and reproductive health issues is at the heart of our efforts. The Common Country Assessment undertaken by the UN system as a whole recognizes the importance of these issues, and we intend to address them in our planning and programming activities. Among the key challenges we have identified are those of the disparities within Turkey. In addition, population relocation continues to have an impact on public services, including health care services. Some of the fast-growing peri-urban areas are struggling with inadequate health care infrastructure while patterns of underutilization can be seen in depopulated rural areas. Anne-Birgitte will be happy to provide you with more detailed information on our work.

3. Conclusion

In our deliberations here and those elsewhere, I believe there are two key principles that we need to take into account as we address these challenges.

First, understanding migration in the development context.

Meeting the Challenges of Migration: Progress Since the ICPD points out that migration should be seen as a development tool. No longer considered as a failure of development, migration is recognized as an integral aspect of the global development process. For example, research shows a strong positive correlation between remittances and poverty reduction in developing countries. In 2003, remittances were estimated to have exceeded US \$90 billion, although actual figures are much higher when informal transfers are taken into account. This exceeds official development assistance (ODA) and constitutes the largest single source of financial flows to developing countries after foreign direct investment (FDI); in fact, remittances may even exceed FDI flows in many countries.

It is important to incorporate migration into poverty reduction strategies and broader development policies. It is becoming increasingly important to capitalize on the benefits of migration and counteract the negative effects of the cross-border movement of skilled labour, commonly known as the "brain drain".

Second, upholding the principles of human rights

The size and diversity of migrant flows have resulted in growing international attention to such complex issues as xenophobia, discrimination, racism, human trafficking, human rights of migrants, and most recently, terrorism and national security. There have been a number of initiatives to address these issues, including the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants in 2000 and a Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in 2004. The United Nations General Assembly increased the visibility of migrants and their plight by proclaiming December 18 as "International Migrants Day", inviting Governments as well as inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations to disseminate information on the human rights and fundamental freedoms of migrants as well as the sharing of experiences which ensures the protection of migrants.

At the Millennium Summit, world leaders agreed, among other things, to ensure respect for, and protection of, the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families.

The ICPD objectives also called for, *inter alia*, ensuring the social and economic integration of, and eliminating discriminatory practices against, documented migrants; addressing the root causes of undocumented migration and reducing the number of undocumented migrants; preventing international trafficking in migrants; reducing pressures leading to refugee movements by combating their root causes; finding durable solutions to the plight of refugees and displaced persons; and ensuring effective protection of, and assistance to, refugees, especially women and children. The Programme of Action underscored the importance of gathering data on flows and stocks of international migrants and on factors causing migration.

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families which entered into force in July 2003, counted 26 States as party to the agreement one year later. But while the entry into force of this Convention is regarded as a major achievement in human rights protection, the signatories are almost exclusively countries of origin and not destination countries where migrants' rights are often in jeopardy. Implementation of human rights principles and agreements on the appropriate mechanisms to protect migrants' rights continue to be a major challenge.

There are of course a wide range of other issues that we need to address together, such as:

• the issue of improving coordination itself;

- building an awareness and understanding of the social and economic implications of migration;
- creating the political will to manage migration flows and to address the consequences of migration, institutional capacity and trained staff, and resources to manage migration flows.

And there are more technical and conceptual issues, as well as country and region specific considerations to focus on. Your expertise and experience will be vital in addressing the challenges of population, migration and reproductive health. I hope that UNFPA, in our own way, can be a valued partner to you, in order to meet the needs of the people of Turkey and those in the countries we serve.

I wish you a successful conference.

Thank you.

Migration Management Today by Brunson McKinley, Director General International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva

It is hard to pick up a newspaper or to switch on the TV or radio these days without finding a reference to issues surrounding the movement of people or the impact of migration on societies. This is hardly surprising, as roughly one in every 35 persons is a migrant. The current estimate of the number of international migrants is 185 million, that is, some 3 percent of the world's population, nearly fifty percent of whom are women. The phenomena of internal migration and displacement add additional dimensions.

By its geography, history and policy orientation, no country has a greater interest in migration than Turkey. This conference is proof of that interest. In every field of migration management – development, labour, regulation and emergencies - Turkey is in the forefront of attention.

The themes of this conference point to the breadth and scope of the migration issue. Population, health and the regional focus are all integral elements of the migration debate, along with many other specialities.

The majority of people who migrate today do so not because they are fleeing persecution but because they are looking for a better life – education, training, employment and temporary or permanent opportunities in a different place.

Modern communication and transportation ensure that more people know about and can aspire to see for themselves once distant and inaccessible lands. Aging and shrinking populations in much of the developed world stand in sharp contrast to growing populations in much of the developing world. This fact creates its own pushes and pulls. Personal aspirations are increasingly linked to employment or other opportunities abroad. Migrant remittances, skills and investments are the mainstay of many national economies. All these factors and more indicate that migration is here to stay and is indeed an integral feature of modern life. My remarks today will focus on six principal areas of future work in migration management.

First, we need to **get the facts right**, to understand the nature of migration, its causes and consequences, its benefits and its challenges.

In the economic realm, migration is a prime driver of the international economy. At least 100 billion dollars were sent home in remittances last year by migrants, helping to sustain the economies of many developing countries. Migrants make a crucial contribution to the economies of the societies in which they work. At the same time, brain drain deprives many developing countries of the potentially critical contributions of their best and brightest to their long-term development.

In the social realm, migration holds great potential for nation-building, as evidenced by the experiences of some of the most stable yet dynamic and culturally rich societies globally. On the other hand, migration can bring challenges in the form of social tension, conflicted identity, and the alienation caused by inadequate integration. The latest UNDP *Human Development Report*, which focuses on cultural diversity, well illustrates the benefits and challenges of social change through migration.

The UN Population Division has made a great contribution to the understanding of key migration facts and statistics. The Division's *International Migration Report* provides the latest and most detailed figures relating to the stock of international migrants. The Division has also prepared recommendations on the collection and analysis of statistics, recommendations that states have not yet fully applied. Much more needs to be done to promote these recommendations, by both governments and international organizations, and to improve our understanding of the economic and social dynamics of migration.

Second, we need to identify, define and address the fundamental policy issues. Here are some of the major questions involved in the migration debate.

Issues of sovereignty:

• It is the fundamental right of each country to determine who enters and remains in its territory and under what conditions. Open societies face the question of how to regulate and facilitate movement without overly intrusive surveillance and control mechanisms or turning away the new arrivals on whom their future prosperity may depend. • Much migration today occurs outside of governmental awareness or control. What are the implications for public health, security, and the domestic labour market of wide-spread irregular migration?

Issues of security:

- In the wake of heightened global security concerns, it has become more important than ever for governments to know who enters their territories and for what purposes. We need to explore these issues in an open, honest and constructive way, to reduce the risks to individual migrants and to the societies they enter.
- How can security concerns be addressed without stifling legitimate and needed movement and without serious constraints on personal rights and liberties?

Issues of economic integration in a global labour market:

- Businesses want to recruit and move their personnel globally and yet must work through often complicated and time-consuming governmental administrative structures to do so.
- Current structures are inadequate to the task of rapid recruitment and movement of workers and professionals. Businesses and communities suffer.
- While legal opportunities for migration for work are limited, demand for migrant workers is high and supply is even higher. How can we align these factors in safer, more flexible and more equitable ways? How can we ensure that it is not smuggling networks that do the matching?

Issues of national identity:

- Once relatively homogenous and cohesive societies are giving way to multiethnic, multicultural societies, whether by design or default. How can core values be identified and adhered to in the midst of growing diversity?
- How can social structures established on the basis of national identity adjust to cope with temporary and permanent migrants from vastly different cultural backgrounds and with varying legal and social status?
- What is the social and political impact of trans-nationalism and growing multiple citizenship?

Issues of social change:

- What are the implications for social welfare states established on the basis of a social compact between a state and its citizens? What are the implications of newcomers from different cultures and societies temporary and permanent, authorized and not?
- How can we ensure the cohesion and stability of societies while protecting the rights of growing minorities?
- While nearly fifty percent of all migrants today are women, most migration-related policies and regulations have not adapted to this new reality. What are the implications for migrant women, for governments, for international and non-governmental organisations? How can gender issues be factored into migration policy making?
- How do we educate our children to grow up in the context of dynamic social change?

Issues of rights and responsibilities:

- How do we ensure that individual rights are respected regardless of the legal status of the migrant?
- For societies and for individuals how do we balance and reconcile universal rights with citizenship rights? In an era of increasing temporary migration for work, are we faced with the necessity of creating multi-tiered systems of rights and responsibilities?

Third, we need to pursue comprehensive approaches.

Governments over the past decades have tended to focus on isolated elements of migration. For some, labour migration needs have predominated, with a focus on maximizing the flow of remittances home. For others, asylum has been the main concern. Irregular migration and efforts to staunch it have occupied the attention of many governments.

In recent years there has been significant reflection on how to shift from an isolated, uni-sectoral and largely ineffective focus to more meaningful, constructive and comprehensive approaches. 'Comprehensive' means in content, in participation and in perspective. On **content,** it is essential to address each of the **main challenges** of managing migration, as portrayed in the IOM 'Four-Box Chart':

- migration and development;
- facilitated migration;
- migration control; and
- forced migration.

Cross-cutting issues such as the protection of rights, gender, health, public information, research and dialogue are inherent to every area of migration management.

On participation, there is a need to include all significant players.

At the national level, all relevant governmental ministries - such as labour, trade, development, justice and home affairs - need to be involved. The business community, trade unions and civil society are key voices which need to be heard down to grassroots level.

At the international level, organisations dealing with issues such as development, labour, human rights, trade, health, and crime prevention have valuable contributions to make.

On **perspective**, the full migration life-cycle needs to be considered, from pre-departure preparation, to en route facilitation, to integration options, to eventual return.

Fourth, we need to take stock of **existing international norms** and promote their implementation.

While there is no comprehensive international legal instrument governing migration, many norms do exist – in the fields of human rights, refugees, humanitarian action, migrant work and crime control. Many of these are not well-known and most are even less well implemented.

There is a need to consolidate and disseminate existing international norms on migration. IOM is gearing up to do its part.

Fifth, we need to promote dialogue and consultation, especially at the regional level.

From the "Five Plus Five" in the Western Mediterranean, to the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa, to the Colombo Group of Asian labour-sending countries, governments are increasingly coming together at the regional level to share their migration interests and experiences and to search for common approaches to address them. Today some 142 States around the globe participate in various regional consultative processes on migration. Whether in the field of labour migration, irregular migration, counter-trafficking or data sharing, this new spirit of regional cooperation must be encouraged. I believe that the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization could have a useful role in this part of the world, as it bridges between EU and non-EU countries.

Similarly, new strides have been made in the development of global dialogue on migration. IOM's International Dialogue on Migration brings together in IOM's Council more than 130 states and additional partner organizations to share experiences and perspectives and create better understanding and cooperation in the management of migration. The Berne Initiative, a consultative, inter-governmental process meant to develop a non-binding policy framework for the management of migration, shows promise.

Sixth, we need to engage and manage the public debate.

Discussion of migration today is too often fed by misperceptions, ignorance and fear. We all need to work hard to ensure that the debate is better informed, more rational and less prone to superficial analysis. More effective efforts are needed to combat xenophobia and racism. Migrants must not become the scapegoats of global social change in the 21st century. The time has come to change the public discourse on migration and rid it of some of its enduring but unsubstantiated stereotypes.


Fortunately, public attention of a more positive nature is now increasingly common. The recent creation of a Global Commission on International Migration should serve to raise awareness of migration and of its positive potential. The report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization has a useful chapter on migration. Other examples abound.

Conclusion

I have quickly reviewed the major challenges facing attempts to construct a more rational, effective and humane international order for migration management. Much more needs to be said about each of the seven points. The heart of the matter, for me, is this – the realization that opportunities for win-win approaches to migration will only open up once we recognize migration as a natural and potentially beneficial phenomenon – both for migrants and societies. Once we have seized on the idea that migration is here to stay, we can move ahead with the long, difficult but rewarding job of **managing migration for the benefit of all.**



MANAGING MIGRATION



by Ambassador Murat Sungar Secretary General for European Union Affairs

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me start by thanking the organizers for this timely conference on population challenges and migration. It seems that for some in Europe, this is one of the most difficult and controversial aspect of Turkish-EU relations.

As we are passing through a crucial stage in this relationship, the impact of Turkey's membership on the EU is becoming an important agenda item, coupled with emerging myths, fears and prejudices. I think this conference provides a unique opportunity to elaborate such issues in a rational and methodical manner.

It is interesting to observe that a lively, and sometimes fierce debates on Turkey's accession to the EU are taking place both in Turkey and Europe. Many arguments have been raised in favour or against, ranging from Turkey's size and population to the threat of immigration, from the strategic importance of Turkey to its contibution to the Union's foreign and security policy.

It is generally agreed that Turkey's membership would have considerable implications on the EU and on Turkey itself. In these debates, some arguments reflect genuine challenges, while some are of an emotional and exaggerated nature. I think many doubts and fears about Turkey are based on inaccurate assumptions or lack of sufficient information. I therefore believe that these debates are useful, necessary and timely to be able to make an objective assessment as to what Turkish accession would really mean. They also help people to familiarize themselves with the process and overcome the misunderstandings and prejudices.

Turkey is now on the eve of beginning accession negotiations with the EU after more

than four decades of association. In the course of the history of Turkish-EU relations, we see ups and downs as well as prejudices and doubts on both sides. Yet, the perspective of membership has never been lost.

If the decision to open accession negotiations is taken in December, it will represent the beginning of a new phase in our relations. Contrary to the prevailing perception in some quarters in Europe, this would not mean immediate membership. This is a crucial point in considering the impact of Turkish accession on the EU.

As you might know, a comprehensive reform process has been launched in Turkey which has also culminated in an evolution over the last years. This irreversible reform process has resulted in far-reaching and unprecedented changes to the Turkish political and legal system, which has at the same time aimed at complying with the political criteria, a precondition for the opening of accession talks.

It has been questioned by many in Europe whether Turkey would ever be able to meet the political criteria. As the reform process has acquired a significant momentum with tangible results, the skeptics are now turning to other themes, such as geography and culture. They seem to forget that all these arguments were ruled out of court when Turkey's eligibility for membership was explicitly confirmed on many occasions by the EU.

Turkey's population and possibility of Turkish migration flow into the EU still seems to be a top agenda item for certain quarters in the EU. It has been claimed that Turkey's population would be a burden on the EU and that the EU would face the risk of a mass flow of Turkish immigrants, should accession takes place. Indeed, the same fear of immigration was raised against those countries with developing economies when they joined the EC, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Such fears did not come true, and no enlargement has ever resulted in a big wave of migration into the existing member states.

But in the case of Turkey some in Europe still seem to persist their negative views on the impact of Turkey's population and try to put pressure on their respective governments.

In fact, this is perhaps one of the reasons why the Commision, in its rec ommendations which was published last week, introduced a new approach which envisages the consideration of a permenant safeguard clause to avoid "serious disturbances on the EU Labor Market".

Our reaction to that can be seen in our official statement which was declared on the same day. In that statement it was indicated that Turkey is subjected to some procedures which differ from those of other candidates as well as from past practices. Obviously, this was the expression of a disappointment with regard to the proposals of adopting different criteria and methods for Turkey.

It is becoming quite clear that Turkey should not be portrayed as a country with a big population growth rate. It is estimated that our population growth rate will steadily decline in the coming two decades and the total fertility rate, which stands at 2.2 at present, will also decrease further. Namely, Turkey's population which is already over 65 million, is estimated to reach 80 to 85 million in next 20 years, and stabilise at that level. As far as the movement of population is concerned, some recent studies show that the rate of emmigration to the EU from Turkey could be considerably less, if Turkey, with a high economic growth rate, would become a member in 2015. I would think such views and predictions perhaps be eloberated during the course of this conference,

On the other hand, one should keep in mind that the EU faces the risk of being confronted with economic and social problems in the coming decades as a consequence of its declining and ageing population.

Many seem to underrate the fact that, with its population and its increasing purchasing power, Turkey is a big market for the EU which will help strengthen the European economy in the coming decades. Furthermore, Turkey's young, well-trained and qualified work force might well be an asset for the EU to sustain its economic development and social welfare.

From the population point of view, the implications of Turkey's membership on the functioning of EU institutions constitute another source of anxiety in some European circles. However, it is misleading to argue that Turkey will alone effect the decision-making mechanisms of the EU.

As acknowledged in the Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, which was made public last month, "the new constitutional treaty's double majority system strikes a fine balance between the principle of equality of member states and the recognition of their different demographic weight . And the continuation of the consensus principle in important areas of EU action, diminishes the relevance of the population size of member states for the Union's decision-making process. As to the European Parliament, Turkey's large representation would be much reduced by the fact that voting in the Parliament normally follows party lines rather than the national

positions of member states."

As Turkey's economy grows and the living standards further improve, the probability of immigration can be expected to decline further. On the other hand, the need for Turkish work force - and this time for skilled work force and better educated peoplemight well emerge once again to fill in the gap as in the past as a result of the demographic developments in Europe. It is widely accepted that this could constitute a positive impact of Turkish accession rather than being a burden.

Another issue with which both EU and Turkey are confronted is illegal migration. The world-wide increase in illegal migration has prompted the origin, transit and destination countries to take counter measures. It is no longer a problem which any given country can tackle on its own. Measures need to be developed in a cooperative manner. That is why, fight against illegal migration is an important area of cooperation between Turkey and the EU. Turkey is indeed aligning its legislation and practices in this area with those of the EU in accordance with its National Programme. In this respect, the capacity of the public administration is being improved to develop effective border management, steps are being taken to align the visa legislation with the EU acquis, work is ongoing to adopt and implement the acquis and best practices on migration, including the signing of readmission agreements with countries of origin, with a view to preventing illigal immigration. Furthermore, the negotiation of a readmission agreement with the EU is expected to start soon. I must add that these developments are reflected rather accurately in the progress report of October 6.

In conclusion, Turkey, as a candidate state destined to join the EU on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate states, must be treated in a fair and objective manner without being discriminated against. There is no doubt that Turkish accession would have considerable implications for the EU. However, I am confident that, as was the case in previous enlargement rounds, the EU is capable of coping with challenges for achieving the historical project of European integration.

Thank you.

by Halim Mete TOBB Repesentative

I would like to congratulate the Turkish Family Health and Planning for the organization of this well-timed conference on population, international emigration, and reproductive health as part of the relations between Turkey and Europe.

Before I begin my talk I would like us to remember our gratitude to the late Vehbi Koc, who was the founder of the Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation, as well as one of the leading authorities of the business world.

Esteemed guests, the European Commission has completed a very detailed evaluation of the stage reached in respect of Turkey satisfying the political criteria which was requested by the heads of governments of the European Union of at the Copenhagen Summit in 2002. The result of this evaluation clearly indicates that the strategy implemented prior to the accession has been successful. On October 6th, with the publication of the progress report by the European Commission, a historic stage has started in Turkish and European Union relationship. In the report it has been established that Turkey has completed the political criteria, except for certain legislative arrangements that need to be made, and recommendation has been made to the European Council to start accession negotiations with Turkey. In the Impact Evaluation Report prepared by the European Commission in which the probable effects of Turkey's membership, in spite of its implication of some problems, offers important opportunities for both sides.

In the European Commission's Strategy Document there are suggestions for bringing in some limitations to the free movement of labor force, even after Turkey's membership is realized. In effect these proposals are contrary to European Union rules and have no chance of implementation in the long term. I take this opportunity to remind everyone once again how important it has been to organize this conference. The European Union is experiencing certain internal economic and social problems. Unemployment and incapacity to create new jobs, the crisis of the social security systems, and most important of all, the gradual aging of the population are among the top structural problems which the European Union is trying to resolve. In a survey prepared by the Brookings Institute, which is one of the leading think tank organizations of the USA, the ratio of the middle aged group within the total population is expected to rise slightly to become 35.4 % in the year 2050, while this ratio for the EU currently is 37.7 % and expected to rise to 52.3 %.

Therefore, during a period when competition is expected to become more fierce, Europe is becoming an aging continent compared to the vibrant economies of the USA, China and Asia. On the other hand, in another survey conducted by a research institute in France, it is being put forward that the current share of 22 % for the European economy within the world economy shall drop to 11 % by 2050. Leaving aside the political and geostrategic arguments, it is quite clear that Turkey shall make serious contribution to the European economy. Nevertheless, Turkey's contribution shall be directly related to the educational opportunities that she will be able to provide to her young population, as well as the capacity to raise the level of her skilled labor force. The utilization of the advantage of our young population can only be realized by possession of a skilled labor force which can respond to the needs of modern age and which could be employed anywhere around the world.

I want to touch briefly on a report published during the first half of this year by the Foundation for Betterment of Labor and Living Conditions based in Dublin. A survey has been conducted in 2002 with those 15 year old and over at 13 candidate countries, among which Turkey was also included. The survey has tried to determine the emigration tendencies of the ones surveyed to the EU member countries. Within the survey the emigration tendency to the EU member countries has been graded ion a rising scale of intensity; namely, those who generally show the intension to emigrate, those who seriously think of emigrating, and those who have definitely decided to emigrate. According to the survey results, Turkish citizens who definitely intend to emigrate have the lowest ratios of 0.6 % among the 13 countries. This ratio is 2 % for Bulgaria and Romania, while it is 1 % for Poland. The survey results have further indicated that those who have emigration intention are generally from the better educated groups. Therefore, emigration tendency is not a risk for the EU countries, and on the contrary, it is a phenomenon that would contribute to the labor force market. The emigration tendency for the source countries, however, carries a real risk for brain drain. In other words, Turkey is face to face with brain drain danger.

At this point of my talk I would like to touch upon the developments until the month of December with respect to Turkish and EU relations. Firstly, I would like to express that it was very odd to observe certain comments in the European Commission report which insinuated that the accession negotiations may not result in full membership. At this very important juncture for the Turkish and EU relations and which extend back into history, we would have expected a clear and net expression of determination for the future. We request from the member countries that this expression which carries serious risks from the point of view of Turkish public opinion shall be changed. Furthermore, the present positive atmosphere must certainly be well utilized in order to assure an affirmative decision in December. The Government and the members of Parliament should avoid wasting time on secondary and unimportant issues, and concentrate their energies to sustain the reform process. All eyes shall be on Turkey until the month of December, thus there is a need for highly careful pronunciations more than ever. The period of negotiations shall be a very difficult process. Our Government is putting together a large team in order to overcome this difficult process successfully. With the start of the negotiations, the discussion shall not be conducted within an economic framework only, but politics at sectoral basis shall now be determined. In this situation our sectors will have to be in direct contact with the negotiators. The adaptation of the Turkish business world to the EU competition environment has a critical importance for the success of this process. Consequently, the Union of Turkish Chambers and Exchanges (TOBB) is aiming to establish a basis for direct cooperation Our discussion with the EU Commission along this objective are with the EU. continuing. With this purpose in mind we are implementing a project for internal restructuring, and through our sectoral committees, we are working on a mechanism for the representations of our sectors in Brussels. I would like to reiterate that as the Union of Turkish Chambers and Exchanges (TOBB), we would try to give support to the realization of this important target of Turkey through our projects which we will offer to our members and to public at this stage of the relations between Turkey and the EU, and that we shall continue to encourage our governments' efforts as we have done until now.

On behalf of TOBB and myself, I would like to express our gratitude to Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation for this very successful conference organization.

POPULATION AND

REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH

The Population of Turkey at the Turn of the XXI. Century: Past Trends, Current Situation and Future Prospects

by A. Hancıoğlu, B. Akadlı Ergöçmen, T. Ünalan


Turkey's population underwent substantial changes in its demographic structure in the 20th century. Demographic trends, particularly in the recent decades, and causes and consequences of these trends have brought population issues to the fore of public and intellectual interest. The current demographic profile of the country and the future prospects of the population necessitate radical changes in our thinking. The popular discourses of rapid population growth and high fertility are now defunct conceptual instruments to a large extent, with the exception of smaller sub-populations which appear to have resisted change.

Past and Present

We begin with a simplified account of demographic trends during the 20th century. Solid lines in Figures 1 and 2 show trends in major demographic parameters. Turkey was experiencing a pre-transitional demographic regime at the time of establishment of the Republic in the early 1920s. The total population stood at a mere 13 million, slightly above today's population of Istanbul. High birth and death rates prevailed; as a consequence of this balance at high levels, population growth rates were relatively low. In the 1930s, a newborn would expect to live only about 30 years. Some 25 percent of births did not survive to age 1, and an average woman was expected to give birth to almost 7 children.

Until the 1940s, rates of population growth in Turkey remained below 2 percent per annum; high crude birth and death rates prevailed until this period. Fertility rates, at first resistant to change, finally declined at a quite rapid pace mainly due to changes in marriage patterns; survival probabilities improved, and population growth reached high levels, especially in the 1950s. Rapid declines in fertility in the 1970s are particularly notable. The highest population growth rate was experienced during the 1955-1960 period, at 2.85 percent per annum.

The Turkish population has now almost reached the end of its first demographic transition. Standing at a total size of around 72 million, the population of the country enjoys a life expectancy of 70 years; infant mortality rate is 29 per thousand births and women give birth, on the average, to 2.2 children in the reproductive lifetime (Turkey Demographic and Health Survey, 2003)¹. Rapid changes in fertility and mortality appear to have lead to a rapid decline in population growth rates especially during the last quarter of the century. The annual population growth rate is currently estimated as 1.5 percent. Estimates for the crude birth and death rate are, 20 and 6 respectively. Turkey is now more urbanized, people are living longer, population growth rate has slowed down and half of the population is below age 25 (Table 1).



Last Quarter of the XX. Century

We have more detailed data on demographic trends for the last quarter of the XX. Century, thanks to Demographic and Health Surveys. Comparing major demographic

¹ Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 2004, Turkey Demographic and Health Survey, 2003. Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, Ministry of Health General Directorate of Mother and Child Health and Family Planning, State Planning Organization and European Union. Ankara, Turkey

variables in 1980 with their levels in 2000 reveals the speed of change in Turkey. During this time, where the total population increased from 44 to 67 million, vital rates appear to have been cut down by a third, in some cases halved. The total fertility rate almost halved, while the proportion of population living in urban areas doubled; the proportion of contraceptive users doubled too. With an incredible decline, the infant mortality rate declined from 91 to 29 per thousand (Table 1).

	1980	2000	Percent Change
Population (1000)	44737	67420	50.7
Population Growth Rate (%o)	22.8	14.9	-34.6
Crude Birth Rate (%)	30.8	19.6	-36.4
Crude Death Rate (%)	9.0	6.3	-30.0
Total Fertility Rate	4.1	2.2	-46.3
Life Expectancy at Birth	59.0	70.4	19.3
Infant Mortality Rate (%o)	91	29	-68.1
Population Urban (%)	43.9	64.9	47.8
Median Age	20.3	25.3	24.5
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (%)	44.5	67.5	51.6
Total Induced Abortion Rate	0.73	0.51	-29.7

Table 1. Trends in demographic indicators: 1980-2000


Changes in demographic rates during the last 20-25 years have not been uniform. Particularly noteworthy is the 1993-1998 period, when levels of contraceptive use and fertility remained largely at the same level, while although mortality declined, the decline was not shared by all sectors of the population (Turkey Demographic Health Survey,1998)²

What is striking about the last few decades is that the demographic behavior of the Turkish population changed so much that a completely new set of meanings can be attributed to current levels. For instance, below-replacement level fertility is now a reality for most of the population; infant mortality rates have declined to low levels; neonatal rates now exceed post-neonatal rates, the shape of the age-specific fertility curve is no longer with an easily distinguishable peak at age 20-24.


During the last two decades of the 20th century, life expectancy of the population steadily improved and life expectancies at birth reached 67 years for males and 71 for females (Figure 2). Increases in life expectancy during the recent decades have been predominated by improvements in the survival of children, although improvements in survival probabilities of the adult population have also been witnessed. As mentioned

² Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 1999, Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 1998. Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, Measure DHS+ Macro International Inc. Ankara, Turkey.

above, infant and child mortality in Turkey underwent a period of structural transformation in terms of post-neonatal and neonatal mortality. Recent findings show that the survival chances of children have improved further with a 38 percent decline in the last ten years. The estimated infant mortality rate for the most recent period (0-4 years preceding the Turkey Demographic and Health Survey,2003) is 29 per 1000 live births. Most of the births before the first birthday in Turkey occur before completing the first month of life (59 percent of infant deaths). The pattern where neonatal mortality rates exceed post-neonatal rates continues to prevail since early 1990s. (Figure 3)



Profound changes in the age composition of the population taking place with the interaction of demographic processes are reflected in the population pyramids in Figure 4. The age composition of the population in the first half of the 20th century presents the classic picture of a rapidly growing high-fertility high-mortality society; transition from a high fertility and high mortality setting to a declining fertility and mortality situation by the year 2000 caused a radical change in the age structure with the constricted base for the youngest cohorts indicating rapid fertility decline and placing 15-24 ages as the biggest age cohorts in numbers.



Rapid migratory movements have accompanied, reinforced and were influenced by rapid changes in vital rates. A largely agricultural population in the early 20th century has now been transformed into a population where almost three-quarters of the population live in urban areas, although the character of urban areas also changed in the process. In urban localities, irregular housing predominate, irreversible problems in pollution, traffic, public hygiene continue to mark the lifestyles of the urban population.

Turkey was known as a migrant sending country; since the beginning of the 1960s, and especially in the 1970s, hundreds of thousands of migrants moved from Turkey to foreign countries, particularly to West Europe. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, labour migration was replaced by family unification and refugee movements. Nevertheless, it is now estimated that some 4 million Turks live outside Turkey.

During the last two decades, the main character of the Turkish population changed, in that Turkey has now become not a migrant sending country, but a sending and receiving one, with the new movements such as temporary and step migration, transit migration, refugee movements, asylum-seeking, and various types of illegal migratory movements.

The demographic history of Turkey has been one of mobility, particularly migration. The high rates of rural to urban migration in the 1950s and 1960s, were followed by equally intense migration in the following 2-3 decades, but as research has shown, not only in the shape of rural to urban migration, but also urban to urban migration. Presently, migration movements are still continuing, perhaps at lower rates but still affecting large portions of the population. Lesser known and quantified aspects of mobility – residential mobility, are now also better known, with the inclusion of a series of questions on mobility in the recent DHS. Results have shown the high mobility of the population age 5 and over appear to have moved, either within the same locality or between localities. A fifth of the population of Turkey appears to have moved house within the same locality, a phenomenon championed by Istanbul and West Anatolia. The same survey also shows that Istanbul is still attracting large numbers of migration, while the Black Sea and Eastern Anatolian regions continue to lose population through migration (Table 2 and Table 3).

Region	Immobile	Mobile		
		Intra Residence	Inter Residence	
lstanbul	58.0	30.5	11.5	
West Marmara	68.6	17.3	14.1	
Aegean	69.8	19.0	11.2	
East Marmara	68.3	19.1	12.6	
West Anatolia	61.4	27.0	11.6	
Mediterranean	69.3	19.4	11.4	
Central Anatolia	72.2	16.4	11.4	
West Black Sea	72.6	16.4	10.9	
East Black Sea	76.1	15.9	8.0	
Northeast Anatolia	76.6	12.5	10.9	
Central East Anatolia	74.9	15.8	9.4	
Southeast Anatolia	73.8	18.6	7.6	
Abroad	36.7	25.7	37.6	
Total	68.3	20.7	11.0	


Table 3. Mobility between 1998-2003 (Percent)

	Inmigration	Outmigration	Net Migration	Crude Migration
lstanbul	10.4	4.7	5.7	15.1
West Marmara	6.6	6.3	0.2	12.9
Aegean	3.8	4.3	-0.5	8.1
East Marmara	6.4	4.9	1.4	11.3
West Anatolia	8.8	6.8	2.0	15.6
Mediterranean	4.6	5.1	-0.5	9.6
Central Anatolia	5.3	8.2	-2.9	13.5
West Black Sea	4.5	9.4	-4.9	13.9
East Black Sea	3.3	6.4	-3.1	9.7
Northeast Anatolia	4.8	5.9	-1.1	10.8
Central East Anatolia	4.4	7.5	-3.1	11.9
Southeast Anatolia	2.9	5.5	-2.6	8.4

Future Prospects

As a consequence of radical changes in vital rates, the age composition of the population transformed from a very young population to a structure with a potential for rapid ageing. The past demographic trends and structure of population did not bring the issue of population ageing to the top of the demographic agenda in Turkey when high fertility and mortality predominated the policy agenda. The proportion of elderly in the population that has never exceeded 5 percent during the 20th century is now faced with a projected rapid increase during the first half of the 21st century (Figure 5). It is projected that the proportion of elderly will reach almost 20 percent by 2050 exceeding the estimated world average which is 16 percent. Within the next 30 years, the number of children age 0-14 will stabilize, the size of the so-called economically productive age group, ages 20-54, will increase rapidly, and almost double; the size of today's elderly, currently 3.6 million, will reach 10 million in 2030 and 15 million in 2050. This emerging new structure call for rethinking since the elderly will soon start to be not only a larger group but also a more demanding pressure group on social and economic life. The rethinking should include new dimensions in population policy and developing new strategies. The demographic window of opportunities, if reflected in economic and social policies, is likely to bring about not only radical changes in development trends, but also in the vital rates and population structure.

Future prospects of the Turkish population point out to the need for new styles of thinking and a new agenda for population studies. Deepening poverty, problems in public funding due to rapid ageing, the family in a below replacement fertility environment, quality of life, especially in large metropolises and remote areas, the ever increasing disparities among regions, will deserve more attention in the forthcoming years.



In this context, the first step should be the alteration of the prevalent intellectual outlook in the country to catch up with these sudden developments. Highly unlikely, since even at slower paces of demographic change, thinking has always lagged behind, sometimes considerably for that matter. Nevertheless, such sudden changes will necessitate new ways of thinking and better monitoring of changes on national as well as at sub-national levels.

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Population Since 1990 New Developments, Old Trends, Uncertain Futures


by D.A. Coleman

Introduction: Turkey and the EU

This paper reviews demographic developments since 1990. It may be helpful to begin by making a very brief comparison of the population characteristics of Turkey in 2001 with those of the 15 countries of the European Union (EU15) in 2001. Some remarkable differences emerge. Population growth in Turkey is four times that of the EU15 countries. Its rate of natural increase – 14.2 per thousand - is 14 times greater and in absolute numbers – over one million per year - it is more than the double the total of the natural increase of all EU15 countries put together. The contrasts may be illustrated best in a diagram. Figure 1 shows the value of several demographic parameters for Turkey, compared to the EU15 average values set at 1.0. If Turkey had the same average characteristics as those of other EU countries all the blue bars in the diagram would all be down at the number 1. In fact very few are on the EU average. A few are below : for example expectation of life at birth for men is 9 years lower and for women, eleven years lower, and the proportion of population over age 65 (5.5%) is only onethird of the EU figure. An earlier presentation showed us that will take several decades before Turkey's demographic characteristics converge approximately with those of EU. The differences between the demographic characteristics of Turkey and those of the EU are much greater than those of any previous candidate country.

The demographic situation in the West.

What of the demographic position in the EU countries and their neighbours? Some trends have been inherited from the past; others are new. The postponement of almost everything, of birth, of marriage, of leaving home, with all the consequent deflation of vital rates, continues without much evidence of slowing down. It is well known that this postponement of births, which deflates the total fertility rate, is likely to underestimate final average family size in many countries, although no-one is denying that fertility




is low. There seems to be no end in sight yet for the increase of expectation of life at birth. Death rates even in old age continue to fall; some optimists even speak of an average expectation of life at birth 100 years or more (if that is optimism). Population ageing is an absolutely inevitable consequence of the maintenance of these low vital rates, not just for Europe but also, eventually, for the whole world. Indeed some forecasts suggest that the entire global population may start to decline by around 2070. As a consequence of changes in living arrangements and marital behaviour, families and households are move diverse than ever before; a trend which perhaps has not yet touched the Turkish population. All European countries are experiencing pressure from immigration.

Forecasting the future is always difficult, never more so than today because Europe is moving into a unknown world; developing characteristics which no industrial country has ever experienced before. We have the novelty of Eastern Europe emerging from the fifty-year deep freeze of communism into a demographic scene which is still highly unstable and the future of which remains unclear. Their demography in the next few decades is obviously going to be very diverse, with some of the countries of Central Europe regaining some of the similarities with Western Europe from which they were separated half a century ago. Further East, where demographic regimes and political and economic systems were always more distinct, convergence, like reform, is less obvious.

Migration, previously ignored as a major demographic component, has emerged as a prime factor in population change, affecting the size, growth and also ethnic population composition of many industrial countries. Politicians and the media are waking up to the facts of population ageing which demographers have been talking about for a much longer period of time.


The 'second demographic transition'

Let us first consider the revolution in partnership, which has scarcely touched the population of Turkey yet but which is creating radical new patterns in European demography. In some countries marriage is no longer the primary setting for fertility. Furthermore in those countries marriage is becoming very fragile, with at least 40 per cent of marriages ending in divorce by their 25th anniversary. Many couples now live together before marriage, or even without marriage, ignoring marriage




altogether. And thus extra-marital births are becoming normal – up to 60 per cent outside marriage in some Scandinavian countries, whereas in others it is still no more than 10 or 15 percent.. All these characteristics together are described under the heading of the "Second demographic transition", supposedly following the first demographic transition as a consequence of the security given by greater prosperity and universal welfare. Freedom from social pressures enable an educated people to adjust their sexual behaviour and their living arrangements according to their preferences, as opposed to obeying traditional norms, expectations and obligations required by God, by parents or by their peers. Figure 2 shows the total first marriage rate for various European countries; that is to say the average number of first marriages with an average person would expect over a life-time. We can take this as being an approximation to the proportion of people likely ever to marry if those rates continue. In many countries this has fallen to about 60 percent although much variety remains.

This transition is clearly incomplete. Figure 3 shows the different level of popularity of cohabitation in various countries among women aged 20-24 and men aged 25-29. Up to 45 per cent of young women in Denmark in 1996 were living in a union with a partner outside marriage, compared with tiny proportions in Greece. No doubt if Turkish data were available they would show a pattern similar to those of Portugal, Greece, Spain and others which so far have resisted the embrace of the new behaviour.



In contemporary Europe many children are born to cohabiting unions, and in some countries such as the UK, quite often to lone women without partners. In the UK a high proportion of the latter mothers are teenagers. Not surprisingly therefore, great variation also exists in the proportion of births outside marriage: a majority, 500-600 per thousand in some of the Scandinavian countries, but much lower proportions, one in ten or less, in Poland, in Italy, in Spain and elsewhere (Figure 4). According to the advocates of the second demographic transition all countries are trending towards the same destination. Indeed the trends are upwards in most populations. But the final outcome remains to be seen; in a few populations the trends have stopped or even been slightly reversed.

We may ask how coherent is this pattern of supposedly associated behaviour. Some trends do indeed seem to go together: those countries with higher proportions of



births outside marriage also tend to have high divorce rates. Those countries where marriage is in retreat also have high divorce rates. So this appears to be coherent. What is not so coherent is the relationship with fertility. One of the chief characteristics of second demographic transition is claimed to be that birth rates would be become exceptionally low, a casualty of individualistic, more hedonistic attitudes and behaviour that put personal needs first. In practice, however, this seems not to be the case in respect of fertility: the reverse is true: only those countries with large proportions of births outside marriage in Europe have reasonable high birth rates. And these also tend to be societies where cohabitation and divorce have reached high levels. Those countries where births are confined within marriage tend to have very low birth rates.


There are major geographical discontinuities. Some of the countries south of the Alps have been persistently behind-hand adopting these behaviours. Also, so far, it is culturally bound. Muslim populations in Europe for example are relatively untouched by the second demographic transition: proportions of birth outside marriage in the Muslim population in Britain and in the other EU countries are very low. More generally, the question arises as to whether Muslim countries such as Turkey and others will ever eventually adopt this kind of behaviour or not. At present there is little evidence for it. But then that was true in the West up to the 1960s, when marriage was durable, cohabitation rare and births outside marriage infrequent – less than one in twenty in most countries.

Transitions are presumably, by definition, not reversible. However it is important to realise that marriage rates can go up as well as down. The total first marriage rates in Figure 2 are a synthetic indicator of the proportion of women likely ever to marry if current rates are maintained. As marriage is being delayed, they probably under-state the eventual proportions marrying. But interestingly, in a number of countries, marriage rates have been creeping up again, possibly only for technical reasons associated with postponement. Nonetheless the decline may not be as relentless as it would appear. These trends are often presented as a progressive and desirable consequence of the liberation of the human spirit from previous material and social constraints. But it may be asked if they are in fact sustainable at a high level in the long run. To some extent second demographic transition behaviour depends upon high levels of welfare, as some of the lifestyle choices, notably lone parenthood and divorce, typically involve welfare subsidy, including for example the provision of publicly subsidized housing and support payments. These costs of the second demographic transition are likely to grow at the same time as the unavoidable cost of population ageing. Furthermore, at least in the case of the US and the UK, the psychological and social consequences for children brought up in unconventional families are unhelpful; they are more likely to suffer psychological and social disadvantages affecting their education and their subsequent performance as adults.

Space prevents the exploration of the new trends in Eastern and Central Europe since the fall of communism. (Figure 4). These are usually presented s the consequences of the long-delayed diffusion of post-materialist values to those populations, as a retarded second demographic transition. That may be the case with the more affluent sections of those societies but other explanations may be appropriate when looking at what appears to be social breakdown in poor rural and minority groups.

Low fertility and its consequences


Low fertility is causing concern throughout Europe. A country that cannot sustain birth rates at replacement level is clearly headed for population decline and in the very long run for extinction. If its numbers are maintained by immigration, then it will be replaced by a population of different origins from somewhere else. However, it is not correct to talk about the 'decline' of fertility in most European countries. Birth rates are low but are not declining. In some countries, fertility is going up. The 'bottom line' of this discussion is the repeated conclusion, from very many surveys, that most women in Europe state that they would like to have at least 2 children, despite the fact that they are not actually producing two children at present. Figure 5 shows the total fertility trend rates for groups of countries from 1950. They have tended to stabilise, with very few still going down, mostly in Eastern Europe.




Ouite small differences in the absolute level of the total fertility rate are, of course proportionately large. A difference of 0.5 - typically the gap between Southern and NW Europe - make a big differences to the future level of population ageing and population decline: implying an eventual proportion of population aged 65 and over of over 35% in the former case compared with about 25% in the latter. These countries in Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, and some of the Asian industrial countries (Japan and Korea) are heading for what some call 'demographic collapse' unless birth rates can be increase in the future. In other countries, in the English speaking world overseas and in the North West of Europe, although the birth rate is closer to replacement level. In the industrial world, only the United States, New Zealand and a few small countries such as the Irish Republic and Iceland face a future with no population decline at all. The recent example of France is exceptionally interesting, as an example of a recent increase in fertility, shared to a less marked degree by the populations of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. The reasons behind it are not clear; it is not primarily due to the higher fertility of immigrant populations. Some general increase in fertility is predicted for most countries, as a consequence of the recuperation of births in later life by women who had postponed them in their 20s.

If women do produce those two children that keep on saying that they want to have, or near to it, they will do it irrespective whether they are married or not. In Figure 6,

Iceland, Norway, Denmark, France, Finland, Sweden, the UK which have quite high proportions of births outside marriage, have relatively high fertility levels. Those populations that confine most of their births to marriage, mostly in Southern Europe and in Germany, have relatively low levels of fertility and appear to be heading for serious demographic trouble.




Things may change. Previously it was thought to be an iron law that a woman could not easily work outside the home, in a conventional job, and also raise a conventionalsized family. Career or children was the choice. In 1970, that quite clearly true: in those countries where relatively high proportions of women were working the birth rate was very low. This incompatibility with no means gone away, but nonetheless since the 1990s this relationship, considered across countries, has reversed. Figure 7 shows that it is only these countries where women have high levels of workforce participation which also have birth rates closer to replacement. Where few women work, the birth rate is low. Many factors contribute to this. Arrangements for childcare, family subsidies and flexibility in the labour market are important. Perhaps first and foremost are the social and domestic arrangements, and the relations between the sexes, that make it easy for women to share their domestic burdens with their partners. That means that where women behave more like men – in taking their part in the workforce and in public life, men must behave more like women in helping in sharing domestic tasks.




Otherwise women will have two jobs – one outside, and one inside the home and will not have the number of children which they say they want. This 'gender equity' may be crucial. It is not yet characteristic of the Southern European countries, or the Asian industrial countries. Nor does it seem very evident yet in Turkey. For the time being that may not matter from the viewpoint of the birthrate, which is still high. But if women become more emancipated and their workforce participation increases, then men may face a new challenge.

Population ageing, population decline and migration

I move finally to the questions of population ageing and population decline and migration. Migration is now the dominant, and in some cases the only factor of the population growth in many developed countries. France is one of the few exceptions. Given projected levels of population ageing and decline, it has been said that European governments have been mistaken in trying to moderate or minimise the immigration flows from other countries. In the face of future population decline, instead immigration should, perhaps, be welcome . Figure 8 shows the the potential support ratio projected by the UN to 2050. The potential support ratio is the inverse of the aged dependency ratio. It is the number of people of nominal working age (conventionally 15-64 or 20-59) for every person of nominal retirement age (conventionally 65 or 60 and over). At the moment about 4 in Europe, it is projected to be between 2 and 2.5 in the most favoured cases and in others just 1.5 and even lower. Large-scale migration, it is




claimed, is a way to solve the problem. It is true that migration does moderate population ageing somewhat. Immigrants tend to be younger then the average of the population into where they are moving. None the less, to preserve the current level of potential support ratio into the future would require the importation of impossible numbers of immigrants. Figure 9 shows the annual immigration required to maintain the UK Potential support ratio at its current level of 4.2 until the end of the century. On



average over 1 million would be required on average per year increasing to up to 5 million annually by the year 2100. The demographic consequences would be that the UK population would increase to 120 million from its current level of 60 million by 2050 and would reach 310 millions in 2100. That would make the UK by far the biggest population in EU, and three times the projected total for Turkey (94 million). The ultimate absurdity is the case of Korea, where the UN has shown that over 6 billion immigrants would be needed by 2050 to sustain its current PSR. Six billion happens to be the current world population, so we would all have to pack our bags and go there. The effects of birth rate on population ageing are more efficient, but even so, higher fertility cannot 'solve' the problem. To preserve European potential support ratios would need an average family size of 3.5 children, which would generate perpetual population growth of nearly 2% per year. However, a return to replacement fertility would imply a PSR of just under three, and without any population growth in the absence of net immigration. In overcrowded Europe that would be a much more satisfactory and sustainable response. But there is no demographic 'solution' to population ageing; current age-structures are disappearing forever. All that can be done is to moderate it, and to manage it through non-demographic means.

One pressingly urgent 'management' tasks, essential anyway for Europe's prosperity, is to reform the labour market. In some of the EU countries employment rates are very low. In Italy and Spain, only just over half the population of nominal working age is actually employed, or at least in a way that is known to the taxation authorities. Overall the workforce participation rate in EU is about 64 per cent; lower than the any major industrialised block. In some countries retirement is still early and pension replacement rates, mostly based on unfunded pay-as you go state systems, are unsustainably high. Students can spend much of their 20s pretending to study instead of working.

Some level of international migration, in and out, is normal in open societies and can have beneficial effects. However current patterns of immigration are not a solution to Europe's labour force problems – they add little to actual workforce participation levels no matter how much they may increase numbers. Most immigration into Europe in the last few decades ahs not been for purposes of work – over 75% has been for family and other non-labour reasons. Europe has imported not workers but dependants and spouses, many ill-qualified for work and in some cases debarred by their religion from participation in the labour market. Figure 10 shows the purposes of entry of immigrants coming to the Netherlands from Turkey and from Morocco. Turks and Moroccans, among others in Europe, still prefer to imort spouses from their own country rather than marrying Moroccan or Turkish people living already in the Netherlands, or marrying into the local population. That is generating a large, growing



and seemingly permanent immigration stream, which together with other migration streams and the higher fertility of many immigrant populations is changing the ethnic composition of Europe.

Conclusions

A few brief conclusions. For the foreseeable future, demographic diversity rather than convergence seems to be the most likely outcome. Low fertility, partly arising from the postponement of births, is one of the crucial issues. European countries and all populations that become 'modern' face difficult decisions, some more than others. At the family level, fertility sufficient to sustain the population, or at least prevent its rapid decline, may require cultural change as well as improvement in family support and in labour market flexibility. Men may have to behave more like women, if women are determined to behave more like men. Managing population ageing will mean that some cherished privileges; early retirement, generous state pensions, a long student life, will have to go. Europeans should set aside delusions that their responsibility to work, and to reproduce themselves, and to maintain a manageable age-structure, can be done for them by immigrants rather than by their own efforts.

Sources

Most of the data used in this paper are derived from the annual demographic yearbooks

of the Council of Europe. The data on the Netherlands come from the Central Bureau of Statistics, The Hague. The UK population projections are from the Government Actuary's Department and the international population projections are from the United Nations report on 'Replacement migration' and from the UN two-yearly 'World Population Prospects'.

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Population Dynamics and Reproductive Health

by Ayşe Akın

I would like to begin with thanking the "Turkish Family Health and Family Planning Foundation" for organizing this conference and the supporting organizations for sponsoring such an important meeting at such a proper time.

Until last decade, decision makers, health service providers, researchers that is to say the entire health sector have been working mainly on mother and child health. Certainly there were some reasons for that.

Such as;

After the Second World War, international efforts had been focused to decrease mortality, especially infant mortality in the developing countries. In 1960's, an increasing sensitivity about the negative impacts of uncontrolled population growth began to develop in the whole world, mainly in the developing countries. Demographic approach in 1970's left its place to emphasis on health related problems in 1980's and human rights issues in 1990's.

In this process, by means of three major conferences which took place in Bucharest (1974), in Mexico City (1984) and in Cairo (1994) with the participation of experts and representatives of many governmental and non- governmental organizations, it was stated that population and family planning were closely associated with sustainable development.

Reproductive and sexual health was first defined in the Program of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (1994). In Cairo, it was accepted that development is a fundamental and unique human right, and promotion of quality of life for individuals should be the basis of population policies. The necessity of awareness of the interaction between population, environment, resources and development and the inevitability of cooperation of countries against poverty were focused upon.

In Cairo, it was emphasized that the promotion of gender equality and equity, empowerment of women, attention to all forms of violence against women, the rights of women to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality established the fundamental basis of development related programs. This conference also implies that the governments should take actions to attain the highest achievable standard of health services including family planning and reproductive health respecting gender equality. The outcomes of this conference were then emphasized upon in the Fourth World Conference on Women and involved in the Platform for Action. in Beijing in 1995.

Definition of Reproductive Health

WHO defines reproductive health as the state of physical, emotional, mental and social well-being related to sexuality; it is not merely the absence of disease, dysfunction or infirmity.

Reproductive health therefore implies that people are able to have a satisfying safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so.

According to the holistic health approach, as we know, reproductive health concerns every age and sex group and individual growth is influenced by cumulative effect of different factors.

I would like to take a look at the global picture of reproductive health related problems.

- Today the world population has reached to 6.4 billion and it increases by 76 million per year.
- By 2050, the world population will have been increased by 2.5 billion which is equal to the whole world total population in 1950.
- Average number of children in 1960's has decreased to 3.
- However, in spite of all these decreases, population of 10-19 age group is estimated to be 1.2 billion. That means that high fertility rate and its consequences will continue for a period of time.

Many successes were achieved about population-development and reproductive health arena in the decade after ICPD; but there's still much to be done. Because;

- Each year, some eight million of the estimated 210 million women who become pregnant, suffer life-threatening complications related to pregnancy, many experiencing long-term morbidities and disabilities.
- In 2000, an estimated 529 000 women have died during pregnancy and childbirth from largely preventable causes.
- The maternal mortality ratio has not changed substantially over the past decade.
- Regional inequities are extreme, with 99% of these maternal deaths occurring in

developing countries. The lifetime risk of death from maternal causes in sub-Saharan Africa is 1 in 16 and in South-East Asia 1 in 58, compared with 1 in 4000 in industrialized countries.

- More than 50% of women are living in the world's poorest regions.
- Antenatal care is available and widely used in industrialized countries; by contrast, in the late 1990's, almost half of pregnant women in southern Asia and one third in western Asia and sub-Saharan Africa received no antenatal care at all.
- Each year 6 million perinatal deaths occur worldwide.
- More than 120 million couples have an unmet need for safe and effective contraception.
- About 80 million women every year have unintended or unwanted pregnancies.
- Some 45 million unintended pregnancies are terminated each year, an estimated 19 million of which abortions are unsafe.
- Unsafe abortion is an important cause of maternal deaths.
- An estimated 340 million new cases of sexually transmitted bacterial infections, most of which are treatable, occur annually. More than 100 million mostly-curable sexually transmitted infections occur each year in young people aged 15 to 24.
- Five million new HIV infections, 600 000 of which are in infants owing to motherto-child transmission occur annually.
- Despite recent positive trends among young people (especially females) overall about twice as many young women as men are infected with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Sexually transmitted human papilloma virus infection is closely associated with cervical cancer, which is diagnosed in more than 490 000 women and causes 240 000 deaths every year.
- Some 60 to 80 million couples worldwide suffer from infertility.
- These aspects of reproductive and sexual ill-health account for nearly 20% of the global burden of ill-health for women and some 14% for men.
- WHO estimates unsafe sex to be the second most important global risk factor to health.

In this conference, population and migration issues are also going to be discussed. **From population and migration perspective, extent of the problem:**

- Each year, 700 million people migrating internationally worldwide.
- One of every 35 persons is an international migrant.
- It was mentioned that "feminization of poverty" in the world; nowadays we are witnessing "feminization of migration" so that approximately 50% of migrants are women.

Migration fact brings many risks to women and children, such as;

- Sexual abuse, rape.
- Human trade.
- Gender-based violence

- Increase of STI and HIV/AIDS cases among women.
- Inability to access health services.

In summary, reproductive health agenda maintains its importance in "The Global Health Agenda".

Now, I would like to mention the strategies presented at the 57th Assembly of WHO in Geneva, May 2004. Why do such significant problems still exist? What are the barriers and obstacles for progresses?

According to WHO, the challenges are:

- Inequalities and inequities related to gender and
- Adolescents and young people are exposed to risk.
- Inequities related to poverty and access to health services.

And other challenges are:

- Inadequate financial support.
- Inadequate human resources (quality, quantity, distribution).
- Distance from services, lack of transport and, problems related to cost.
- Inadequate number of women as policy maker.
- Low values placed on women's health.
- Failure to access to appropriate technology.
- Lack of health related data, and also inappropriate or non-use of existing data.
- Sometimes laws, policies and regulations may hinder access to services.
- Unnecessary limitation of role of health personnel.

Main objectives of the strategy related to reproductive/sexual health are:

- To accelerate progress toward meeting internationally agreed reproductive health targets and
- To attain the highest achievable standard of reproductive/sexual health for all.

The guiding principle should be "Human Rights".

According to WHO, reproductive/sexual health services have five core aspects:

- Improving antenatal, perinatal, postpartum and newborn care; providing high-quality services for family planning, including infertility services;
- Eliminating unsafe abortion;
- Combating sexually transmitted infections including HIV, reproductive tract infections, cervical cancer and other gynaecological morbidities; and
- Promoting sexual health.

WHO proposes the five key action areas for countries, and is committed to supporting Member States in building and strengthening their capacity to improve reproductive and sexual health.

- Strengthening health systems capacity
- Improving information for priority setting
- Mobilizing political will
- Creating supportive legislative and regulatory frameworks
- Strengthening monitoring, evaluation and accountability

Finally, I would like to mention about the strategic plan of WHO Regional Office on sexual and reproductive health.

In 2001, a study group including myself prepared two strategic documents on this issue. One of these is on the Regional Strategies and the other determines the strategic actions for women's health in European Region.

The objectives of WHO-EURO Regional Strategy Related to Sexual and Reproductive Health:

- To support countries on promoting strategies and service program related to sexual and reproductive health.
- Guarantee the integration of reproductive and sexual health objectives into the health policies and health care reforms of the countries.

Objectives and Goals:

- To ensure access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of individuals' choice.
- Full Implementation of Safe Motherhood Program
- Control of STI/HIV/AIDS
- Prevention of trafficking of women
- Early diagnosis and treatment of breast Ca
- Attention to sexual and reproductive health of adolescents
- Migrants
- Elderly people

There is a large gap between European countries on maternal deaths. WHO's Strategic Framework at the Euro-Regions level

- Carry out necessary actions at the countries' level.
- Carry out necessary actions at the international level.
- Resources (government, private sector, international resources, WHO resources)

Framework for Implementation

- Health system reforms
- Legislative reforms
- Improvement of service quality.
- Sustainability of IEC and advocacy activities.
- Education and training of health personnel

- Gender equity
- Research-Monitoring and evaluation

According to a survey carried out by WHO/EURO, 20 of 52 countries have presently developed a strategy on reproductive health and 6 have asked for support from WHO. It seems that, it will take long for the agenda of sexual and reproductive health to be finished , even in the European Region...

Ayşe Akın

Ayşe Akın is a professor at Hacettepe University Medical School, Public Health Department and Director of Hacettepe University Research and Implementation Center on Women's Issues and Coordinator of the WHO Collaborating Center on RH and Medico-Social Centers of the Hacettepe University. She is also member of the board of the WHO Reproductive Health Committee and has worked for WHO and other international organisations in various capacities. Previously Prof. Dr. Akin was the diroctor general of Mother-Child Health/Family Planning in the Ministery of Health of Turkey. Fertility Regulation in Europe: The Contraception-Abortion Trade Off and Its Health Implications

by John Cleland

Introduction


The purpose of this paper is to analyse patterns of fertility regulation in Europe, with particular attention to the relative reliance on contraceptive methods and induced abortion. The health implications of unsafe abortion are outlined. Throughout the paper the sub-regional classification used by the United Nations (UN) is used in preference to the classification of the World Health Organization. The UN divides Europe into four sub-regions; East, North, South and West. The East sub-region comprises countries of the former Soviet Block: the most popular countries include Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The North sub-region consists of the Baltic States, Demark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The South sub-region comprises the countries bordering the Mediterranean, plus Portugal and the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The West sub-region may be regarded as the heartland of the European Union, containing Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria.

Contraception

Figure 1 summarises the prevalence of contraceptive use among married and cohabiting women, as measured in the most recent surveys, for the four sub-regions, plus Turkey for comparison. Prevalence is highest (about 80%) in North Europe, is around 70% in South and West Europe but lower at about 60% in East Europe and Turkey. Reliance on traditional methods (coitus interruptus and periodic abstinence) is much more common in East Europe and Turkey than elsewhere. Use of such methods is particularly rare in North and West Europe.

Further details of method-mix among contracepting women are shown in Figure 2. Vast differences are apparent. Voluntary sterilisation is an important method only in North Europe. Hormonal methods, predominantly the pill but also including injectables and implants, are dominant in West Europe where they account for well over half of all use. The contribution of hormonals is moderate in North and South Europe but

minor in East Europe and in Turkey, where intra-uterine devices (IUDs) are more commonly used.



Barrier methods (mostly the male condom) have a special public health significance in the era of HIV/AIDS. About 20% of couples in East, North and South Europe report use of these methods but the proportion falls to nearer 10% in West Europe and Turkey. Periodic abstinence is only of importance in East Europe. Coitus interruptus is the most commonly used method in Turkey and accounts for over 25% of contraceptive protection in East and South Europe, but is rarely used in the other sub-regions of Europe.

Table 1 further explores skewness of method-choice by listing countries in which one method accounts for over half of all contraceptive protection. In four countries of

West Europe, the pill is used by over half of all contracepting couples. In Belarus, Moldova, and Estonia, it is the IUD that shows this level of dominance while, in Bosnia/Herzegovina and Albania, coitus interruptus is used by over half of all contracepting couples.

		- Frank - Fran
IUD	Belarus, 1995	58%
	Moldova, 2000	55%
	Estonia,1994	51%
PILL	Germany, 1992	78%
	Netherlands, 1993	62%
	Austria, 1995/6	61%
	Belgium, 1991/2	60%
Withdrawal	Bosnia/Herzegovina, 2000	57%
	Albania, 2000	55%

Table 1. European Countries Where One Method Represents 50%+ of All Contraceptive Use

These huge regional variations and country-specific imbalances in choice of method are intriguing. Clearly, they reflect in part restricted access to the full range of modern methods. This factor is most important in East Europe but it cannot fully account for the observed patterns because the method-mix is extremely unbalanced in rich, highly educated countries such as Germany and Netherlands where access to the full range of methods has been long established. Sociological influences must also be operating. Specifically it appears that, for historical reasons, a particular method gains ascendancy and the "familiar" then becomes the "norm".

The concept of "unmet need" for contraception has been a powerful rhetorical device to support the international family planning movement. It usually refers to the percentage of all married women in the reproductive age span who want no more children or wish to postpone the last birth for at least two years but are using no method of contraception. In many developing countries, the level of unmet need exceeds 20% and thus provides a powerful justification for further investment in family planning services and publicity. Similar estimates, based on sexually active woman, are available for a minority of European countries (Table 2). In most, the level is low (below 10%) but it is higher in Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and is also relatively high in Turkey. It should be noted that this measure takes no account of the number of couples who are dissatisfied with their current method but persist in its use, because of limited access to alternatives or lack of detailed knowledge of alternatives.

		%			%	
East			South			
	Czech Rep.	8.0		Italy	7.4	
	Hungary	4.2		Spain	3.0	
	Moldova	6.7	West			
	Romania	4.5		Belgium	2.1	
	Ukraine	14.9		France	5.7	
North						
	Latvia	10.6	Turkey		10.1	
	Lithuania	12.1	(married women)			

Table 2. Unmet Need for Contraception Among Sexually Active Women

Source: UN 2003

Abortion

Table 3 underscores the point that abortion laws are more liberal in Europe than in other major regions of the world. In the vast majority of European countries access to abortion is unrestricted or available on socio-economic grounds, at least in the first trimester and early second trimester of pregnancy. The exceptions (e.g. Ireland, Poland, Malta) reflect the influence of organised Roman-Catholic opposition.

	Region				
Legal Status	Americas	Central Asia Middle East North Africa	East & SE Asia	Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa
To save woman's life	13	9	8	1	23
Physical health	6	3	3	1	6
Mental health	2	4	4	4	3
Socioeconomic grounds	0	0	3	2	1
Without restriction	4	10	6	28	1

Table 3: Regional Distribution of Countries by Legal Status of Abortion

Source: Rahman et al., 1998

Even when abortion is legal, recording of numbers of terminations may not be complete and there are relatively few countries where abortion trends are considered reliable. Figures 3 and 4 present trend data for two groups of countries where data are considered reasonably reliable. Trends in such countries in West and North Europe are shown in Figure 3. The overall impression is of little systematic change between 1980 and 2000 in the annual number of abortions performed. In three countries, numbers have risen and in the other three they have fallen. A very different picture is present in






Figure 4 for formerly Communist countries. In all seven countries the number of abortions has declined since 1980: in several instances the drop is a steep one, indicating a halving of the number of terminations performed. Declines have not been uniform over the 20 year period. Indeed, in several countries, rates rose in the late 1980s, a time of increasing economic depression and insecurity, before falling. Caution is



needed in interpretation because of the possibility that completeness of reporting has dropped but more detailed evidence is available for Central Asian Republics (which share similarities with the European countries in Figure 4) that real declines have occurred (Westoff 2000; Westoff et al 2002). Interestingly, Turkey has also experienced a fall in abortion rates (Senlet et al. 2001).

Despite the welcome decline in resort to pregnancy terminations, reliance on this method of fertility regulation remains extremely common in many European countries (Figure 5). In the countries of North and West Europe Union, the percentage of recognisable pregnancies that are terminated ranges from 10% in Belgium to 25% in Sweden. In most of the countries of the former Soviet Block, these percentages are much higher and exceed 50% in Romania, Estonia, Belarus and the Russian Federation.



Abortions performed by properly trained practitioners in adequately equipped medical facilities have a very low case-fatality, ranging from 0.1-1.0 deaths per 1000 procedures. By comparison, unsafe abortions (i.e. those performed by untrained people or lacking adequate equipment) are thought to result in a case-fatality of around 4.0 per 1000. The World Health Organization estimates that about half a million unsafe abortions take place in Europe annually. As can be seen in Table 4, 80% of these are estimated to occur in East Europe with most of the rest in South Europe.

The issue of unsafe abortion leads to a consideration of maternal morality, which, of course, includes abortion-related mortality. The most recent estimates indicate a

maternal mortality ratio (that is maternal deaths per 100,000 live births) of 24 for Europe as a whole (WHO, 2004). This figure rises to 64 in the CEE/CIS and the Baltic States. The estimate for Turkey is slightly higher at 70. The contribution of unsafe abortion to maternal deaths is thought to be about 17%, close to the world average.

	Total Number	Abortions per 100 Live-births	Rate per 1000 women aged 15-49
Europe	500,000	7	3
East	400,000	14	5
North	10,000	1	1
South	100,000	7	3
West	(0)	-	-


Table 4. Estimates of Unsafe Abortion c.2000

Source: Ahman & Shah. (2002)


A detailed study in Russian of abortion-related deaths showed that 76% of such deaths took place outside medical institutions and involved late second-trimester terminations (Zhirova et al, 2004). The authors suggest several reasons why women seek illegal and unsafe abortions in a country with liberal abortion laws. These include difficulty in accessing safe services, cost considerations and ignorance. Recent tightening of laws regarding abortion in Russia may only serve the inflate the already serious problem of abortion-related morbidity and mortality.

In view of what might be considered an excessive reliance on abortion in Europe for fertility regulation and more particularly the incidence of unsafe abortion, a reproductive health priority for the region is to promote a shift towards greater reliance on contraception. This shift is not primarily a change from non-use of any method to use among those wishing to avoid pregnancy but a shift from less effective to more effective methods of contraception. Periodic abstinence and withdrawal are intrinsically ineffective methods: in most populations, annual failure rates of 20% or more are recorded. Failure rates for hormonal methods and IUDS are much lower while condom failure rates are intermediate. The link between method-choice and abortion rates is shown clearly in Figures 6 and 7. The higher the use of modern or effective methods, the lower the abortion rate. Conversely, high use of less effective traditional methods is associated with higher abortion rates.


There are encouraging signs that greater use of more effective methods of contraception has started to impact negatively on abortion rates, particularly in East Europe (see Figure 4). In a few countries trend data are available for both contraception and abortion, which further support the view that greater access to effective methods of contraception is reducing reliance on abortion. In Bulgaria and even more strikingly in Hungary, rises in use of modern methods is associated with declines in abortion rates (Figures 8 and 9).




countries with TFR between 1.7 and 2.2 children per woman




is between 1.7 and2.2 children per woman





Turkey has also experienced a decline in abortion rates, though the explanation is more complex than probably the case in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Turkey, three factors appear to have combined to reduce abortion: a declining propensity to abort pregnancies that result from failure of coitus interruptus; more effective use of coitus interruptus; and a shift to more effective methods (Senlet et al. 2001).

The case of Romania is of special importance and carries compelling policy lessons. In 1957 abortions was legalised. Severe restrictions were re-introduced in 1966 in an effort to increase the birth rate, but the law was liberalised again after the collapse of the Ceausescu regime. Trends in abortion and abortion-related mortality are shown in Figure 10. Between 1966 and 1989, most abortion were clandestine and many were unsafe. As a consequence, abortion-related mortality roses sharply, only to decline again after the 1989 liberalisation.



Conclusions

Three major concluding points can be drawn from the evidence presented in this paper. Firstly, and paradoxically, Europe, the lowest fertility region in the world, has an "inferior" birth prevention regime to that found in many developing countries. This "inferiority" refers to: the highly skewed or unbalanced method-mix in many European countries; the continued, though falling, reliance on ineffective methods of contraception; and heavy reliance on induced abortion. Two main reasons may be

identified: historical restrictions on access to modern contraception in the countries of the former Soviet Block and the absence of state-sponsored family planning programmes that have been such a huge influence in Asia, Latin America and Africa.

The second concluding point is that an appreciable problem of unsafe abortion persists in East Europe. The final point derives from the example of Romania and concerns policy. European governments that wish to raise birth rates should resist the temptation to restrict access to abortions. An almost inevitable consequence of doing so would be to increase resort to illegal, unsafe abortion, with grave consequences for the health and survival of women.

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John Cleland

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Previous posts included a long spell with the World Fertility Survey Program. He has written extensively on fertility and childhood mortality. More recent interests include the study of sexual behavior in relation to the AIDS pandemic and women's health.

Women's Health & Reproductive Health Care Within the Framework of the 2003 Population & Health Survey of Turkey

by Arzu Köseli

The 2003 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS-2003) is the eighth national population and health survey conducted every four years in Turkey since 1968. The survey has been realized by the Institute of Population Studies at the Hacettepe University in cooperation with the General Directorate of Mother/Child Health and Family Planning of the Turkish Ministry of Health, and supported by the Turkish Reproductive Health Program, which is being implemented by the State Planning Organization and the Turkish Ministry of Health in conjunction with the European Union. From the point of view of its survey methodology and its contents, the TDHS-2003 is of a quality that can be compared with population surveys conducted in our country earlier or with international population and health surveys. This data has been gathered from interviews carried out with first-time married woman of reproductive ages (15-49) during the field research conducted between December 2003 and May 2004. The basic objectives of TDHS-2003 have been to collect data on fertility, mortality, contraceptive methods, mother and child health, as well as reproductive health.

According to the survey results, 29 % of the Turkish population is under the age of 15. This ratio is higher for the rural areas. The ratio of the elderly within the total population (65 or over) is 6.9 %.

The survey results also indicate that the majority of women (53.7 %) have received five-years primary education, 21.8 % have never gone to school or were unable to complete primary education, while 17 % were high school graduates.

There has been remarkable drops in fertility rates. At the beginning of 1970's the total fertility rate per women was 5 children, and it has dropped to 2.7 in 1993 and then to 2.6 in 1998. According to the results of TDHS-2003, the total fertility rate is 2.23. During the period between the last two surveys, there has been significant drops in the

age-based rates within almost all age groups. The total fertility rate in three of the five demographic regions (the western, the central and the northern Anatolia) is below what is known as the population replacement level of 2.1, near to the renewable level in the southern Anatolia, and 3.65 in the eastern Anatolia. It has been discovered that women with at least high school education have a very low fertility behavior (1.39 live births per women). The total fertility rate is found to be above the average rate for Turkey in the rural areas, in the eastern region and among the uneducated groups.

Three fourths of all deliveries take place at least after 2 years interval from the last delivery. About half of the deliveries occur after 3 years interval from the last delivery. The interval for the middle delivery is 36 months. And this is one year longer than the safe delivery interval. Those living in the rural areas and the uneducated are disadvantaged from the point of view of short delivery interval.

The average age of first delivery of middle child is determined to be 21.8 (?). The period between the first delivery age and the marriage age is 21 months. This illustrates that women get pregnant 12 months after the marriage. It has been identified that the most important variant from the point of view of mother's age at first delivery is education. The first delivery age for women with high school education or above can extend to the average age of 24.5.

According to the TDHS-2003 results, the rate of women who have given birth within the age group of 15-19 years or who have become pregnant to their first child is 7.5 %. The percentage of teen age pregnancy increases with age. Although no definite relationship can be observed between teen age pregnancy and the place of residence, there is a strong relationship between education and teen age pregnancy. The highest rate of teen age pregnancy is in the Aegean Region with 13 %.

According to the results of TDHS-2003, most of the married women who were interviewed (99.7 %) and women who are still married (99.8 %) have heard of modern contraceptive methods. While the pill and intra-uterine devices are the most widely heard methods, the female condom is the least well known.

90 % of women have used a contraceptive method sometime during their lives. In general modern methods (73 %) have been preferred to the traditional methods (70 %).

Currently 71 % of the married women who were interviewed were employing a contraceptive device. Out of these 43 % preferred modern methods. The most

widespread type of modern devices is the intra-uterine devices. Condom takes the second place. The most widespread of the traditional methods is withdrawal method. The data gathered during the survey has indicated that there are variations from the point of view of contraceptive methods depending on the place of residence, the regions, the age of women, the number of surviving children, and the education level of the women.

It has been observed that the basic source for obtaining modern contraceptive methods has been public institutions. The most widely used locations for receiving the preferred method of contraceptive are Health Centers.

Currently 70 % of the married women do not wish to get pregnant again or have performed tube legation and 14 % wish to wait for at least 2 years prior to their next delivery.

One out of every 100 pregnancies result in still birth, while 11 end up as induced abortions and 10 result in miscarriages. 40 % of those who have asked for abortions have declared that they have resorted to this solution only once. Half of aborted pregnancies have been consummated during late withdrawal of an intercourse, while 23 % of aborted pregnancies have occurred while modern contraceptive methods (condom, pill or intra-uterine device) were being used. One third of women have not used any contraceptive method during the month following the miscarriage or abortion, however, traditional methods, with withdrawal being the most common, have been used by those choosing contraceptive methods during this first month. The ratio of those who have chosen a modern method of contraceptive during the month following the results of TDHS-2003, 92 % of family planning requests are being satisfied.

The ratio of those receiving pre-natal care in 1988 was 43 %, and this ratio has increased to 63 % in 1993, to 67.5 % in 1998, and to 75.3 % in 2003. Young mothers and first time pregnant women have a high ratio of receiving pre-natal care.

The ratio of deliveries accomplished with the help of a doctor or a trained midwife/nurse is 82.9 %. The deliveries performed at a health institution is 78 %. The main factors which increase the possibility of the delivery to take place at a health institution have been determined, during the surveys, as the young age of the expecting mother, first or a pre-mature child, and the high education level of the mother.

To sum up, TDHS-2003 results indicate variations in some demographic indicators in

recent years. Compared to the results of earlier survey periods, the figures for infant mortality and total reproductive rates have fallen faster than expected. These examples and similar variations of the survey results need to be carefully analyzed and interpreted.

The correct evaluation of changes that occur in population and health areas would throw light upon reassessment of priorities for health service plans and target groups.

Arzu Köseli

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Reproductive Health Services in Turkey

by İbrahim Açıkalın

The concepts of reproductive health and reproduction rights have begun to be considered in our country following the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994 and within the framework drawn by the World Health organization.

The reproductive health as a definition does not mean only the prevention of sickness and disablement with respect to areas related to functions of reproductive systems and their performance, but also the state of complete well being of individuals from the physical, mental and social angles.

The reproduction rights consist of the free will of couples and individuals to decide in a responsible manner on the number of children to have, on the interval between deliveries, and the timing of deliveries, as well as the chance to be able to reach the highest standards of reproductive health.

Reproductive health means that the people should not have any sickness or disablement in respect to their reproductive system, its functions and its duration, but in addition to this, it entails the people to have satisfactory and safe sexual lives and to possess reproduction capacity and to have the right to decide when and how it should be.

The National Reproductive Health Target

Taking into consideration the groups which can not reach to the services or can not get full service, the integration of life-long reproductive health services within our routine services is being pursued as a strategy. Our attempts to develop reproductive health services which have started with a reproductive health pilot program at four provinces is continuing. Our national target is to provide full capacity reproductive health services as an integral part of general health services, with first step health institution being a priority by the year 2015.

Legal Framework

In Turkey there is a strong legal base for reproductive health services. Article 41 in the Social and Economic Rights Section of the Constitution, under the heading of "Protection of the Family" states:

"Family is the foundation of the Turkish Society.

The State is responsible to take the necessary measures to provide for the comfort, peace of mind and welfare of the family and especially of the mother and the children, and also for the education and application of family planning."

The first family planning law was enacted in Turkey in 1965. The current legislation regulating family planning services became law in 1983. The new measures introduced by this law, which were wide ranging and had a rather liberal approach, can be summarized as follows:

- The termination of pregnancy on demand up to 10 months;
- To give authority to practicing doctors who have received training to apply Menstrual Regulation (MR) under the supervision of a gynecologist;
- To give authority to nurses and midwives who have received training to apply family planning methods;
- Acceptance of surgical sterilization of men and women as a family planning method;
- Special emphasis has been laid on the fact that family planning is a wide and important matter which can not be solely the responsibility of the health sector, and for this purpose, there is a need for cooperation among various sectors which needs to be provided by an Advisory Council.

It is necessary to strengthen the pre-graduation education and continuing professional development of health personnel in the field of reproductive health in order to improve the quality of service.

The priority areas and subjects within the reproductive health have been developed as projects through the cooperation of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the 2001-2005 Third Country Program.

Special Programs

Safe Maternity

The first of the special programs which are of milestone capacity along the process of Reproductive Health Services in Turkey is the "Safe Motherhood" Program.

In this Program the objectives have been the provision of basic requirements of safe maternity such as pre-natal care, clean and safe delivery and post-natal care, care of the newly born infant, and the development of family planning services, as well as increasing of their quality and revival of demand for them in the society.

Safe Motherhood Program has been implemented between 1994 and 1997 in the provinces of Istanbul, Ankara, Adana and Diyarbakir through the financial and technical cooperation of the UNFPA.

As part of the Program, the Safe Motherhood Set of the World Health Organization has been translated into Turkish and adapted as a small book to local conditions to be used for in-service trainings. In principle it has been decided to consider mother and baby as a whole and evaluate and provide health services as such.

18 centers of training have been established in order to carry out in-service training on Safe Maternity Program. Care has been taken to provide practical training hand in hand with clinical services. Basic medical supplies together with training models and equipment have been provided for the training centers, and ultrasound devices have been supplied with the sole purpose of using them for pre-natal care. Provision of iron pills have been made possible for pregnant women from the beginning of second trimester.

Free-standing women health and family planning clinics have been tested as a model. In Istanbul, Ankara and Adana 3 clinics that offer full family planning services, including surgical methods in conjunction with a nearby hospital have been established within the existing Mother/Child Health and Family Planning Centers. The clinic model has been found successful, and its extension has been considered following the completion of the Program.

Joint activities have been organized together with the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and one day meetings have been arranged with muftis and other religious leaders with the purpose of information dissemination and for overcoming doubts.

An important portion of implementations administered as an Umbrella Program have consisted of pilot models applied by the leading four Family Planning NGO's of Turkey. The Turkish Family Planning Association, the Foundation for Development of Human Resources, the Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation, and Public Health Foundation of Hacettepe University have offered public service through training of individuals from different regions of the country.

In the regions where society related work models have been implemented, the increase experienced in demand for services and the rise in accessibility to family planning methods have been evaluated as a success from the point of view of visible rise in the ratio of use of contraceptive methods.

The National Strategy Action Plan for Women Health & Family Planning

The National Strategy Action Plan for Women Health and Family Planning has been prepared during the period from 1994 to 1997, with the participation of all sectoral establishments and experts. The study which was initiated under the title of Maternity Health Strategic Plan has ended up as women health. During the preparation process of the plan, a transformation from "maternity health" expression and approach to "women health" has been experienced.

The National Strategy Action Plan for Women Health and Family Planning consists of six headings which are summarized below. In spite of the overwhelmingly successful participation during the preparation stage of the National Action plan, the implementation and follow-up stages have not been similarly successful.

The Project for Increasing the Quality & Accessibility of Reproductive Health Services

This was implemented as a pilot project between the years of 1997 and 1999 within the four provinces in which the Safe Motherhood Program was carried out.

The health personnel have been familiarized with the reproductive health concept. Safe Motherhoodand family planning subjects have continued to be in the foreground. However, significant advances have not been achieved in respect of the youth, the elderly, the male components of reproductive health, as well as life-long approach to women health.

Importance has been given to in-service training and it has been sustained with training materials, medical supplies and devices.

Republic of Turkey-UNFPA Third Country Program

This Program has been developed through joint efforts with the intention of implementation between 2001 to 2005. As a result of formation of a wide ranging base program for reproductive health, several projects have been developed and implemented.

Project for Strengthening the Management of Reproductive Health

Survey has been conducted in order to discover the need for training at the level of management, as well as to assess the current status of the reproductive health management at the central and the provincial organizations of the Health Ministry.

Training materials for the managers have been developed based on the findings of the surveys. Training will start in 2005 following the evaluation of other resources as well.

Increasing the In-service Training Capacity of Reproductive Health

An evaluation report has been prepared for the in-service training programs related to reproductive health in Turkey in recent years.

The necessary educational skills development trainings have been realized. Training models and tools have been supplied to the training centers.

Integration has been achieved with the training activities of the Reproductive Health Program (TABUS) implemented in cooperation with the European Union.

An important portion of the project resources have been used in initiating and institutionalizing of reproductive health training of young people completing their military service within the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). For this purpose, medical officers of the TSK throughout the country have been trained as trainers. Training material and Bilgi, Eğitim, İletişim(BEİ) material has been developed and distributed. The activities are being perpetuated in cooperation with TSK Medical Corps, General Directorate of Mother/Child Health and Family Planning, Gulhane Military Medical Academy and the UNFPA. At the beginning stages 233 trainers have been trained during the year of 2004, and reproductive health education has been offered to over100,000 privates and noncommissioned officers. It is projected that between 450 to 500,000 people will be trained annually.

Strengthening of Reproductive Health Training of the Assistants

This is a project supported by UNFPA and implemented through the cooperation of the Ministry Health's General Directorate of Mother/Child Health and Family Planning with the Foundation for Development of Human Resources. It has become one of the successful examples of cooperation between Public (Ministry-University) Organizations and the NGO's.

The aim has been to strengthen the reproductive health training in five of the branches directly related to the reproductive health (gynecology, pediatrics, public health, urology, family medicine). At the initial stages an assessment of situation has been made to discover the training needs and management view point, as well as the state of reproductive health education.

During the pilot stage, trainers have been trained from the clinics, and assistants have been educated. The training materials have been developed. The final evaluation report has been completed. Extension and integration to the routine assistants training program stage has been reached.

Up-dating Reproductive Health Strategic Action Plan

It is proposed that the National Action Plan for Women Health and Family Planning shall be up-dated within the contents of reproductive health. The implementation level of the current plan has been determined. The writing of the plan has started, and its completion, publication and announcement conference are being planned by the end of the year 2004.

Development of Reproductive Health Services for the Young

This is one of the important sub-projects of the Third Country Program. Its objective is to provide special reproductive health service for the needs of the young people. As part of this objective, service aimed towards the young has been started at 11 health institutions from among the first level health institutions in which the physical structure and the personal situation are appropriate. To increase the numbers and qualities of these institutions is among our national targets.

International Reproductive Health Training Center

Beginning in 1998, in order to disseminate Turkey's knowledge and accumulated experience in the field of reproductive health with her neighboring countries, training

programs on technical and training material development and communication of reproductive health have been implemented with the contributions from public organizations and universities, under the leadership of the Ministry of Health's General Directorate of Mother/Child Health and Family Planning.

At the outset financial assistance from UNFPA and JICA (?) have been utilized; however, national resources are currently being used to continue the project. Up to the present, training has been provided to 149 participants from 13 different countries at 16 training sessions.

The Reproductive Health Program of Turkey

Under the MEDA program signed between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey in 2001, a total of 60 Million Euro budget, of which 5 Million were national contribution, has been allocated to this project. Essentially it is aimed to give support to the reproductive health services in Turkey.

General Objective: To improve the sexual health and reproductive health (CS/US) of women and youth within the population of Turkey.

Program Objective: To increase the beneficiaries of sexual health and reproductive health (CS/US) services through the support provided to the Ministry of Health organizations and NGOs.

Long Term National Targets Expected from the Program

- 1. To decrease the current maternity mortality ratio of 3/4ths until the year of 2015;
- 2. To decrease the regional differences of reproductive health indicators by 50 % until the year of 2015;
- 3. To bring the ratio of age-based fertility ratio of 60 per 1000 for the age group of 15 to 19 below the ratio of 10 per 1000 until the year of 2015.

The subjects within reproductive health which have priority for Turkish conditions and those areas which have the possibility of intervention within the project duration have been included in the work program.

The Expected Results:

• To increase the Family Planning and CYBE/HIV/AIDS services provision and demand;

- To increase the Sexual Health and Reproductive Health (CS/US) services provision and demand for the young people;
- To strengthen the CS/US training capacity;
- To strengthen the NGO projects in order to contribute to the increasing of demand for the CS/US services.

The Summary of the Fundamental Framework as a Basis for the Planning & Implementation of the Program

- The integration of reproductive health within the performance of health services and to ensure the continuation of the program activities within the context of routine services after the completion of the program;
- To increase the quality of the infrastructure in reproductive health services and in human resources;
- To provide for the sustainability and institutionalizing of the benefits obtained within the context of the program, as well as the institutions that are established and the service models that were implemented, and to start taking necessary measures from the beginning of the program to achieve this;
- The strengthening of the training capacity (for pre-graduation education and for in-service training), and development of training materials;
- The strengthening of the cooperation, solidarity and sharing among the partners;
- To support the projects of NGO's related to the reproductive health and the strengthening of the sectoral development within the NGO's which are active in the field if reproductive health;
- Development, extension, and institutionalizing of reproductive health services aimed towards the young people;
- The strengthening of the reproductive health management;
- To pay careful attention within the general framework of the Program to planning and implementation at the level of the provinces in line with the local priorities, and to secure support for the provincial authorities from the center;
- To provide material, equipment and medical supplies; and,
- The planning, implementation, and monitoring of implementation and evaluation, material development and provision of technical support in all necessary operations of the Program Technical Support Team for its activities at Ministerial and Provincial level programs.

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The Role of NGO's in the Development of Reproductive Health

by Nurcan Müftüoğlu

Reproductive health means not only the freedom from sickness and disability in respect of reproductive system function and duration, but also related to these, the complete well being of an individual from physical, mental, and social aspects. Safe and satisfying sexual life, ability to decide on child ownership in a responsible and conscious manner, availability of effective and safe family planning methods are subjects that comprise reproductive health. However, reproductive health is a concept beyond solely the health dimension and it involves sexuality, fertility, family structure within a historical perspective and duration.

Sexuality and fertility, in the presence of physical, social and economic variants, are defined as part of social sexuality and segregation based on sexuality environment, and they continue to be affected from these perspectives. The definition of sexual rights and the reproductive rights, as well as the framework set for this area are closely related to the point reached by human rights and social status of women. Attainment of contraceptive devices which regularize fertility, safe motherhood services, women's reproductive health services, and the utilization of sexual health services by young people develop parallel with social progress.

NGO's are closely involved with how people live and how they should live. The role and influence of these organizations in transformation process of each country changes according to their levels of institutionalization, their strong features and their social standings. In our country the NGO's are relatively fast developing and becoming prevalent, however, they are still far from meeting the expectations of general public about them. Many NGO's from different fields with activities related to different mission make contributions to the reproductive health area in spite of the fact that they do not work in this field.

Activities assisting the development process, fighting against poverty, strengthening

women and improving health services help the development of reproductive health, while the increasing participation of women in social developments, the betterment of their education and employment rates raise their living standards. The health indicators point to the close relationship between education levels of women and the rates of infant mortality, while the death rates drop significantly as education increases. The legislation which improve human rights and prevalence of their implementation guarantee wider application of reproductive rights. The human rights groups which are formed within the NGO's, the associations and foundations active in the fields of the women movement, poverty, development, education and youth have been working effectively since 1980's. The gains realized in the improvement of legal situation of the organizations, in widening of education, in fighting poverty, in strengthening of women give an indirect but important support to reproductive rights and reproductive health.

Although we are not confronted with a homogenous sector, it is accepted that the NGO's, compared to other sectors, are more creative, flexible and prompt. It is also well known that they serve the public good and are sensitive to society's needs independent of their grass roots connections. In spite of their difficulties in institutionalizing and resource creation, they progress rapidly in building up experience and accumulate knowledge. The organizations actively involved in reproductive health in our country have accomplished many projects within the last 20 to 30 years in spite of their limited numbers and activities. Development of new service models, comprehensive programs in the areas of knowledge, education and communication, extending service to disadvantageous groups, accomplishments in the fields of need assessment and policy formation have helped to increase the demand and availability of services aimed towards sexual health and reproductive health.

Reproductive Health Perspective Following United Nations Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994

While evaluating the activities in this area, the Cairo Conference which brought an entirely new perspective for definition and view point should be taken as a turning point. The International Conference on Population and Development was organized by UNFPA in 1994 in Cairo. 182 countries participated in the Conference and the action plan drafted at the conclusion of the Conference was indicating a new course of action with its principles and objectives. This new paradigm has placed sexual rights and reproductive rights, into the focal point of population politics through underlying gender and women rights. In the light of this perspective depending upon rights, the program based on family planning would be replaced by a more holistic approach, one based on politics and program relying upon reproductive health and reproductive rights.

The approach based on gender, sensitive to equality of women, was evaluating the reproductive needs of women and men as part of their social roles. From the perspective of rights, the youth and the reproductive health conditions and needs of the young people were putting important responsibilities on the governments. One more important area to be underlined was the role played by the NGO's and the importance of cooperation among sectors.

This perspective which was brought in at Cairo in 1994 was insisting on the view that the governments would be unable to meet the reproductive health needs of the society without the participation of the NGO's and cooperation among sectors that include private sector as well as international organizations, was being encouraged in all fields. The joint action platform consisted of development of reproductive health policies, strategy planning, mobilization of resources, extension of services and improvement of their quality and provision of their sustainability.

The activities of the NGO's in this area prior to 1994 were concentrated on two basic subjects, the family planning and the safe motherhood. For the family planning subject, the introduction and the promotion of the concept, the increase of the awareness of the family planning methods and the development of the knowledge on methods, to encourage the use of service were among the activities provided for the public. The law No. 2827 enacted in 1983 and called "Population Planning Act" brought in a considerable liberal framework, and its preparation and enactment process had become a successful period of defence from the NGO's point of view. For the subject of family planning service provision, on the other hand, information and integration of advisory services, standardization of services and information, training of service providers were among the focal points of the program. Among the service models developed for these purposes, campaigns for communication and information, programs for social marketing, community based distribution, family planning training and services at places of work and at factories, training of the trainers for service providers, development of guide books and pamphlets, publication and dissemination of supporting printed materials could be listed. In a similar manner the safe motherhood activities were supported through campaigns of communication and information, community based distribution models, and strengthening of health services.

During the post 1994 period, the NGO's started to integrate the new approach into their missions and strategies within the framework of reproductive health. Their activities were redefined by taking into consideration this new perspective and their capacities were developed to offer services within this framework. This was a time consuming process which started from regeneration of resources and extended to learning new fields. However, it can be said that the NGO's in Turkey were able to complete this new approach at the same time with those in many other developed or developing countries.

The NGO's not only were able to incorporate this approach into their own working processes, but also put in efforts to introduce and demonstrate concepts like reproductive health, reproductive rights, sexual health and sexual rights. From the point of view of public opinion, the regularization of fertility, safe motherhood and sexual health were among the subjects which became current issues frequently. When looked at from the point of view of the Ministry of Health and the related departments of Universities, and even concerned public organizations, it is observed that this terminology and approach is shared very effectively.

The cooperation among sectors and the support given to this cooperation by the participation of international organizations, as well as the platforms at which the public and private sector organizations and NGO's could come together was used not only for joint work programs, but also at the same time for establishing firmly the reproductive health approach.

The establishment of communication networks and other networks among NGO's accelerated after Cairo Conference. It is possible to talk about three groups actively concentrating on reproductive health: The Commission of Women Health (KASAKOM) centred in Ankara, the International AIDS Commission, and the NGO Advocacy Network for Women (KIDOG) centred in Istanbul. These organizations have gathered around a common aim in a flexible manner and without forming a legal identity. These three groups which work towards providing support for priority problem areas in reproductive health and for development of policies have made significant contribution to the field by sharing different experiences and developing joint activities, beyond the simple strength and synergy provided by their coming together.

Post 1994 Activities of NGO's Working in Reproductive Health Field

In this section, without claiming to cover all activities of NGO's working in reproductive health field, especially the programs which have been developed in the light of new approaches after 1994 will be tried to be summarized. No doubt different criteria could be used to evaluate the programs. Many activities on project basis could be said to have moved beyond the original targets defined by each one. Nevertheless, it would be advisable to approach to these activities through two separate variants within the framework of civic society mission. Firstly, to establish the effectiveness and sustainability at the point of developing a model and finding an original approach to the problem; and secondly, to discover how much of what is done can reach to the groups which are outside the social organization, without security, marginalized and disadvantaged. These approaches will be answer not only for satisfying a need, but also for establishing how effectively functional the NGO's would be.

The reproductive health requirements of the adolescents and the youth which have been identifies as a priority target group within the action plan of 1994 is a priority problem area for our country. The reasons behind this are that this group from the quantity wise is a large one and as the future adults their reproductive health condition and behaviour are important, and furthermore, very little research has been carried out in this area. This subject under the title of sexual education has been carried to the public agenda, discussions have started on syllabus development and integration, and training programs and materials have been developed and implemented by NGO's for different groups within the youth. Trainers are being trained and programs aimed toward volunteer teachers training are realized at education faculties. At university level peer education programs are being implemented, and reproductive health services are being added to health services for the university students, even though these are at pilot projects level. Offering health services to the young people is on the agenda of the Ministry of Health, the theoretical and practical aspects of education and service provision are continually being discussed at inter-sectoral meetings and seminars. It is still very early to claim that reproductive health and sexual health education and service provision for the youth has been institutionalized, however, to have started on the road is an important step by itself.

Campaigns for information and communication aimed towards increasing the public's knowledge level are continuing. The sexual health subject is carried to the top of the agenda through sexually transmitted infections, and generally through HIV-AIDS subject. Through web-sites complementing mass communication channels, more comprehensive information and personal advisory services are being offered. Research directed towards sources of knowledge has indicated that in most activities the media has been in the foreground. This source of knowledge, beside being an opportunity, also carries a risk due to segregation and labelling by media, and from time to time, as a result of this unethical conduct of media. For this reason, efforts are continuing to transform journalist into more responsible and sensitive agents.

The projects aimed towards sex workers and defined under sexual health title constitute an important effort within the projects aimed at reaching to disadvantaged groups. The gradually increasing sex trade and women trafficking the participation of young girls and even children within the prostitution sector prompt the NGO's to add new problems to their agendas. The organization attempts by groups with different sexual identities and the acceleration of their activities cause this field to be more obvious. Gender hand in hand with sexuality, the increasing questioning of manhood and womanhood roles, and problems created by this in the form of violence ranging from beatings to murders of morality continue to carry this problem area to the agenda of the general public. All these steps turn the sexuality which was carried forth to the agenda of the general public into a complex matter, and for the conservative people and the young whose values and approach in this field are traditional, their need to be better informed is continually increasing.

Safe motherhood and family planning activities are still continuing to be the important objectives of reproductive health approach. Through reproductive health risks entailing self-examination of breasts for early recognition of cancer, activities which include pap smear test and menopause, accessibility to people are being attempted by various models. NGO's with limited capacities in providing services are trying to compensate their deficiencies by services based on society, such as field training, motivation of service utilization, information and advisory services. Although NGO's do not participate in direct service provision, they attempt to standardise services, train the service providers, and raise the standards of service. In order to bring to life an approach based on reproductive health, the service users and service providers are being trained and informed about an area beginning from patient's rights to sexual rights, and training for different groups at various centres is continuing.

The social marketing programs which are widely used in many countries has started to be applied in our country since 1990's for promotion of women health services and family planning methods. These programs are trying to mobilize private sector resources within a social framework and utilize private sector products for different specialist areas from research to marketing. Within a program aimed at increasing the use of modern family planning methods, campaigns to introduce at first the condom, and later contraceptive pills and injections have been carried out. Surveys in respect of each product, from user point of view to user habits, from marketing to pricing where all the market factors are analyzed and problems identified, promotion strategies were established. In a similar manner in the area of provision of women health services the existing conditions were evaluated and applications were put into effect aimed at solving problems. These programs were especially effective in the direction of extension of information on family planning methods and increasing of utilization. Nevertheless, operating with large budgets and dependence on international organizations were important drawbacks from the point of view of the sustainability of the model.

One more area which moved to the top of agenda after Cairo was arrangement of advocacy activities. The target groups for this work were decision mechanisms, leaders

of public opinion, policy makers and politicians. Instead of working on single projects aimed towards need groups, to develop policies for problem solving, to implement these policies, and to transfer resources for these define the area of advocacy which is an important field that overlaps with NGO's missions. In the area of reproductive health starting with the subject of rights, extension of services and raising of standards , sexual education and availability of sexual health service to the young and adolescents, formation of new services for need areas are fields for which strong policies have to be designed. On the other hand, what have been already achieved in these fields are very limited. Advocacy programs on population and development aimed towards parliamentarians have been continuing for some time. Another channel of advocacy activity has been to create awareness in local administrators and media workers through an action plan and to increase publicity with correct sensitivity. Developed by KIDOG, a campaign aiming to make available in a sustained manner the family planning materials offered by public sector forms an exemplar model in this area.

Published in 1998 The National Action Plan for Women Health and Family Planning, under the leadership of the Ministry of Health, was prepared after years of effort put in by representatives of public sector, private sector and the NGO's at the national level. At the time of its preparation this process exemplified a success story for cooperation among sectors, however, same success could not be attained in the implementation of action plan and for integration to institutional activities. At this point it must be underlined that many international organizations are present at our country in order to provide financial and technical support.

International Organisations and Reproductive Health Activities

The financial support provided by international organisations are in a large measure being used by public organizations within the framework of inter-governmental agreements. In spite of the fact that at international platforms the increasing role of NGO's and the need to support them are being underlined. The public organizations receive the major share in this process since 1970's to which the United Nations if also included.

It has been observed that between the years of 1975 to 2000 the Agency for International Development (AID) was the leading organization in the USA from the point of view of both finance and program. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the European Union (EU) are the other actors of the process. From among these organizations JICA and GTZ have had very limited contact with NGO's, but UNFPA and EU have in comparison taken part in the area of NGO-run reproductive health

programs. At the moment besides the EU's Turkish Reproductive Health Program and the UNFPA's Third Country Program' there are no other programs at government level giving support to this area. However, from time to time as a result of individual efforts by NGO's and through relationships that they have established at international platforms, some limited and short duration projects may be realized.

It is difficult to say that during the last 30 years programs by international organizations which have started and especially focused on family planning aspect with a population perspective, and then during the last few years expanded their contents towards reproductive health were discussed enough. Almost all of the programs in this field have been developed by adapting the models for developing countries to our country's conditions. It is necessary to develop lessons for the future by evaluating together many studies entailing health service management, infrastructure construction, training of service providers to end uses.

These programs beyond the transfer of resources, which in fact are not very large when it is observed how limited are public resources to this field, have provided important contributions with respect of information dissemination and learning process. The acquisition of knowledge in this field by the NGO's building up experience and gradually becoming perfect have been realized parallel to this process' and introduced a working model which can not be put to practice on its own. This practice, beyond the development of dialogue among the organizations, has prepared the basis for cooperation.

The NGO's and the Institutional Capacity

The limited number of organisations working on reproductive health field, when evaluated with a variety of NGO's in our country, could be considered relatively more successful from the institutionalizing, sustainability and effectiveness points of view. These organisations, though are limited in numbers, have been employing professionals and there is division of labour among its board of directors and volunteers. However, there are deficiencies in resource generation and financial difficulty is one of the basic obstacles towards institutionalizing.

The weaknesses identified for all the NGO's are being experienced in different degrees by the organisations active in the field of reproductive health. Strategic planning, democratic structure, and human resources management should be developed. As one moves from central organizations to local organizations with grass rots support, the problems of infrastructure and institutionalization increase. Deficiencies in project management, techniques of implementation and evaluation begin to be experienced. The use of short term resources and working with reference to projects is a major weakness of the NGO's. Although the projects offer important opportunities in resource creation, "the project dependence" may hinder becoming a visionary organization. The projects in majority bring together the methods and strategies of resource organization, and may force the organizations which are not clear in their own objectives and are indecisive to different directions.

The NGO's must not fall into a trap by trying to solve all the problems, and they should work as a charitable organization. By identifying the source of the problems, by developing solutions to these, by forming policies, by managing decision mechanisms, and by mobilizing resources, the NGO's must establish their agendas this way. This approach will support cooperation and help them to make firm progress in another weakness of joining forces with others.

Reconciling differences is an unavoidable element of success for the NGO's. In as much as the management and evaluation of the programs, it is necessary to gain expertise in the field of reproductive health. The organization besides permitting its employees to increase their expertise of chosen fields, shall make it possible for the efforts to perform more effectively in various aspects reproductive health and the area of service/education/communication.

The developments in the field of reproductive health are closely related to the social and economic conditions that our country is in, as well as the prevalence and quality of health services. The possibility of NGO's to play an active role in this process depends upon the programs entailing service and education, as much as and may be more onto their ability in sustainability, their efforts of defending influential policies, and on how strong they can be regarding joining forces with others.

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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION



International Migration and Turkey: Changing Trends

by Serim Timur

In the first session of this conference on international migration I will try to provide a brief overview of the main trends in migration and comment on some of the topics of current interest such as family-related migration; gender and international migration; integration and citizenship.

The late twentieth century had been called the "age of migration". Since 1945, and particularly since the 1980s, the volume and scope of international migration have grown rapidly. An important aspect of these migratory movements is that they involve flows both from less developed to developed countries, and between developing countries. Every region of the world and most countries are now areas of either immigration or emigration, and sometimes both (Castles and Miller, 2003).

The current estimate of the number of international migrants is around 175 million. The UN figures show that the global migrant stock (the number of people resident in a place outside their country of birth) grew from 75 million in 1965 to 175 million in 2000. The current estimate is roughly equal to 3 percent of the world's population. In fact altough migration involves only a small proportion of the total population, the process has a disproportionate impact on both the country of origin and that of destination, as well as the people directly involved: the migrant and his or her family.

Over 100 million international migrants (60 percent) live in developed countries where almost one in ten persons is a migrant. Within Europe which historically has been a continent of spatial mobility, stocks of migrants have increased to 31 million in 2000, representing some 7 percent of the total population of the area.¹ (United Nations Population Division 2002).

¹The proportion of migrant stock in selected countries are as follows: 11.2 % in Sweden; 10.6 % in France; 9.9 % in the Netherlands; 9.4 % in Austria; 9.0 % in Germany; 8.6 % in Belgium; 6.8 % in the United Kingdom; 5.7 % in Denmark; 5.0 % in Greece and 2.3 % in Turkey. In traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada and the USA the corresponding figures are 24.6 %, 18.9 % and 12.4 % respectively. (United Nations Population Division, 2002).

Historical Trends

It is important to recall that international migration is not static but a dynamic process with the direction of flows changing through time as new forms of migration evolve, new receiving countries emerge, and as former sending countries become receiving countries.

In the immediate post-war period from 1945-1952, the main trend of migration was emigration from Europe (4.5 million migrants out of a total of 6.3 million), in addition to the movement of large number of refugees. The chief sending countries were the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal.

Within the same period the United States still received the largest number of migrants (1.1 million) but immigration to the United States was not the dominant factor that it had been in the early years of the twentieth century. The other receiving countries were Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa and Israel (Thomas, 1961).

By the second half of the 1950s, the pattern of emigration from the main European countries was reversed, with Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom becoming net importers of labour (Thomas, 1961). There was a remarkable upsurge in the productive capacity of Europe. This increased the propensity of manpower to be absorbed into booming European industries. Until the beginning of 1970s the advanced industrial countries of Europe continued to import substantial numbers of Mediterranean workers to relieve labour bottlenecks.

Latin America, in contrast, experienced a declining inflow of migrants. By 1970s Latin America's role as a receiver of permanent migrants from Europe changed to being a provider of 20 percent of permanent migrants to the US. The signs that Latin America was once a migrant-receiving region have gradually disappeared (Pellegrino, 2000).

Recent Trends

In the mid-1980s there were further shifts in migration flows within Europe, as traditional sending countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece have now become receiving countries. Among these four countries common features are significant enough to allow discerning a Southern European pattern of immigration. Joaquin Arango makes the interesting observation that "They represent a second generation of receiving countries in Europe, following the first constituted by the early-starters of the

northwestern quadrant and preceeding the third that is presently taking shape in Central Europe". The structural characteristics of their labour markets including flexibility of labour markets and the existence of an informal economy, as well as the considerable difficulties they face as far as the control of entries and stays is concerned result in high proportions of immigrants in irregular condition (Arango, 2004).

Following the massive regularization of 690 000 undocumented migrants in 2003, Italy now has 2.6 million immigrants comprising 4.5 percent of the total population. As stated by Enrico Pugliese, laws of regularization seem to be the basic condition of economic integration in Italy as similar operations were carried out in 1986, 1990, 1996, 1998 and 2002 (Pugliese, 2004).

The 1990s saw a new wave of migration, which is much more varied, including new types of migrants, varying from the highly skilled to asylum seekers, to irregular, temporary, and transit migrants. There is also an argument that many of these categories are beginning to blur into each other, so that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between types of migrants.

Flows to, from and through Turkey

In Turkey, since the early 1990s, unexpected new in-flows of migration have emerged. In addition to the increasing number of foreign residents mostly from the Balkan and Caucasian countries, businessmen, European retirees in resort towns of the Southern Turkish Coast, these new population movements include cyclical "shuttle" migration from countries like Ukraine, Romania, Georgia, Moldova and the Russian Federation, transit migratory flows, movements of refugees, asylum seekers and diverse forms of irregular migration (Erder, 2003; Icduygu, 2003; Kirisci, 2002; Erder and Kaska, 2003).

The history of emigration from Turkey is better known. International migratory movements that started during the 1960s as labour migration towards Western Europe, later accompanied by migration through family reunification were followed by temporaray contract migration to the Arab States, and more recently by various forms of business and labour migration towards Eastern European and Central Asian countries (Abadan-Unat 2002; Icduygu, 2003).

As a result, Turkey's position in the international migration scene has changed. Turkey has now become both a country of emigration and immigration. The net change due to international migration is still negative however, with a rate of -0.8 per thousand in 2000. The net migration rates in some other sending countries are much higher such as -5.7 in Georgia, -4.9 in Bulgaria, -2.5 in Moldova, -2.0 in Ukraine, and -3.3 in

Mexico. The receiving countries, on the other hand recorded annual net gains with a rate of 1.6 per thousand for the Western European countries as a whole in 2000. (United Nations Population Division, 2002).

Today, 3.6 million migrants from Turkey live abroad, of whom a large majority are in EU countries. Since the 1990s however, there has been a relative fall in flows from Turkey as a part of the total flows towards OECD countries. In Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark and Finland there is a general trend towards a reduction in the relative share of Turks in immigration flows from 1984 to 2002. An increasing share of flows into the OECD area is taken by the flows originating in Asia, Latin America and Africa (OECD, 2004).

Family-related Migration

Despite the ban on the recruitment of migrant workers following the 1973 oil crisis and the recession, migratory flows from Turkey to Western Europe have continued mostly through family-related migration –accompanying family members and family reunion. Family reunions for most of the first generation migrants were completed by mid-1980s, but migration through family formation and marriages has continued.

A high proportion of these marriages and the prevalence of the so-called "imported brides", in particular among the very young couples, imply the emergence of transnationally arranged marriages. The desire of traditional immigrant parents to marry their offspring to spouses from the homeland instead of, for example, to second and third generation compatriots or others seem to reflect efforts to sustain the values and norms of the patriarchal family system. The observed "transnational family formation" pattern through arranged marriages resembles the marriage pattern of the patriarchal extended families of the 1960s. Among patriarchally extended families it is expected that the choice of a spouse for the son will be made by the parents and economic transactions will accompany marriage. Preferential marriage rules among certain relatives and the patrilocal residence pattern at marriage are means whereby parents are able to control the marriage of their offspring.

In the 1960s less then one-fifth (19 percent) of families in Turkey lived in patriarchally (lineally) extended households with this proportion rising to 25 percent in rural communities (5 percent in the metropolitan areas of Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir) and with variations among geographic regions, with higher proportions by the Black Sea Coast, Central Anatolia and Eastern Turkey (Timur, 1972).

In the last decade family structure and household types in Turkey have changed

considerably towards a higher proportion of nuclear families and much lower proportion of patriarchally extended families, with implications for family formation and marriage patterns.

It is interesting to note that family reunion flows have also continously decreased since 1996 (90.000) and reached approximately 60.000 in 2001 (OECD, 2004).

International Migration and Gender

The number of Turkish women migrants in Western Europe has been increasing since the 1980s. Around half of immigrants from Turkey are women. They slightly outnumber male migrants in countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium (51 percent) whereas the proportion of women migrants is 46 percent in Germany and Switzerland; 45 percent in France (OECD, 2004).

The role of women migrants in the process of integration, in bridging the ethnical boundaries is crucial. They form three main groups:

- Those who usually came through family reunion;
- Daughters and granddaughters -the second and third generation migrants;
- Women arriving for employment purposes, often not accompanied by other family members.

All these groups have been faced to varying degrees with discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, gender and class.

Participation of women in the labour force and in income-generating work is considered as a means for personal empowerment, economic and social independence through which new gender and ethnic identities are constructed.

The labour participation rates of Turkish women migrants are relatively low compared to their male counterparts and to that of all foreign workers. These rates range from 22 percent in Belgium, 25 percent in the United Kingdom and 30 percent in France to 40 percent in Germany, 42 percent in Austria, 45 percent in the Netherlands upto 62 percent in Switzerland where global employment rates are as high as 81 percent for the natives (OECD, 2004).

In a small-scale study carried out in Sweden, Akpinar has shown that waged work has different meanings for immigrant women of different generations and social backgrounds. Employment became a mechanism of alienation for the first generation Turkish women with rural backgrounds who found themselves in an ethnic and gender segregated labour market at the bottom of working life hierarchy. For urban second generation young women who have been better integrated than their mothers, working is perceived as a means for having a better life, to develop job-related skills and to become active citizens (Akpinar, 2003).

Integration and Citizenship

The impact of migration is felt first in the economic sphere and later in social and cultural spheres, through time affecting also national politics and international relations.

Access to citizenship and granting of political rights are crucial factors in facilitating social integration. By the early 1990s, the key problem in Western Europe was how to include immigrants and their descendants as citizens. There seems to be some progress in this direction, as virtually all receiving countries found it necessary to modify their citizenship laws.

Out of 3.7 million immigrants from Turkey in 8 EU countries, 1.3 million have already been granted citizenship. There is considerable variation among countries: the proportion of naturalized immigrants of Turkish nationality range from 26 percent in Denmark, 28 percent in Germany to 62 percent in Sweden and 64 percent in the Netherlands. The proportion of naturalized is 47 percent in France and the United Kingdom; 40 percent in Austria and 39 percent in Belgium (Annex Table 1).

The growth in migration has also been linked to an increase in cultural, ethnic and religious diversity resulting in new forms of belonging, transnational communities and multiple identities (Abadan-Unat, 2002; 2003; Kaya, 2002).

Results of a recent large-scale survey carried out among Euro-Turks in Germany and France, point to the striking generational differences in attitudes towards "Europeanness". First generation migrants in the 1960s and 1970s, developed a discourse revolving around economic issues. The second generation in the 1980s, generated an ideological and political discourse which in fact originated from homeland-related issues. However, the third and fourth generation youngsters, who were born in their country of settlement, have developed a cosmopolitan identity that underlines differences, diversity and citizenship (Kaya, 2004).

All types of migration lead to social and cultural change and integration is a two-way process. In line with the social dynamics of the migratory process, modes of integration of third generation migrants are changing. Policies that will manage diversity are

expected to affect subsequent integration.

Future Research Needs

As a final remark I wish to stress the importance of reliable, comparative research results based on well-designed, cross-cultural projects conducted by international teams of researchers.

There is intensive need for multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary research on diverse aspects of the causes, dynamics and consequences of migration as well as on the interrelations between migration and social and cultural dynamics of EU integration and enlargement processes. In view of the complexity of the processes involved and the need to provide viable policy responses, cross-cultural and comparative research cannot be taken up by a single country or a single discipline. Interdisciplinary cooperation through international research networks is of crucial importance.

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	Total	Turkish nationality	EU naturalized	% EU Naturalized
Germany	2642	1912	730	27.6
France	370	196	174	47.0
Netherlands	270	96	174	64.4
Austria	200	120	80	40.0
Belgium	110	67	43	39.1
UK	70	37	33	47.1
Denmark	53	39	14	26.0
Sweden	37	14	23	62.1

Annex Table 1. Turkish Population in EU Countries (thousands

Source: Eurostat, Federal German Statistics Office, Turkish Studies Center, Essen, 2003; as cited in the Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, p.35.

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Migration from Turkey to Europe: a Debate of the Past, Present, and Future within the Context of Turkey's EU Membership*

by Ahmet İçduygu

As the recommendation from the Commission of the European Communities on October 6, 2004 indicated that the start of accession negotiations with Turkey is highly likely to take place in 2005, Turkey-related migration issues have gained importance on the agenda of the EU-Turkey relations.¹ In fact, this most recent communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament stated that given the presence of studies showing various expected additional migration flows following Turkey's accession, *"long transition periods and a permanent safeguard clause can be considered to avoid serious disturbances on the EU labour market"*. Same communication also stated that *"in the case of free movement of persons permanent safeguards can be considered"*. Consequently, the projected nature of migration from Turkey becomes one of the most important key dimensions of Turkey's EU membership debate. As widely observed, Turkey's EU membership question has been controversial since the beginning. The possible immigration pressure the EU would experience as a result of Turkish membership, and eventual free circulation of labour, is one issue that is consistently brought up within this context.

It is within this context that this essay briefly elaborates the types, magnitude and determinants of migration from Turkey to Europe, and tries to relate the past dynamics of this movement to the prospect of the migration trends. This essay also briefly examines the history of the issue of free movement of labor between Turkey and Europe. It has been now more than 40 years since the start of large-scale emigration from Turkey to Europe. Interestingly, it has also been more than 40 years since the start of the debate on free movement of labour between Turkey and Europe. In that time many changes have taken place in these migratory flows, and the relationship between the European Union and Turkey is quite different from what it was 20 or 30

^{*}I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Basak Baykal for the preparation of this essay.

¹For a detailed discussion of this kind, see for instances, Erzan, R. and Kirisci, K. , "Turkish Immigrants: Their Integration within the EU", Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.3, No.3, Fall 2004, pp. 61-70

years ago. There is no doubt that some parts of these changes have been associated with the long established emigratory flows from the country to Europe.

The growth of migratory movement from Turkey to Europe has been impressive. Starting from a few in late 1961, there were, by the early 2000s, when the population of Turkey itself was some 65 million, over three million Turkish workers and their dependents in Europe, some 100,000 Turkish workers (without dependents – dependents not being allowed in) in Arab countries, some 60,000 settlers in Australia, and nearly 50,000 workers in the CIS countries. Thus, at any one time during these years, approximately six per cent of the Turkish population was abroad.

As it was elaborated elsewhere², the presence of almost three million Turkish people in Western Europe carries the legacy of two successive periods of emigration today: the labor migration period of the 1960s and 1970s, and the post labor migration period of 1980s and 1990s. Three distinctive forms of migration characterize the latter period: a) family renunciation dominated by marriage migration; b) politically motivated migration, firstly because of the military coup of September 1980, and then because of the Kurdish ethnic revival since the mid-1980s; c) clandestine labor migration. It is obvious that the second phase of migratory flows from Turkey is just one of the examples which confirm Rogers' (1985) observation³ that the suspension of the organized immigration of labor in the early 1970s did not curtail all immigration into Western Europe. On the contrary, the numbers coming into Europe have continued: the migration-originated Turkish population in Western Europe has increased by more than 1.3 million in the last one and half decades. Nearly two-thirds of this increase came about through births to Turkish migrant families. But, more significantly, the remaining part of the increase, three-fifths, was due to the stability of ongoing emigration from Turkey. This emigration occurred in a period when most receiving countries had become more selective and restrictive, and had adopted strict selection policies mainly on the basis of family formation and close family ties. In other words, a migration network has developed through the social links between the migrants who are already residing in Europe and their relatives and friends in Turkey. In addition to the established family-oriented migration, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkish emigration accelerated mainly through large numbers of people applying for asylum in Europe.

There is no doubt that one of the most important features of mass migration from Turkey since the early 1960s has been the persistence of the ongoing migratory flows.

²Icduygu, A. "Historical Development of Migration" in Ö. Ayhan, et.al.: Push and Pull Factors of International Migration, Country Report, Turkey, Eurostat, Luxembourg, 2000, pp. 38-49.

³ See Rogers, R. "Western Europe in the 1980s: the end of immigration", in R. Rogers (ed.), Guest come to stay: the effect of European labor migration on sending and receiving countries, Boulder, Westview Press, 1985.

While various economic mechanisms and dynamics of the early period of Turkish emigration are well known, less is known about the nature and characteristics of the recent period. When one pays attention to this recent period, it becomes clear that asylum seeking was the main form of the migration from Turkey to Europe. Partly because of the push of the "Kurdish Question" in Turkey, and partly because of restrictive immigration policies in Europe which do not permit the arrival of labor migrants but do welcome asylum applications, there were more than 600,000 Turkish citizens who sought asylum in Europe in the last two decades. Within this mass influx, although certainly there were some "genuine" asylum applications, there were also "false" asylum applications as asylum often appeared to be the only quick and easy way of migrating to Europe in the climate of "Fortress Europe" policies. In the broadest term, the flows of asylum seekers from Turkey to Europe started in the early 1980s, gathered momentum in the late 1980s and early 1990s, expanded in 1990s, and dramatically decreased in 2000s. Today, the annual average number of citizens from Turkey who seeks asylum in Europe has dropped to less than 20,000, which used to be around 50,000 in 1990s. It seems that not only the democratization process due to the EU-related harmonization program in the country (which has lowered the tension of the Kurdish Question), but also the improvements in the economy of the country reducing the migration pressure in the country have led to a declining trend of the emigratory flows from Turkey. It is estimated that in recent years overall less than 50,000 Turkish citizens arrived in Europe annually for a type of long-term stay, compared to 100,000 arriving in the 1990s – in the three main types of migration: family reunion and marriage migration, asylum seeking, and clandestine labor migration.^{*}

In addition to these declining numbers of new arrivals of emigrants from Turkey to Europe, there is also a relative increase in the number of emigrants who return to Turkey. Mainly due to the aging of the first generation Turkish migrants in Europe, many first generation Turkish migrants have tended to return to Turkey, even if it is not in the form of "permanent return of old migration patterns", but in the form of "floating migrant population of a new transnational setting". Many of these migrants indeed have tended to live six months in Turkey and six months in Europe. It is estimated that annually around 50 thousand Turkish migrants came back home in a form of "return migration", some of them as a part of the movement of floating migrant population.

With over three million, Turkish migrants by far the largest group of third-country nationalist legally residing in today's Europe. Almost one-third of these migrants are now also naturalized citizens of various countries in Europe. Even if one could argue

⁴See Icduygu, A., Turkey and International Migration, SOPEMI Report, Koc University, Istanbul, 2003.

that there would be no mass influx of migrants from Turkey after the country's accession, in the cases of Turkish migrants who are already living in Europe and of some expected additional new migrants to Europe after accession, the issue of free movement of labor for the integration of Turkey into the EU setting would be an matter of concern. In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the issue of free movement of labor in the context of Turkey-EU relations, we should explore the issue within its historical background. The question of what happened and what was discussed in the past concerning the free movement of labor could be seen as a clue for guessing issues of the future.

The notion of free movement of labor has been very integral to the Turkey-EU relations since the beginning. To better understand the fact that the free movement issue has become an important element in Turkey's relation with Europe one should go back to the early $1960s^{\circ}$. Before this, let us very briefly look at the question of why Turkey has turned its face to Europe. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 Turkish policy makers have tried to keep up with the European states and followed a policy of westernization in order to modernize, reorganize Turkish society and its relations with the outside world. Turkey's choice of western alliances was primarily influenced by the cold war atmosphere and the separation of Europe into two blocks. Through this process Turkey applied to all international institutions of the time, among them the Marshall Plan, the OECD, the Council of Europe and NATO. Depending on the economic alliance it created among western European countries, EC was a natural target for the Turkish policy in the way to integration to the west. This was also a good opportunity for Turkey since it was suffering from severe economic and political problems at the time of the post war period. European Community responded to Turkey's application of membership on 31 July, 1959 by adopting a stand over. In September 1963, EC and Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement establishing an Association between Turkey and the Community. According to the Agreement Turkey was supposed to pass three stages, a preparatory stage, a transnational stage and a final stage. The Agreement envisaged membership of Turkey to the Community, at the end of these periods as clearly stated by the 28th article: "As soon as the operation of this agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the treaty establishing the community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community."

Council of Association was established in order to guarantee the implementation and the progressive development of the Association through a certain procedure (Article 6-22-27). Two parties agreed to follow the articles 48-49 and 50 of the EC treaty as

⁵ For a detailed historical perspective on this issue, see Cicekli, B., The Legal Position of Turkish Migrant in the European Union , Karmap, Ankara, 1998.

stated by the 12th Article in order to provide freedom of movement for workers between the Community and Turkey on a progressive level. Article 13 was also binding the EC on the Agreement of the 52nd 56th and 58th Articles for eliminating restrictions on freedom. Similarly Article 14 of the Agreement concerns Articles 55, 56, 58 to 65 on abolishing restrictions on freedom to provide services between the Community and Turkey. An Additional Protocol was negotiated setting a timetable for the regular establishment of free mobility of Turkish workers. EC supported Turkey's commitment to the Customs Union - and reductions in tariffs to the Common Customs Tariff. Article 36 of the Additional Protocol which came into force on January 1, 1973 states: *"Freedom of movement for workers between member states of the community and Turkey shall be secured by progressive stages in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement of Association between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of that Agreement. The Council of Association shall decide on the rules necessary to that end".*

The commission interpreted these texts as follows: (1) Free movement is to be secured by progressive stages between December 1, 1976 (12th year) and November 30, 1986 (22nd year). In other words, Article 12 of the Ankara agreement is to be implemented in full from December 1, 1986. (2) The actual concept of free movement of workers, as part of the Association Agreement, has still to be defined, the parties being guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty of Rome. (3) Implementation of free movement is no way self-executing as it is for the Council of Association to decide on the rules necessary to achieve it.

Meanwhile as the 1970 crises struck the European labor market the Community countries started taking decisions to stop the further employment of foreign workers. Eventually at that time the EC considered Turkey's efforts for the free movement of workers as too conceited. In 1985, Turkey had the right to demand for freedom of movement of its workers depending on the 30th Article of the Agreement. However instead of having this right in the Association Agreement Turkey had it included as part of its membership application. The reason cited often why free movement of workers was not put into practice was mainly because of the concern on the increasing number of Turkish migrants. This also emerged as one of the reasons for European states not to be so keen on Turkey's membership to the EU. European fear about possible migratory flows from Turkey has become especially widespread in the last decade. This fear has once more documented in the recent debates concerning the start of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005. It seems that the debate on the free movement of labour between Turkey and Europe has been very much tied to the direct perceived need of labour market in Europe, as taking a pro-position about it if there is a need for labour there, but having an anti-position toward it if it is considered no need for labour.

In conclusion, it is possible to make two main observations concerning the possible direction of emigratory flows from Turkey to Europe as they are articulated into the European international migratory regimes. First, the preceding discussion leaves very little room for doubt about the existence of substantial levels of declining migration flows in 2000s. Although direct evidence is naturally lacking for the estimation of migratory flows from Turkey after pursuing freedom of movement of labor earliest within two-decade time from now, it is plausible to assume that a declining trends of emigration pressure will exist in the coming years as Turkey will continue to achieve more clear steps towards more democratization and economic restructuring. Some recent figures suggest that Turkey will continue to experience notable reductions in the migration to Europe. Of course, the pace of change will be slower in the context of the failure of social, political and economic improvements in the country that very much depend on the successful steps towards the European integration. Second, even in the case of an opposite scenario in which migration pressure is seen as an ongoing feature of the Turkish population, one should not underestimate the population dynamics of Turkey which could make a contribution to offsetting the aging of EU societies.

As the whole idea of the EU stands as an economic, social, and political project, debate about Turkey's membership to the EU is primarily of a political nature. It is therefore not surprising to see that international migration as always being a highly political issue also becomes an intrinsic part of the debate. However, it seems that if the experience of some of the previous candidate countries such as Portugal, Spain, and Greece is any guide, then the Turkish emigration after the accession and application of free movement would be expected to have similar trend. Not only a clear decline in the emigration flows from the country would be observed, but the country would also experience various flows of immigration from other parts of the world. In fact, this trend is already observable in the last decade, as thousands of migrants arrive in the country mainly from the neighboring countries⁶.

⁶ For a discussion of the immigration to Turkey, see Icduygu, A. Irregular migration in Turkey, IOM Publication, Geneva, 2003.

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Irregular Migration and Turkey

by Sema Erder

If I will define with my own terms "irregular migration" is a response of ordinary people to the globalization process, as it is one of the complex issues to define in international migration literature. Irregularity in migration movements may occur at various stages: during cross border movements either in the sending country or receiving country or both, as well as in the destination country, at stage of entry, during residence or in the course of various economic activities. Thus, irregularity is depending on chance and circumstances of which migrant may drift into and out of. However, a discussion concerning these definitions must begin with the different aspects, dynamics and driving forces of irregular migration.

To begin with we have to notice that, the rising scale of international movement of people can be seen as an indication of globalization. Declining costs of transportation and availability of cheap mass travel have greatly reduced barrier of movement for even lower income groups. Thus, currently the volume, the directions and the composition of cross border movements of people have changed drastically.

On the other hand, due in large part to economic globalization, there has been a marked increase in the "off-shore employment" of unskilled labour, which is radically changing the mechanisms of national labor markets. From a labor perspective, the lack of a multilateral framework on migration is a clear illustration of the imbalance in the current rules of the game. While rights of foreign investment have been increasingly strengthened in the rules of the global economy, those "offshore workers" and "migrant irregular workers" have received far less attention.

Besides, concurrent political collapse and unrest on the one hand, and economic depression on the other, have raised the potential for considerable population displacements in the developing world. In some cases this movement has been temporary and hidden in tourism movements, while in other cases it has involved migration

leading to permanent settlement. Meanwhile, what was once a predominantly South to North flow, now has a significant intra-developing country dimension. However, there is no governance regime in place or in prospect at the international level and this situation enforces irregularity.

Thus, new tendency in cross-border activities, which are defined as "irregular migration", suggest that a full understanding of contemporary migratory processes will not be achieved by relying on existing tools and concepts. On the contrary, their complex, multi-faced nature requires a more interdisciplinary, comparative and perhaps even "global" work and understanding that incorporates a variety of perspectives. In general, fair rules for trade and capital flows need to be complemented by fair rules for cross-border movement of people to eliminate exploitative practices of labour.

As in the case with all international border-crossing movements, irregular migration in Turkey is also a dynamic process shaped by the characteristics of migrants and conditions in receiving society. In other words each migration experience has its own peculiarities.

Since the 1990's Turkey also has had to deal with new population inflows, whose features have been markedly different from former experiences, as other countries in the globe. These inflows have not occurred through the direct choice of Turkey, but rather as the unexpected consequences of various political and economic developments going on at the regional and global level.

Nowadays, Turkey is experiencing new cross border movements, both in and out, due to the new economic and political developments in the region.

After 1960's Turkey officially had considered herself to be a sending country in terms of labour migration flow. It was expected that the remittance incomes would help to fill the gap in the balance of payments and contribute to the stock of foreign exchange. Since than, Turkish international migration legislation and institutions are structured with a limited view of exporting labor. From 1980's on restrictions in labor recruitment and introduction of rigid visa requirements of European countries increased requests for asylum and pseudo tourism flows from Turkey not only to the European countries, but also to the other regions (Abadan-Unat: 1995).

According to the official statistics nearly 3.5 million Turkish citizens are living abroad; 1.2 million of them are "formal workers", the rest classified as either dependents or students. On the other hand, Turkish citizens are becoming more mobile than ever. Each year more than 6 million Turkish citizens are leaving and coming back to the country as "tourists"; some of them may be traders, businessmen or sub-constructors.

More than a half million new passports were issued in 2003, which is also a sign of increasing desire for mobility. As may be easily foreseen, these Turkish citizens are not willing to stay abroad permanently, but leaving country for temporary basis. Currently the cross border movements of Turkish citizens seem to be rather heterogeneous and more voluminous than it was in the 1960's and can no longer be restricted only to the category of exporting labor.

On the other hand, influx of foreign arrivals to Turkey has also started to be more huge and complex, both as political migrants and as temporary arrivals. Until 1990's Turkey had been largely familiar with influx of political migrants having Balkan origin who were willing to settle in Turkey. Furthermore, the recent ethno-political clashes in the overall Eurasian region, e.g., the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasia, Iran, have changed the nature and the volume of the political immigration and refugee movements (Kirişçi: 2001). Even though some of them are considering Turkey as a "waiting room" (İçduygu: 2003), the majority of them is willing to stay and is still staying in Turkey. They are either getting help from communal networks or finding their way in the informal labour market as "irregular migrants".

Meanwhile, as artificial constraints on international mobility have largely disappeared or at least have been drastically reduced, a variety of new population movements have started to occur in the region. The policies that were intended to close the gap in the balance of payments promoted not only labour exporting measures, but also encouraged the tourism activities since 1960's. Thus, the encouragement of an "open border" policy for tourism activities, constructed an unintended basis for "liberal" attitudes toward all kinds of "temporary" foreign arrivals, not only "tourists", but also "irregular migrants". Recent political turmoil in the region, such as collapse of the USSR, and the resulting new border policies of these newly emerging states started a new era in the nature of population flows within the region.

While no research is available, some estimation can be derived indirectly, from different sources. According to the official statistics, (Table: 1) tourism entries from neighboring countries accelerated enormously, which had reached to 4.8 million in year 2003. (Whereas, entries from ex Soviet countries are 2.1 million; from Balkan countries are 2.0 million and 0.7 million from Middle Eastern countries.) On the other hand even though the official policy encourages temporary arrivals, since 1990s there has been a growing tendency to stay for longer periods. Both volume and composition of foreigners with residence permits have radically changed over last decade. (Table: 2) There may be several reasons to explain this tendency to stay longer, such as arrivals for political reasons, to work or to settle for retirement. Composition of foreigners in this category is also heterogeneous; they may either be from neighboring countries or from EU.

The temporary population movements from regional countries seem to be a disguised form of new cross border movements that may be defined as "circular migration" flows. One of the most important circular migration movements is informal trading activity within regional countries. The volume of this trade is considered to be one of the main sources of foreign currency and thus encouraged by the public authorities.

According to the official estimates the informal exporting activities which was exceeding 4.065 million dollars, constitutes more than 10 percent of total export revenues (30.430 million dollars) and is exceeded the workers remittances which is 1.936 million dollars in the year 2003. (Table:3)

As one may easily predict, these trading activities had created a new sub sector within Turkish informal economy, which is producing goods only for this specific market. Moreover these trading activities are generating a new area of employment, reserved just for the members of these groups. Recently, one of the most popular areas of employment for these groups is providing services for these activities, including, translators, saleswomen, receptionists, designers and stylists, to their compatriots.

Meanwhile, it is also possible to find some of these "pseudo tourists" in worker's bazaars, waiting to find job as day laborers in the construction work; as nurses and domestic servants in Turkish middle class households and as sex workers. The extensive and dynamic informal labour market in Turkey; the wage differentials between regional countries and Turkey and the willingness of Turkish employers to employ foreign illegal workers and/or traders all combine to create daily or short term employment possibilities in various industries for these who are willing to work (Erder: 2004).

However, the legal restrictions on the employment of foreigners in Turkey create an environment conducive to deception and racketeering. Moreover, raising xenophobia towards foreign workers and the negative image of women from former socialist countries as coming for prostitution projected through media, further heighten the vulnerability of the women and the possibility of being deceived (Erder and Kaşka: 2003).

In general, the "commuting" between Turkey and their home countries may be seen as the most appropriate survival strategy to cope with the changing economic conditions in their home countries. As these activities are based on formal, but short-term voluntary and transitory entry, the effects and consequences of these movements are structurally different than involuntary or permanent types of migratory movements. Despite their different motives, their common feature is apparent legal entry into Turkey. In general these movements may contribute to the development of economic, social and cultural relations. However, legal restrictions on these activities and employment of foreigners further heighten vulnerability of circular migrants and the possibilities of being deceived and exploited. Any measures taken to combat with irregular migration should not interfere with such beneficial relations.

We should conclude that, international migratory pressures have increased the problems as exploitation of migrant workers has intensified. Steps have to be taken to build a multilateral framework that provides uniform and transparent rules for the new types of cross-border movement of people and balances the interest of both migrants themselves and of countries of origin and destination.

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	1988	%	2003	%
Balkans	708.8	20.3	1.959.5	14.6
Bulgaria	7.5		1.004.5	
Greece	400.1		368.4	
Form. Yug.	286.2		369.7	
Middle East	314.0	9.0	696.9	5.2
Former USSR	4.5	0.1	2.159,3	16.0
Russian F.			1.285.8	
Azerbaijan			193.3	
Georgia			172.9	
Ukraine			227.3	
B+ME+USSR	1.027.4	29.4	4.815.7	35.8
Others	2.470.6	70.6	8.645.7	64.2
TOTAL	3.497.9	100.0	13.461.4	100.

Table 1. Tourist Arrivals in Turkey (000)

Source: Ministry of Interior

Years Other Work Permits	Students TOTAL
1995 53.870 14.314	16.443 84.627
1996 68.198 16.371	21.904 106.473
1997 90.248 21.012	24.654 135.914
1998 99.186 25.808	26.495 151.489
1999 112.814 23.420	25995 162.229
2000 119.275 24.198	24.574 168.047
2001 114.894 22.414	23.946 161.254
2002 113.566 22.556	21.548 157.670
2003 108.743 21.650	21.810 152.203

Table 2. Foreigners Living in Turkey With Residence Permits (1995-2003)

Source: General Directorate for Foreigners, Ministry of Interior.

Table 3. Export, Workers Remittances and Luggage Trade Revenues of Turkey (million US\$)

Years	Export	L Luggage Trade	Workers Remittances
1996	32.067	8.842	3.542
1997	32.110	5.849	4.197
1998	30.662	3.689	5.356
1999	28.842	2.255	4.529
2000	30.721	2.946	4.560
2001	34.347	3.039	2.786
2002	30.430	4.065	1.936

Source: www.hazine.gov.tr/yayinhazineistatistikleri/6-1-Dev.xls. May 2004.

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Population Trends and Implications for Immigration Policies

by Miroslav Macura with Chiara Orefice* and Charlotte Rasmussen**

1. Introduction

Scholars and policy makers increasingly agree that, viewed from a population perspective, Europe is entering a new era. Two examples will suffice to illustrate the point, one emphasising the uncertainty and the other stressing the novelty of the era. The lead article in the Summer 2003 issue of the Population Network Newsletter, POPNET (Vienna Institute of Demography and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2003) states that "Europe is entering demographic *terra incognita*" and that the new phase in the demographic evolution of Europe "is full of uncertainty". The unattributed article goes on to state, "no one [is] able to say exactly how low fertility is likely to fall and how high life expectancy may still go". At the European Population Forum 2004 (Geneva, 12-14 January 2004), Brigita Schmögnerová (2004) spoke of Europe entering a "new demographic regime, a regime not known to Europeans in their recent history". She emphasised the oncoming spread of population decline and the acceleration of population ageing. Speaking of their implications for labour markets and immigration, she noted, "as domestic labour will sooner or later grow scarce, there will be a growing need to rely on foreign workers, who will, only naturally, have their families joining them. In view of this, immigrant populations in many European countries are poised to increase further in absolute and relative terms, rendering Europe increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-racial".

In view of the uncertainty that the POPNET article stresses, the following question is in order: Is Schmögnerová right when asserting that the domestic labour in Europe will become scarce? Also, in response to the possible scarcity will Europe increasingly have to rely on foreign labour and as a result turn increasingly multi-ethnic and multiracial? There is no agreement among scholars and policy makers as to whether these

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developments will take place. Some claim that Europe will not need foreign labour on a larger scale. Others argue that the European Union, in particular as it existed prior to the May 2004 enlargement, will in the short- to medium-run have to rely increasingly on labour immigration. They also argue that in the long run the dependence on foreign labour will become unsustainable and, therefore, a rebound in growth of domestic labour will become a necessity. Which of these two opposing views is likely to be more credible?

This paper seeks to shed light on this question, rather than fully answer it. Dealing with the 15 pre-enlargement EU countries, either as a group or all of them individually is beyond what can be attempted here. Our objective is a more modest one: it is to provide an answer to the question for the four largest EU economies – Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy, which in 2003 together amounted to 71 per cent of the total pre-enlargement EU economy, and for the largest EFTA economy – Switzerland. In particular, while looking for the answer, the paper will provide indications as to the order of magnitude of future required immigration to the five countries under alternative simulation assumptions. It will also consider what the simulation results imply about desirable features of future immigration policies.

The paper consists of four sections. Section one provides an overview of recent trends in and future prospects for fertility, mortality and international migration and their implications for changes in the size in the working age population in Western Europe, particularly in the five countries just referred to. Section two offers a summary of the recent debates within the European intergovernmental organisations and institutions (the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the European Commission and the Council of Europe) on challenges to policy making that recent trends and future prospects of demographic changes across Europe pose. Building on these debates, section three presents and discusses results of the simulations for the five countries. These simulations involve, among other things, different assumptions regarding the future Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employment and fertility changes. The simulations show the implications of these assumptions for the level of required international immigration and the domestic-foreign composition of the population. Lastly, section four considers broad implications for immigration policies deriving from the simulation results.

2. Demographic and employment changes: an overview


2.1. Demographic changes: past and future

Below we will briefly examine relevant aspects of the demographic changes over the past half a century or so. Then, even more briefly, we will consider what the future

may bring with respect to a particular one of these aspects, namely the change in the size of the working-age population.

The stylised description of the last stage of the demographic transition, which suggested a stability of fertility and mortality rates at low levels proved a poor guide to Western Europe's changes in vital rates over the last six to seven decades. The low period fertility rates – often below replacement level – of the Great Depression era were succeeded by a fertility recovery. The baby boom began during the early years of the Second World War in several countries that did not witness military operations on their soil. Practically all other Western European countries joined the baby boom after the war. The end of the unanticipated high post-war fertility ended some two decades after the war. Then in 1965 a universal, and perhaps equally unexpected, steep fertility decline began. Fluctuations of the rates followed, overall dominated by a continued decline. After a lag, the fall of the mean age of childbearing observed during the later part of the baby-boom era was replaced by a sustained increase. In many instances this rise appears to have not yet run its full course.

Even though the five countries considered here shared this broad fertility development, they had at the beginning of the present decade vastly different sub-replacement fertility levels (figure 1) and substantial differences in the mean age of childbearing. For example, in 2003 the French total fertility rate (1.89) was 47 per cent higher than the Italian rate (1.29). The difference between the highest and lowest mean age of childbearing amounted to just over one and a half years.



Mortality trends have also followed a course different from that suggested by the demographic transition theory. Life expectancy at birth of both women and men kept on rising though the beginning of the current decade. Large gains in old age survivorship occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. It is those gains that have made the march of life expectancy to ever-higher levels possible. The five countries that we concentrate on here have fully shared this development. However, the differences between the highest and lowest levels of life expectancy for both women and men basically did not change between 1960 and the early years of this decade. The female-male gap in survivorship also did not see a substantial change during the period.

Outlining the patterns and trends in international migration in Western Europe during the post-war era is exceedingly more difficult than sketching the patterns and trends in fertility and mortality over the period. Salt et al. (2000) provided a succinct, highly informative review of Western European international migrations during the era. These authors distinguished a number of different waves of international migration since the 1950s. During the fifties, which they refer to as a period of liberal immigration, the former colonial powers, (France and the United Kingdom included) received back their nationals. These include nationals who either went to serve in the colonies or were born and raised there. This inflow of nationals in France, for example, stretched into the early 1960s. Also, during the 1950s the need for foreign labour driven by the post-war economic reconstruction resulted in the emigration of workers from all the Western European countries along the northern Mediterranean rim apart from France. These workers went to, among other countries, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, France and, towards the end of the decade, Germany. Then followed the guestworker phase during which the recruitment of "foreign workers became a central plank for continued growth and prosperity in much of north-west Europe". This recruitment also attracted workers from new source countries - Yugoslavia and Turkey. After the economic slowdown, triggered by the early 1970s oil crisis, an end to recruitment ensued. However, this was not accompanied by a policy of forced return; immigration continued but this time of family members and marriage partners.

In the post-war international migration history of Western Europe, closing of a particular channel of immigration, such as labour immigration, often resulted in potential migrants seeking to arrive through other channels. Between 1980 and 1985 applications for asylum in Western Europe kept rising, an increase that was a precursor of later developments. Also, according to Salt *et al.* (2000) in the mid-1980s the labour migration started to recover. At the same time the former recruiting ground along the Mediterranean rim turned into an area that on balance saw more people arriving than leaving. The arrivals included foreigners from the southern and eastern Mediterranean and returning nationals that were now needed by these economies. Also, from the


mid-1980s on, the numbers of asylum seekers kept rising to nearly 4.5 million in 1997. They included *bona fide* as well as bogus asylum seekers, the latter being persons seeking to circumvent increasingly strict entry controls. During this period, Germany experienced a major inflow of Germans *Aussiedler* – 1.87 million during 1988-1994. On top of these developments, the 1990s has appeared to become a decade of irregular migration, a substantial part of which, evidence suggests, is aided by migration traffickers.

Salt *et al.* (2000) concentrated to a considerable degree on immigration. In spite of this, they show how changes in the net balance between immigration and emigration have affected some of the countries, including some of the five we have paid particular attention to. Thus, it is worth briefly examining the changes in the net balance of the five countries since 1960. During much of the period, France, Germany and Switzerland have experienced a positive net balance; in the course of nearly 45 years, there has only been a negative balance in some five to seven years. The United Kingdom has mainly seen net losses due to international migration until the early 1980s. The next two decades recorded annual net gains. Italy turned from a net emigration country into a net immigration nation, however, not overnight. It took two decades for this to happen.

The post-war trends in fertility, mortality and international migration led to a decelerating population growth in the Western European countries. In most of the countries the deceleration, driven by the fertility and mortality trends, was weakened by the positive net international migration. This did not occur in the Mediterranean countries where the deceleration was reinforced by net losses due to international migration. Council of Europe (2003) data show that during 2000-03 all five of our countries recorded a moderate population increase; the growth rates ranged roughly between below 0.3 per cent in Italy and above 0.5 per cent in Switzerland. In two of these countries – Germany and Italy – the growth would have been negative had these countries not experienced a positive net international migration balance. In Switzerland and the United Kingdom the rates of natural increase were barely above zero – in the 0.1 to 0.2 per cent range. Barring large immigration flows into these five countries in the very near future, the population decline of the five is imminent.

Until a few years ago, the change in the size of the working age population, a group of particular interest to us, has, at least in many Western European countries, been following an upward trend. This is documented by the United Nations (2004). The EUROSTAT New Cronos data illustrate the trends for the five countries since 1960, where the trends are expressed in terms of indices where the number of persons aged 15-64 equal to 100 in 2000 (figure 2). The working age populations of Italy and Germany reached their peaks in 1998 and 1994 respectively and have been falling

since. Those of France, Germany and the United Kingdom are still expanding. What paths will they follow in the future?



We now turn to the future and briefly consider possible changes in the working age population as well as in fertility and mortality. The various population projections through 2050, including those prepared by the United Nations and EUROSTAT, point to a continuation of the decline of the working age population in countries where it already began. An onset of decline is expected in the near future in a number of other countries. Needless to say, the projected declines depend in part on the international migration assumptions that the authors of the projections made. Furthermore, from about 2020 on, the projections are also influenced by the fertility assumptions. The baseline EUROSTAT projections, which appear to replicate the recent official projections prepared by the countries themselves, show the continuation of the decline in the size of the working age population for Italy and Germany through 2050. For France, Switzerland and the UK they show a rise through 2010 and a decline thereafter (figure 2). The projected declines for Italy and Germany, which are particularly sizeable, result in a working age population that in 2050 is respectively one-third and one-fifth smaller than the largest size attained in the second half of the 1990s. In the other three countries, the levels projected for 2050 suggest a decline that amounts to between five per cent and 10 per cent of the size in 2000.

Significantly, the decline in Germany rests on the assumption of large positive net international migration. The assumed net gain due to migration falls linearly from 300 thousand persons in 2000 to 200 thousand in 2010 and remains constant at the 200 thousand level thereafter. The total net addition during 2000-50 amounts to 10.7 million. The decline for Italy is grounded in smaller net additions from migration. They rise from 50 thousand in 2000 to 80 thousand in 2010 and then remain at that level through 2050. The total net gain amounts to some 3.9 million, just over one-third of that of Germany. The baseline projections for France and the United Kingdom also assume net immigration. In France it amounts to 50 thousand in 2000 to 70 thousand in 2010 and then stabilises at that level. Regarding the fertility assumptions underlying the baseline projections, depending on the country, they envisage limited if any increase of the total fertility rate over time.

These projections of the numbers of people in the working age are all pointing to declines in the numbers in spite of the assumed net immigration. This begs the following question: Will Western Europe, and in particular the five countries under consideration here, need labour immigration? And if they will require foreign workers, what will be the orders of magnitude of required immigration flows?

The fertility assumptions referred to a moment ago are in line with what appears to be an emerging consensus among students of Europe's populations, namely that fertility in most Western European countries in the foreseeable future will remain by and large unchanged. The countries that have seen major postponements of fertility and/or have the lowest levels may witness some recuperation. However, this recuperation is likely to be limited. On the other hand, as the authors of the United Nations and EROSTAT projections assume, it appears that further gains in survivorship are generally anticipated. Given the fact that improvements in mortality prior to old age have been virtually exhausted, the gains in survivorship are expected to be realised through further declines in old, especially oldest-old mortality. The simulations, which will be presented and discussed later in the paper, will reflect these broad expectations about the future trends in fertility and mortality.

2.2. Recent employment changes

Scholars and policy makers who have addressed the issue agree: in a number of Western European countries there still exists unutilised reserves of labour; in some countries these reserves are anything but large. Coleman (undated) is among those scholars, while scores of European Commission policy makers are among the policy makers in question. As we shall presently see, the European Commission policy makers have made an impact at the highest levels of the EU countries' governments. The consensus on the issue boils down to the following. In a number of countries, there is one or

more of the following, often overlapping pools of untapped labour: unemployed, in some instances especially unemployed young; women, including those in the prime working-age years; foreign-born or minority populations, including foreigners; and the young old, in particular those aged between 55 and 64. Moreover, those agreeing on the issue insist that leaving the labour reserves at home untapped while drawing labour from abroad is plain wrong.

As we share these positions, we attempted to assess the extent in which labour remains underutilised as a prelude to preparing the various simulations for the five countries. The analysis drew on the European Labour Force Survey (LFS) data available in New Cronos. It focused on the rates of labour force participation, employment and unemployment since 1983 among native and foreign men and women within different five-year age groups. (The Italian LFS data did not distinguish between the nationals and foreigners, while the Swiss LFS data were available only since 1996.) A particular aspect of our simulations – they make use, among other things, of assumptions on employment rates rather than on labour force participation and unemployment rates – requires that we here confine the presentation and discussion of the LFS-based results to employment rates. The need to keep the length of the paper in check also necessitates this focus. Moreover, we could at best highlight salient facts about the extent to which people in these countries work.

There are huge variations across the five countries in employment rates – the proportions of the working age population working. Switzerland and the United Kingdom led in 2003 with, respectively, 78 per cent and 72 per cent of the members of the working age population working. These rates are higher than the Lisbon target set in 2000 for the 15 EU countries as a group for 2010 (see below). Germany and France trail with the rates that are similar – 65 per cent and 63 per cent respectively, considerably below the Lisbon 2010 target. Italy, with the rate of 56 per cent will have an arduous road ahead, if it were to achieve the target. Judging by these figures, Switzerland appears to have utilised most of its labour reserves, although one cannot be certain as to where the outer limits of employment rates in general are. At the other end of the spectrum, Italy has barely over one-half of its working age population working – quite a dismal record. At the same time, for one reason or another, the country appears to be sucking in immigrants at an impressive rate. One cannot but assume that many of them are being welcomed as additional hands.

Men work more than women, no matter whether they are natives or foreigners. This is what the data show for France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Although we lack the relevant data for Italy, the same is likely to be true for this country. In the four countries just referred to the foreigners, irrespective of sex, work less than the nationals. The gap between the employment rates of the native and foreign women has generally widened in all the four countries but France, where it has been roughly constant since the early 1980s and remains the largest. In Switzerland the widening of the gap goes back to the second half of the 1990s, in the United Kingdom and Germany back to the first half of the 1980s. If the native Swiss, men and women alike were taken as a standard – possibly a standard very difficult to approach – it is clear that improvements in the employment rates are possible across the board – from the United Kingdom native men all the way down to the foreign women in France and the women in general in Italy.

In spite of the room for improvements in the work participation, the question still remains whether the five countries and, by extension, all the old 15 EU countries can steer clear of an increasing dependence on foreign labour in the decades to come.

3. Intergovernmental debates

The population changes, which in time led to the Europe's new demographic regime that Schmögnerová (2004) spoke about, began attracting attention in Europe's intergovernmental circles at the beginning of the 1990s. United Nations (1994), when referring to the demographic situation in the developed countries at the time noted that "[t]hey experienced a sustained period of low, at times unprecedented low, levels of fertility. In many instances, these countries are still evaluating the implications of long-term population decline. At the same time the population is ageing rapidly. Also, Europe is now a region of destination of international migration." As time passed, these developments drew a growing attention. United Nations (1999) portrayed the situation at the end of the 1990s in starker terms, however, no major concerns were expressed in this document, except the following: "...the long-term challenge of restoring control over and of successfully managing [international] population movements remains intact in many countries".

The two documents just referred to were respectively negotiated and adopted at the two UNECE population meetings, the European Population Conference (Geneva, 1993) and the Regional Population Meeting (Budapest, 1998). The former was jointly organised by the UNECE and the Council of Europe, while the latter was prepared by the UNECE. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) was a co-organiser of both events, however, its substantive inputs were relatively modest; this is understandable, as these two events mainly focused on the UNECE region. During the negotiations that took place at these events, the European Union countries acted as a group, leaving a mark on both documents.

Particularly important was the imprint the EU left on the Recommendations of the Geneva Conference. The EU, with Denmark in the Presidency, proposed during the conference a new section on international cooperation in the field of population. The proposal, which was taken on board, was a message to the international community of the UNECE donor countries a year prior to the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994). It was a message on the basic principles and objectives of the donor countries regarding their cooperation with recipient countries in the population field. It was also a statement of commitment to this cooperation. Neither the Recommendations of the Geneva Conference nor the Conclusions of the Budapest Meeting included a message or messages on the Europe's population issues as powerful as the 1993 message on international cooperation. It appears that through the end of the 1990s, the EU – the most influential negotiating partner in Geneva and Budapest – did not find it necessary to begin articulating its position on contemporary and prospective population changes in Europe and, in the process, influencing European population debate.

The early years of the current decade brought about a major shift. This became apparent as the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the UNECE Ministerial Conference on Ageing (Berlin, 2002) got under way early in 2001. The negotiations, which were presided over by Germany and, by and large, driven by the EU countries, resulted in two final documents (United Nations, 2003a and United Nations, 2003b). The latter of the two, the Regional Implementation Strategy, provided a broad framework for the formulation and implementation of national policies in response to population ageing in the UNECE region. However, the Strategy did not stop at that. Some of the ten Commitments of the Strategy were about policy response to demographic changes broadly conceived. This unprecedentedly broad orientation of the document adopted by a conference on population ageing was prominently stressed in the former document, the Berlin Ministerial Declaration. At one point the Declaration stated: "We are cognisant of the economic and social consequences of the long-term nature of demographic changes." Then it continued, "[t]he challenge is for society as a whole to adapt to demographic changes, in particular ageing".

It is significant that unlike the final documents of the UNECE population meetings of the 1990s, the Regional Implementation Strategy put ample emphasis on economic growth and full employment as means of meeting challenges arising from the variety of demographic changes, ageing in particular. Referring to financial sustainability of social protection systems in general and pension schemes in particular, the Strategy, in its Commitment on economic growth, underscored that the distribution and transfer issues arising from population ageing are easier to address when the available resources are increasing at a sufficient rate. "It is therefore important that every effort be made to raise the underlying rates of economic growth and productivity in the UNECE region..." In a similar vain, in the Commitment on labour markets, the document pointed out that higher rates of economic and productivity growth need to be accompanied by higher rates of employment. Being a document that is amply focused on ageing policies, the Strategy placed particular emphasis on raising economic participation among older persons.

International migration received a limited attention, while the issues of low fertility and whether and/or how to respond to it were considered but brushed arise. On the former issue, the document stated: "[1]abour migration from abroad can sometimes help to overcome particular labour or skill shortages but it cannot be considered as a solution to the issue of population ageing. It is undoubtedly an element to be taken into account when it comes to designing adequate strategies for economic growth and full employment. In connection with low fertility and policy responses to it, the EU made an effort to include in the Strategy a paragraph stressing the need to assist couples with achieving their fertility desires. The US, Russia and Malta objected and in the last hour of the negotiations the EU withdrew its proposal, getting in return a concession from the US on another contested piece of the text.¹

Why is it relevant to recount what the Strategy included and what it might have, but did not contain? The reason is simple: some of the issues negotiated in the run-up to the Berlin Conference appeared on the EU policy agenda two years before the Berlin Conference. Other issues, it appears, were added to the agenda shortly after the Conference. In view of this, the Berlin Conference could be perceived as a prism through which some of the policy issues important to the EU were reflected. Let us consider those issues by drawing on EU policy documents and public pronouncements of high EU officials.

At the Lisbon European Council (March, 2000), the Union "set itself a *new strategic goal* for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion". As part of the goal, the Union set out to develop an "active employment policy". Its aims were to "raise the employment rate from an average of 61% today to as close as possible to 70% by 2010 and to increase the number of women in employment from an average of 51% today to more than 60% by 2010. Recognising their different starting points, Member States should consider setting national targets for an increased employment rate." (see European Union, 2000). At the Stockholm European Council

¹ The text that the EU, supported by the Czech Republic wanted included in the Strategy read as follows: "Governments should, to counter the ageing of populations, promote policies that enable couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of children, but also support them in achieving their desired number of children. In particular, policy should attempt to close the gap between the actual and the desired number of children by providing more generous benefits to families and by seeking better arrangements for combining work and family life."

(March, 2001), a new target was added – the employment rate of older workers, that is those aged 55-64, were to be raised to 50 per cent by 2010. In addition, interim targets for the employment rates were fixed for 2005.

The Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs in the Prodi Commission, Anna Diamantopoulou, spoke on a number of occasions during her tenure on the new European Employment Strategy and how it could be implemented. In one of her 2003 addresses Diamantopoulou (2003a) stated: "[i]n concluding, I would like to underline that our Lisbon objective is full employment, but we clearly need economic growth to create jobs. Employment policy is not enough. The economic arithmetic is clear. Productivity increases by 1 and a half to 2 per cent in Europe every year. We need that much economic growth just to stand still in terms of employment. Therefore we obviously need at 3 per cent or more a year economic growth, sustained for several years, in order to start to be able to reach the Lisbon targets."

Late in 2003, speaking on the future of Europe, Diamantopoulou (2003b) addressed, among other things, issues pertaining to demographic developments, especially population ageing and how to respond to them. Alluding to the prospect that "by 2030, Europe's working population will fall by 23 million" she reiterated the aims of the Lisbon Strategy and stressed the need for economic growth to "increasingly depend on gains in productivity and a higher quality of human capital". Significantly, in connection with the importance to raise employment rates of women, where these are still not sufficiently high, she pointed out that "without better reconciliation of work and family life, we cannot provide the right conditions for parenting and child-rearing and secure basic human capital". As if securing "basic human capital", even if successful, will not suffice, Diamantopoulou went on to say, "we see that increased immigration flows are not only inevitable, but they are increasingly necessary to meet the needs if the EU labour market". "... closing our borders is not an option".

Jérôme Vignon² (2004) visited this same set of issues at the European Population Forum 2004, pushing the envelope of policy thinking well beyond what might have been deemed acceptable only a few years ago. According to him: "[t]he contraction of the working age population will soon make it impossible to counteract the impact on labour supply solely through higher activity rates. Economic growth will therefore increasingly depend on productivity gains." The Lisbon Strategy – an integrated set of macroeconomic, employment and social policies – "will be increasingly less likely to be a sufficient response to demographic imbalances". "This leads us to the need for a new stance on immigration into the EU." According to Vignon, this stance ought to

² Director, Social Protection and Social Integration, Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs, European Commission.

recognise, among others, the following points: Firstly, "[i]mmigration inflows are likely to increase, both as a result of external 'push' factors and the internal 'pull' factors of the ageing and shrinkage of the working age population." Secondly, "[i]ncreased immigration can make important contributions to labour supply and fertility levels in the EU, and thereby to overall growth and well-being, which will be direly needed. Thirdly, "[z]ero immigration is therefore not option".

Vignon then addressed an issue that demographers, as a rule, like to evade or outright dismiss as an issue unworthy of debate. "Even if we are successful in our efforts to counter the impact of the changing demography through "active ageing" and wellmanaged, higher immigration, the demographic prospects of the EU are still rather challenging. Therefore, with a view to a better balance in the longer term, we need to broaden the scope of social policy responses to include the promotion of proactive policies to support basic human capital formation. Building upon existing, or sometimes old viewpoints, in the mindsets of European citizens, I see two constructive ways to frame the issue of counteracting depressed fertility levels. In the first instance it would be about **[o]** vercoming barriers to choice and preference (in relation to childbearing). In the second it would concern the economic and social necessity of [s]ecuring basic human capital formation (at reasonably sustainable levels)." The rationale that Vignon offered for the 'first constructive way' is in our view eminently rational: "... if people to a large extent – as surveys of their preferences indicate – are barred from realising their choices and preferences, then policy makers have an obvious duty to seek to improve the conditions for family formation, childbearing and child-rearing." "The aim is to secure an environment that enables people to realise their preferences about the number of children they have and family size."³ In connection with human capital, Vignon indicated, "...family policies should be treated as an integral part of future-oriented strategies for investment in human capital". His and similar positions expressed during the European Population Forum 2004 on both international migration and fertility issues are reflected in the Summary of Deliberations of the Forum (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2004).

³ Vignon went on to list policies that improve the conditions: "The list of important policies is a long one: assess to affordable housing, quality health care during pregnancy and infancy, quality childcare, good schools, community environments suited to the needs of children and parents, social services in support of families, jobs that can be combined with family obligations, affordable access to further education etc. etc..."

4. Simulations

4.1. The approach and procedure

The purpose of preparing the simulations was to respond to the following set of questions. If the Western European economies, in particular those of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Switzerland (listed here from the largest to the smallest) were to experience a sustained growth through the first half of the century, to what extent will they possibly, in view of their likely future demographic trends, have to rely on foreign labour? To what degree will they possibly have to open doors to foreigners in general? How susceptible may the future required immigration – labour and general – be to alternative patterns of economic growth, patterns which combine alternative GDP and average labour productivity growth rates? How sensitive could required immigration be to different levels of employment rates? And finally, how sensitive could required immigration be to a rise in fertility in the countries in question?

In order to answer these questions, the simulations were prepared for 50-year periods, with slightly different starting years for the five countries. The simulation results were calculated for dates five years apart. Each given simulation assumes a particular combination of GDP growth rates and productivity growth rates over time. (The inputs into the simulations are italicised when they are referred to for the first time.) Given the base-year *GDP level* and productivity level (which are the same for different simulations for any given country) and the assumed GDP growth rates and productivity growth rates and productivity growth rates, the GDP and productivity levels are computed for the dates five years apart beyond the base year. In turn, these levels are used to calculate the levels of employment consistent with the GDP and productivity levels. These employment levels are taken as an indication of the numbers of persons that would need to be employed at the various dates.

As part of each simulation, the country's population is also being projected, using an extension of the cohort-component method. The population being projected consist of two groups, to which Cliquet (1993) referred to as autochthons and allochthones.⁴ We use these conveniently imprecise terms to refer to the parts of the national population that are of native and foreign origin. For the base year, employing national statistics, we used the *distributions of the nationals and foreigners by age and sex as proxies* for the distributions of the autochthons and allochthones. Clearly, the larger the share of naturalised foreigners among the nationals, the rougher the approximation – in

⁴ Cliquet (1993) wrote, "[i]n Webster's dictionary autochthone is defines as original inhabitants of a region, whereas allochthone refers to people of foreign origin".

particular, the greater the overstatement of the autochthons, and the larger the understatement of the allochthones.

Beyond the base year, as we shall presently describe, we track the autochthons and allochthones separately. As we do so, for the simplicity sake, we assume that the members of the two groups do not have common offspring – a very strong assumption indeed, but a very convenient one for our purposes. Moreover, although we could do it, we do not allow for the naturalisation of the foreigners, as this is not of interest to us in this exercise. As a result of these assumptions, as part of each and every simulation, we can calculate the numbers and age-sex structures of the two population groups. A major word of caution is in order here: the fact that there are no common offspring, over time, the simulation results increasingly overstate and understate, respectively, the numbers and proportions of the autochthones and allochthones. To these unknown overstatements and understatements one should add those from the base year.

Now, given the projections of the GDP, productivity and required employment, how are the two population groups tracked? It will suffice to describe how this is done over a quinquennial time period. We project the autochthones at the beginning of the period by subjecting them to survival rates derived from the West Coale-Demeny model life tables consistent with the assumed *life expectancies at birth by sex* for the period. Note that these life expectancy assumptions also apply to the allochthones and that they are almost identical to the mortality assumptions in the most recent baseline official national population projections. We also use age-specific fertility rates that are derived from the assumed *total fertility rate* and the *mean age of childbearing* for the autochthones.⁵ This completes the projection over the quinquennial period, as we assume that – and we wish to stress this – the autochthones are a closed population group. There are no nationals returning or leaving the country, which is yet another of the assumptions that we opted for the sake of expediency.

Then comes the turn for the allochthones to be projected over the five-year period. Initially, they are assumed to be a closed group and *life expectancies at birth by sex, total fertility rate* and the *mean age of childbearing* that are assumed for them are used. Note again that the mortality assumptions are identical to those for the autochthones and that the fertility assumptions are specific to the allochthones. No matter whether or not this group becomes open to immigration later on in the course of the calculations, we assume that the allochthones do not leave the country.

⁵ In order to derive the fertility rates we use a procedure devised by the United Nations (forthcoming), which makes it possible to identify an age pattern of period fertility – proportionate age-specific fertility rates – for the assumed mean age of childbearing. The procedure is based on recent period fertility information from low fertility European countries.

The age-sex distributions of the autochthones and allochthones derived in this manner provide a basis for calculating the number of persons available for work at the end of the period. The number is derived from these distributions and from the assumptions on employment rates made separately for the two groups for the end of the period. The assumptions are made for the following employments rates: the *overall employment rate for the age group 15-64*, the female employment rate for the age group 15-64 and the *employment rate for persons aged 55-64*. Note that these are the three employment rates for which the Lisbon and Stockholm European Councils set the targets. Two additional less important assumptions are also made in order to allow for the fact that there are people aged 65 or older who work. We need not go into these assumptions.

Given the numbers of the required and available workers, if the difference between the former number (required) and the latter one (available) is negative, then the procedure can be applied to the next quinquennial period, as no immigration takes place. Note, however, that before this is done employment rates are not modified, but rather the level of productivity is reduced accordingly. This adjustment was far simpler to make than the one that would have entailed modifying the employment rates.⁶ If the difference is positive, then foreigners are allowed in. The number of them admitted in this idealised world of simulations depends in part on the three employment rates assumed for the allochthones and the assumptions on the sex ratio of immigrants and the proportionate age distributions of immigrants by sex. Note that the assumptions on these two inputs rest on the age-sex patterns of immigration used by United Nations (2000). They are assumed to stay fixed over time and across simulations and they apply to the five countries equally. The numbers of foreigners admitted and added to the allochthones at the end of the period is just sufficient to have the difference – call it the employment gap - filled. This completes the cycle of calculations for a given quinquennial period and is followed by a cycle for the next period.

4.2. Simulation inputs

In order to prepare the inputs both for the base years and for the rest of the 50-year intervals we extensively consulted national statistics. They came from New Cronos, from the web sites of the National Statistical Offices and from the officials of those offices.⁷ A detailed account of the data assembled and scrutinised, no matter how interesting, would require a long detour. We will avoid it, but will, among other things, draw the reader's attention to some of the more serious data problems we faced and how we resolved them. Irrespective of whether or not the data for a particular country

⁶ Only occasionally the simulation results showed noticeable downward adjustments in the productivity levels and the growth rates derived after the adjustments were performed. When the adjustments were made, this was almost exclusively done early in the 50-year simulation periods, especially when we assumed a rapid rise in the employment rates. ⁷ The list of organisations that responded to our requests for data is provided in the acknowledgement, at the end of the paper.

were sufficient for our purposes, we sought to systematically use them to better understand the recent past of the five countries, e.g. the past developments in the employment rates discussed earlier. The knowledge we gained in the process, sometimes inadequate due to data limitations, was used to set the baseline figures and formulate the assumptions regarding the simulation inputs.

The major data limitations we encountered, which pertain to demographic statistics, were those for the groups we call autochthons and allochthones. The data from France, Germany and Switzerland, which define the two groups as nationals and foreigners, did not pose serious problems. In the case of the United Kingdom, where information on race/ethnicity is of greater interest than data on natives and foreigners (Haug, 2000), it was not possible to obtain information on the nationals and foreigners. As a result, we derived the age-sex distributions of the nationals and foreigners by applying to the total UK age-sex distribution of the population the proportions of foreigners by age and sex derived from the UK Labour Force Survey. Additionally, the fertility rates for England and Wales for the two groups of women – those born in the UK and those born abroad - were respectively accepted as proxies for the fertility rates of the UK nationals and foreigners. In the case of Italy, a country for which our data were the weakest, we had, by and large, to create a somewhat 'mythical' Italy. Deriving the estimates of the initial age-sex distributions of the Italian nationals and foreigners required making several assumptions, which are probably fairly realistic. Some of the assumptions were required so that we could include the foreigners that were regularised during 2002 in the initial population. We faced particular problems with the fertility and employment rates, as these were not available for the nationals and foreigners. In view of this, we imputed to Italy the national-foreigner differentials of fertility and employment rates observed in France.

As regards to the key inputs for the simulations that pertain to the years and periods beyond the base year, there were some that we varied across the simulations and others that we did not. Among the former were: the GDP growth rates, productivity growth rates, the employment rates for the allochthones, plus the total fertility rates and mean ages of childbearing for the autochthons and allochthones. To each of these inputs – there are four of them if the fertility inputs are thought of as single input – we assigned two alternative values or sets of values. Thus the GPD growth rate was assigned values equal to 2 per cent and 3 per cent per annum, while the productivity growth rate was given values equal to 1 per cent and 2 per cent. (Note that the GDP and productivity growth rates may differ in the initial one or two quinquennial periods from the assigned values until these are reached, starting from the initial rates.) One set of the employment rates for the allochthones included values generally lower than the employment rates for the autochthons, while the other set of the employment rates for the autochthons. Lastly,

for the autochthons, one set of the total fertility rates followed a path that was roughly flat or slightly rising from the base year on. The other set was based on the assumption that during the first 15 years of the simulations, the total fertility rates would rise by 50 per cent or increase to 2.1 children per woman, remaining constant thereafter; the increases were assumed to be linear. The 50 per cent increases were assumed for the countries with generally very low TFRs – Germany, Italy and Switzerland, and the increases to 2.1 children for the other two countries with higher fertility – France and the United Kingdom. For the allochthones, the total fertility rates followed their own paths.

The inputs that we did not vary across the simulations are the employment rates for the autochthons and the life expectancies at birth by sex, which, to repeat, applied to the autochthons and allochthones alike.

The 16 simulations per country, based on the combinations of the inputs that we varied, can be depicted as shown below (table 1). As the quadrants in the table indicate, we used four pairs of values of the GDP and productivity growth rates. Each of these pairs is combined with different pairs of low or high employment among the allochthones and low or high fertility of autochthons and allochthones. Annex table 1, which shows the inputs for the various countries reveals what we exactly mean by the low and high allochthone employment and low and high fertility. Note that high fertility stands for a situation when fertility rates increase for the autochthons but not necessarily for the allochthones.

			GPD growt	h rates	
		2 per c	ent	3 per	cent
		1	3	9	11
		Low fertility	High fertility	Low fertility	High fertility
	cent	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment
tes	per	2	4	10	12
ו ra	ς	Low fertility	High fertility	Low fertility	High fertility
Productivity growth rates		Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment
Ĩ		5	7	13	15
CE		Low fertility	High fertility	Low fertility	High fertility
Produc	cent	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment
	2 per	6	8	14	16
		Low fertility	High fertility	Low fertility	High fertility
		Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment	Low allochthone employment

Table 1. Inputs for the various simulations

Before we turn to the inputs for the individual countries and the accompanying results, we provide a brief rationale for the combinations of inputs underlying the various simulations. The pairing of the GDP and productivity growth rates allowed us to look into immigration implications of the four different patterns of economic growth. These are: (1) a moderate GDP growth (2 per cent) equally driven (for most of the simulation period) by the growth of productivity and the growth of employment Note that the rate of employment growth equals the differences between the rate of growth (2 per cent) entirely driven by productivity growth; (3) a rapid GDP growth (3 per cent) – rapid by advanced economies' standards – mainly driven by the growth of employment; and (4) a rapid GDP growth (3 percent) mainly driven by the growth of productivity. The combining of these pairs with the pairs of allochthone employment and fertility inputs allowed us to further look into the implications of differences in allochthone employment and in fertility under the different growth patterns.

4.3. Simulation results

Now, highly selectively, we present and discuss the results of the 16 simulations for the five countries. To enable the reader to understand the results, the information on the inputs underlying the simulations is presented in the Annex (see, annex table 1). (It is necessary to consult this annex table in conjunction with table 1 above in order to understand the inputs used in each simulation) The results themselves include the following indicators at the end of the 50-year simulation periods: the cumulative size of immigration (table 2), the total population size (table 3) and the proportion of the allochthones (table 3).

We can now return to our central question, namely will Western Europe, in particular the five countries, require immigration during the 50-year simulation periods in order to allow their economies to expand at 2 or 3 per cent annually? Our results suggest an unequivocally affirmative answer: the five countries will indeed need immigration so that foreign labour can help achieve assumed rates of economic expansion. By implication, the same is likely to be true of most and possibly all other Western European countries.

However, this unequivocal 'yes' must be immediately qualified. The volume of immigration will critically depend on the future pattern of economic growth. Let us first look at the results of the simulations assuming rapid economic growth (occurring at 3 per cent), which is mainly driven by employment growth (2 per cent). The results suggest huge numbers of immigrants arising from this pattern of growth. For example, the cumulative size of immigration for France after 50 years, depending on allochthone employment and fertility inputs, varies between 53 million and 64 million. For Germany,

⁸ Note that the rate of employment growth equals the differences between the rate of growth of GDP and the rate of growth of productivity.

Table 2. Cumulative immigration after 50 years (in millions)

GDP 2%, Productivity 1%	France	UK	Switzerland	Germany	Italy
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	30.1	34.1	5.2	57.1	41.3
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	26.2	28.8	5.0	49.4	36.0
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	25.9	27.3	4.5	46.4	35.9
High fertility & High allochthone employment	22.7	23.9	4.3	40.1	31.3
GDP 2%, Productivity 2%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	7.6	9.4	2.0	24.4	18.9
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	6.6	8.3	2.0	21.4	16.4
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	3.2	4.1	1.4	15.3	13.8
High fertility & High allochthone employment	2.8	3.6	1.3	13.4	12.0
GDP 3%, Productivity 1%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	64.4	74.6	10.2	112.4	75.0
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	56.2	65.1	9.8	96.9	65.4
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	60.9	66.2	9.4	100.0	69.2
High fertility & High allochthone employment	53.3	57.8	9.1	86.1	60.4
GDP 3%, Productivity 2%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	29.7	34.2	5.1	56.7	41.0
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	26.0	29.6	4.9	49.0	35.7
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	25.6	27.0	4.4	46.1	35.6
High fertility & High allochthone employment	22.5	23.6	4.3	39.8	31.0

Table 3. The population sizes after 50 years (in millions)

GDP 2%, Productivity 1%	France	UK	Switzerland	Germany	Italy
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	99.0	96.0	12.0	127.0	91.4
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	93.5	90.8	11.8	117.1	84.6
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	99.0	98.7	12.3	130.6	92.7
High fertility & High allochthone employment	94.5	93.9	12.1	121.7	86.6
GDP 2%, Productivity 2%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	66.9	64.7	8.0	86.0	63.0
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	65.5	63.3	7.9	82.2	59.8
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	67.7	66.6	8.2	88.8	63.8
High fertility & High allochthone employment	67.2	65.9	8.1	86.0	61.4
GDP 3%, Productivity 1%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	146.1	146.3	18.2	195.0	133.1
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	134.7	134.4	17.8	175.6	121.0
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	145.3	151.0	18.6	200.7	135.0
High fertility & High allochthone employment	135.1	139.4	18.1	181.9	123.5
GDP 3%, Productivity 2%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	98.6	95.6	11.9	126.5	91.1
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	93.2	90.3	11.7	116.7	84.3
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	98.6	98.3	12.2	130.1	92.3
High fertility & High allochthone employment	94.1	93.6	12.0	121.3	86.3

GDP 2%, Productivity 1%	France	UK	Switzerland	Germany	Italy
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	47.2	47.8	68.6	62.5	60.7
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	44.1	44.8	68.0	59.3	57.6
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	39.9	41.6	62.3	55.1	54.4
High fertility & High allochthone employment	37.0	38.7	61.7	51.8	51.2
GDP 2%, Productivity 2%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	21.8	22.4	52.8	44.6	43.1
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	20.1	20.7	52.1	42.0	40.0
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	12.1	13.5	43.6	34.0	33.9
High fertility & High allochthone employment	11.4	12.6	43.0	31.9	31.2
GDP 3%, Productivity 1%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	64.2	65.7	79.3	75.6	73.0
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	61.2	62.7	78.7	72.9	70.3
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	59.0	61.8	75.1	70.8	68.7
High fertility & High allochthone employment	55.9	58.7	74.5	67.8	65.8
GDP 3%, Productivity 2%					
Low fertility & Low allochthone employment	47.0	47.5	68.3	62.3	60.6
Low fertility & High allochthone employment	43.9	44.4	67.7	59.2	57.4
High fertility & Low allochthone employment	39.7	41.4	62.0	54.9	54.3
High fertility & High allochthone employment	36.8	38.4	61.4	51.6	51.0

Table 4. The proportion of allochthones after 50 years (in per cent)

this pattern yields absurdly high levels of the total population size 50 years later – ranging between 176 million and 201 million – and equally grotesque proportions allochthon – from 68 per cent to 76 per cent. Irrespective of whether or not one were pro- or anti-immigration – and we, the authors of the paper, do not lean either way – one could not but conclude that a rapid, mainly employment driven growth is an option neither for the five countries nor, most likely, for Western Europe as a whole. This conclusion, we may add, could have been anticipated almost solely on the basis of common sense.

A moderate GDP growth (2 per cent) that is equally driven by employment and productivity growth (1 per cent each) and a rapid GDP growth (3 per cent) mainly driven by productivity growth (2 per cent) yield broadly similar results for the five countries. This is not surprising, as these growth patterns go hand in hand with the growth rates of employment of 1 per cent per annum. For France and the United Kingdom, which are similar to each other with respect to the population size and the proportion allochthone in the base years, the results for the end of the simulation periods are comparable. France would see between 23 million and 30 million immigrants added over the 50-year period, while the numbers for the United Kingdom would be somewhat larger. This would amount to the population size of either country reaching somewhere between 90 and 100 million and the percentage allochthone approaching

or surpassing 40 per cent. As regards Switzerland and Germany, these growth patterns would result in larger relative additions to the original populations, with the proportions allochthone reaching into the 60s in Switzerland and mainly into the 50s in Germany. For Italy, the national population, the size of which is similar to that of France and the United Kingdom in the base year would reach somewhat lower levels in 50 years than the levels derived for either of these two countries. The cumulative immigration size numbers and the proportions allochthone would be larger than those for France and the United Kingdom. The proportions would be similar to those obtained for Germany – in the 50s. If pursued, either of these growth patterns would radically alter the demographic landscape of the five countries, especially that of Switzerland, Germany and Italy.

A moderate GDP growth (2 per cent) that is entirely driven by the productivity growth results in outcomes that greatly vary across the five counties. The cumulative size of immigration for France and the United Kingdom is relatively small – 2-8 million and 4-9 million respectively. The accompanying proportions of the allochthones are scattered between the low teens and the low 20s. For Switzerland and Germany, which are at present, in terms of the population size, respectively, about 8 times smaller and roughly 40 per cent larger than those of France and the United Kingdom, the cumulative size varies between 1.3-2 million and 13-24 million. Their proportions allochthone reach levels between the low 40s and the low 50s and from the low 30s to the mid-40s, respectively. For Italy the cumulative size varies between 12 million and 19 million, values far greater than those obtained for France and the United Kingdom. Italy's proportions allochthone reach the values ranging between the low 30s and the low 40s; i.e., they are similar to those obtained for Germany.

These large differences between the outcomes for France and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and those for Switzerland, Germany and Italy, on the other, can at least in part be safely linked to the differences between the two groups of the countries in the trends and levels of their period fertility over the last few decades and the implications of these trends for the future size of their working age populations. These results suggest that France and the United Kingdom have positioned themselves far better than the other three countries for the oncoming challenge of keeping their economies supplied, by and large, by the 'home-grown' labour. Among the three other countries, Switzerland appears to find itself in a situation where the dependence on foreign labour and immigration will be the largest. One of the reasons for this is that at present its employment rates are very high and the reserves of untapped labour, including those among the allochthones are very low.

We now turn to the results that reveal the effects of the rapid increases in the employment

rates of the allochthones until they match the levels assumed for the autochthones and of the increases in the fertility rates of the autochthones and the accompanying changes in the fertility rates of the allochthones. We will only consider the results deriving from the simulations involving three patterns of economic growth, namely those that produced low to intermediate levels of immigration and the proportions of the allochthones. Under each of these growth patterns, the cumulative size of immigration and the proportions allochthone at the end of the 50-year periods are the highest for the combination of low fertility and low allochthone employment. They are the lowest for the combination of high fertility and high allochthone employment. The second highest results regarding the size and the proportion derive from low fertility and high allochthone employment. The second lowest outcomes are obtained from high fertility and low allochthone employment. Some exceptions aside, this pattern of results holds across the three growth patterns and the five countries.

In the case of the moderate GDP growth exclusively driven by productivity increases the improvements in allochthone employment have an effect on the cumulative size and the proportion allochthone that is weaker than the impact of fertility increase. This is particularly true for France and the United Kingdom.

5. Implications for immigration policies

What do these simulation results suggest regarding future immigration policies of the Western European countries, in particular the five countries considered here? It appears that large-scale immigration in order to meet the future needs for labour under conditions of moderate economic growth over the long term – over the 50-year time horizon – is not by any means a foregone conclusion for each and every country. Our results lend a measure of support to the assertion by Coleman (undated) that the Western European countries will not necessarily have to depend on large-scale immigration to meet their future labour needs. The results for France and the United Kingdom suggest that these two countries would need relatively little immigration to sustain long-term moderate economic growth provided that the growth is mainly driven by productivity gains.

These conditions are precisely those that the European Union's policies and policy thinking have been moving towards. These include knowledge-based sustained economic growth, increases in employment rates where the rates are at low to moderate levels and fertility recovery driven by the reduction in the gap between desired and actual family size. Our results suggest that the long-term economic growth would need to be moderate and, by and large, productivity driven. (The United Kingdom productivity data for the last two decades that we examined suggest that a 2 per cent productivity

growth is not a farfetched proposition.) The results also indicate that employment rates would have to increase beyond the Lisbon and Stockholm targets and do so fast; this is what we assume for the autochthons and allochthones, especially in the simulations underpinned by high allochthone employment. That employment rates higher than the EU target rates are feasible is amply demonstrated by the Swiss rates and also by the countries that have been above the targets when those were formulated. Lastly, a fertility recovery would be of considerable help. Note that the simulations assuming moderate productivity-driven economic growth, high (that is, rising) fertility and high allochthone employment have revealed for the end of 50-year periods no need for immigration for France and the United Kingdom, hardly any immigration for Germany and very limited immigration for Switzerland and Italy.

If these challenging conditions were met, the simulation results suggest, there would be a limited need for immigration into France and the United Kingdom. Under the same conditions, relative to the size of their respective populations, Switzerland, Germany and Italy would need more substantial inflows of migrants. It is these three countries that would need to devise policies for larger-scale immigration. These differences across the five countries and possibly across Western Europe may call into question the feasibility of a future common EU immigration policy.

It appears that the countries that are likely become the prime international migration destinations do not yet fully appreciated what the future holds for them; Germany seems to be a notable exception. The authors of the most recent official population projections for Germany (Federal Statistical Office of Germany, 2003) acknowledge what appears to be a certainty – a considerable immigration into the country through the middle of the century. As part of their baseline projection, the authors assume cumulative immigration of close to 11 million over the 50-year period. Our lowest cumulative figure for Germany is about 13 million.

Irrespective of the likely future volume of immigration, immigration policies, as stated in United Nations (1999) will have to restore control over and successfully manage international population movements. This will require bringing to an end irregular immigration and replacing it with controlled and properly managed immigration. If the moderate economic growth is to be mainly driven by productivity increases, then the immigration policies of the future will have, first and foremost to reflect domestic needs for foreign labour of requisite qualities. These qualities include adequate levels of literacy, numeracy and language skills, appropriate work-related skills and the willingness of immigrants to join the mainstream of the economies and societies receiving them. In connection with this, to lend support to such immigration policies, other policies would need to be devised. These should aim, among other things, at discouraging if not penalising business that create pressures conducive to the entry of low-skilled, inexpensive foreign labour incompatible with the knowledge-based economy and should seek to reward businesses investing in research and development conducive to innovations supportive of rapid productivity gains.

As it is possible to assess with some degree of certainty future needs for foreign labour, the governments of all the countries, in particular those likely to receive sizeable numbers of immigrants will have to devise effective control-and-manage international migration policies in concert with the governments of countries from which future migrants will be coming. As was the case during the guestworker era, the governments of sending countries – at least some of them – played a role in promoting orderly international migration movements. If the governments of likely future sending countries have interest in helping their citizens to move abroad, then they should be active partners of the governments of the immigration countries. In particular, they can help their citizens wishing to move abroad to develop the variety of requisite qualities, including the knowledge of the language of the country or their choice, a critically important prerequisite for a successful integration into the labour market and society at large.

These are some of the main features of the future immigration policies that we consider worth highlighting. It is not our aim here to attempt to elaborate finer aspects of those policies.

6. Instead of conclusions

Rather than offering concluding remarks at this point, we want to end on a cautionary note. Our simulation results that are based on the assumptions regarding high allochthone employment and high fertility can be matched in reality only as a result of Herculean efforts. This particularly applies to the speed at which the allochthones employment and autochthon fertility rates are assumed to rise over time. We make this claim since we known that a number of the pre-enlargement EU countries with low to moderate employment rates in 2000 will miss the 2005 intermediate employment rate targets set in Stockholm. We also know that among the low-fertility countries of the 15 only a country or two have concerted policies that seek to close the gap between the desired and actual fertility. In other words, the reader should not jump into the conclusion that our simulations resulting in the smallest cumulative numbers and the lowest proportions of the allochthones are foretelling the future. In fact, they are not.

It will take time for policy and decision makers in the highest echelons of the national governments to rise to the occasion, namely to devise and implement the various

policies that may avert massive dependence on immigration, especially in countries such as Switzerland, Germany and Italy. Needless to say, devising and implementing these policies will depend on whether or not massive immigration is perceived as a prospect that Western Europe should, if possible, avoid. In the meantime, conditions conducive to larger rather than smaller immigration requirements will continue to gain in strength. How quickly and boldly requisite policies will be formulated and implemented is squarely in the hands of top Western European government policy and decision makers.

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GDP growth rates (annual in per cent)	n per cent)										
	1999-2004 2.0 2.3	2004-2009 2.0 2.8	2009-2014 2.0 3.0	2014-2019 2.0 3.0	2019-2024 2.0 3.0	2024-2029 2.0 3.0	2029-2034 2.0 3.0	2034-2039 2.0 3.0	2039-2044 2.0 3.0	2044-2029 2.0 3.0	
Productivity growth rates (annual in per cent)	nnual in per	r cent)									
	1999-2004 0.8	2004-2009 0.9	2009-2014 1.0	2014-2019 1.0	2019-2024 1.0	2024-2029 1.0	2029-2034 1.0	2034-2039 1.0	2039-2044 1.0	2044-2029 1.0	
	1.1	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	
Employment rates (in per cent)	int)										
	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019	2024	2029	2034	2039	2044	2049
Autochthone Total 15-64	61.3	65.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0
Female 15-64	54.8	60.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0
Both sexes 55-64	28.1	40.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0
Allochthone High											
Total 15-64	48.3	61.6	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0
Female 15-64	35.9	50.4	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0
Both sexes 55-64	32.4	43.7	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0
Total 15-64	48.3	53.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0	65.0
Female 15-64	35.9	46.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0
Both sexes 55-64	32.4	38.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0	45.0
Total fertility rates											
	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019	2024	2029	2034	2039	2044	2049
Low fertility Autochthone Allochthone	1.72 2.8	1.72 2.7	1.72 2.6	1.72 2.5	1.72 2.4	1.72 2.3	1.72 2.3	1.72 2.3	1.72 2.3	1.72 2.3	1.72 2.3
High fertility Autochthone Allochthone	1.72 2.8	1.85 2.57	1.97 2.33	2.1 2.1	2.1 2.1	2.1	2.1 2.1	2.1 2.1	2.1	2.1 2.1	2.1 2.1

GDP growth rates (annual in per cent) 2001-2006 2001 2.6 2.9	nual in per o 2001-2006 2.6 2.9	cent) <i>2006-2011</i> 2.6 3.0	2011-2016 2.6 3.0	2016-2021 2.6 3.0	2021-2026 2.6 3.0	2026-2031 2.6 3.0	2031-2036 2.6 3.0	2036-2041 2.6 3.0	2041-2046 2.6 3.0	2046-2056 2.6 3.0	
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Employment rates (in per cent) 2001	per cent) 2001	2006	2011	2016	2021	2026	2031	2036	2041	2046	2051
Autochthone Total 15-64 Female 15-64 Both sexes 55-64	72.4 65.8 52.4	75.0 70.0 55.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0
Allochthone High Total 15-64 Female 15-64 Both sexes 55-64	60.5 51.9 49.1	70.0 60.0 55.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0	80.0 75.0 60.0
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Total fertility rates	2001	2006	2011	2016	2021	2026	2031	2036	2041	2046	2051
Low ler unity Autochthone Allochthone	1.6 2.2	1.63 2.1	1.67 2	1.7 1.9	1.7 1.8	1.7 1.7	1.7 1.6	1.7 1.6	1.7 1.6	1.7 1.6	1.7 1.6
High fertility Autochthone Allochthone	1.6 2.2	1.77 2.17	1.93 2.13	2.1 2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1 2.1	2:1 2:1	2.1 2.1	2.1	2.1

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	ertility ochthone chthone	1.22 1.92	1.4 2.01	1.4 1.88	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8 1.8	1.8	1.8 1.8				

GDP growth rates (annual in per cent) 2002-2007 200 1.7 2.0	נוון אפר כי 2002-2007 1.7 2.0	al in per cent) 2002-2007 2007-2012 1.7 2.0 2.7	2012-2017 1.7 3.0	2017-2022 1.7 3.0	2022-2027 1.7 3.0	2027-2032 1.7 3.0	2032-2037 1.7 3.0	2037-2042 1.7 3.0	2042-2047 1.7 3.0	2047-2052 1.7 3.0				
Productivity growth rates (annual in per cent) 2002-2007 2007-2012 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.9	ttes (annual 2002-2007 1.5 1.5	in per cent) 2007-2012 1.1 1.9	2012-2017 1.0 2.0	2017-2022 1.0 2.0	2022-2027 1.0 2.0	2027-2032 1.0 2.0	2032-2037 1.0 2.0	2037-2042 1.0 2.0	2042-2047 1.0 2.0	2047-2052 1.0 2.0				
Employment rates (in per cent) 2002	per cent) 2002	2007	2012	2017	2022	2027	2032	2037	2042	2047	2052			
Autochthone Total 15-64 Female 15-64 Both sexes 55-64	66.4 60.3 38.6	70.0 62.5 47.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0			
Allochthone High Total 15-64 Female 15-64 Both sexes 55-64	56.0 44.9 34.8	65.5 55.0 44.9	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0			
Low Total 15-64 Female 15-64 Both sexes 55-64	56.0 44.9 34.8	60.0 50.0 40.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0			
Total fertility rates	2002	2007	2012	2017	2022	2027	2032	2037	2042	2047	2052			
Autochthone	1.33 1.43	1.36 1.51	1.38 1.58 ertility Autochthone Allochthone	1.33 1.43	1.55 1.62	1.78 1.81	0 0	0 0	0 0	2 2	N N	0 0	20	0 0

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GDP growth rates (annual in per cent)	in per cent)													
	2003-2008 2.6 2.9	2008-2013 2.6 3.0	2013-2018 2.6 3.0	2018-2023 2.6 3.0	2023-2028 2.6 3.0	2028-2038 2.6 3.0	2033-2038 2.6 3.0	2038-2043 2.6 3.0	2043-2048 2.6 3.0	2048-2053 2.6 3.0				
Productivity growth rates (annual in per cent)	annual in pe	r cent)												
	2003-2008 1.3 1.6	2008-2013 1.1 1.9	2013-2018 1.0 2.0	2018-2023 1.0 2.0	2023-2028 1.0 2.0	2028-2038 1.0 2.0	2033-2038 1.0 2.0	2038-2043 1.0 2.0	2043-2048 1.0 2.0	2048-2053 1.0 2.0				
Employment rates (in per cent)	ent)													
	2003	2008	2013	2018	2023	2028	2033	2038	2043	2048	2053			
Autochthone Total 15-64 Female 15-64 Both sexes 55-64	57.0 43.4 29.7	65.0 55.0 40.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0	75.0 65.0 55.0			
Allochthone High														
Total 15-64	48.0	61.6	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0			
Female 15-64 Both sexes 55-64	32.1 30.2	48./ 42.8	65.0 55.0 >Total 15-64 Female 15-64 Roth sexes 55-64	48.0 32.1 30.2	53.0 46.0 38.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0	65.0 55.0 45.0
Total fertility rates														
	2003	2008	2013	2018	2023	2028	2033	2038	2043	2048	2053			
Low fertility Autochthone Allochthone	1.2 2.1	1.25 2.02	1.3 1.93	1.3 1.85	1.3 1.77	1.3 1.68	1.3 1.6	1.3 1.6	1.3 1.6	1.3 1.6	1.3 1.6			
High fertility Autochthone	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8			
Allochthone	2.1	2	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8			

Growth and Imigration Senarios: Turkey - EU*

by Refik Erzan, Umut Kuzubaş, Nilufer Yıldız

The purpose of the study is to estimate the eventual immigration from Turkey to the EU when Turkey becomes a full member and restrictions on labor mobility are removed. Alternative methods and scenarios are scrutinized in forecasting probable magnitudes for the period 2004 to 2030. The analyses are essentially based on the experience of countries that joined the EU. The estimation methods are those used in recent studies that analyze the membership consequences of the Central and East European countries. Special attention was paid to the experience of the southern "cohesion" countries - Greece, Portugal and Spain. Finally, forecasts were also made based primarily on the Turkish emigration record.

Occasionally, sensational news articles on the scary magnitude of potential migrants from Turkey take the headlines in EU media. Careless interpretation of casual opinion polls can put the number up to 25 % of a population of about 70 million. Magnitudes that emerge from serious research work are a fraction of that. The survey of this literature undertaken by the 2004 "Impact Study" of the EU Commission has reported that forecasts of immigration from Turkey to the EU-15 until 2030 range between 0.5 and 4.4 million, assuming free mobility of labor in about a dozen years from now. The Impact Study also underlines that to arrive at the higher end estimates (about 4 million), the studies have to torture the data and the methodology.

As a result of the literature survey that we have undertaken in the framework of this study and our contacts with the relevant research centers in the EU (see the references), we have not come across any net migration forecasts from Turkey to the EU that exceeds the probable magnitudes reported in the Impact Study.

^{*} This study has been presented at the conference "Immigration Issues in EU-Turkish Relations: Determinants of Immigration and Integration" held at Bogazici University, 8-9 October 2004. It is based on the findings of the "twin projects" - employment and immigration, at Bogazici University, Center for Economics and Econometrics (www.cee.boun.edu.tr) and Center for European Studies (www.ces.boun.edu.tr), sponsored by Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation (OSIAF). The authors are grateful to Nalan Basturk, Gunes Erturk and Engin Evrenos for important contributions in the research.

Analytical studies follow two alternative methods in making immigration forecasts. The first one is statistical inferences based on scientifically designed surveys. The second one is econometric methods. The latter draws on the pre and post EU membership experiences of emigration countries. Quantifiable determinants of immigration - pull and push factors - are identified and their joint impact on immigration is estimated. These estimates are then used to forecast eventual migration from "to be" members.

Our simulation results for net migration from Turkey to EU-15 in the period 2004-2030 is between 1 and 2.1 million, foreseeing a successful accession period with high growth and free labor mobility starting 2015 - a rather optimistic assumption to explore the upper bound of the immigration potential. On the other hand, if Turkey's membership process is endangered and high growth cannot be sustained, 2.7 million people may be penetrating the EU-15 despite the prevailing strict restrictions on labor mobility.

Reference Group: 1967-2001 Immigration From All Europe

At the first stage of analysis, we followed the method of the EU Commission report by Brücker, Alvarez-Plata and Siliverstovs (2003) used in estimating potential migration from Central and Eastern Europe. Using an econometric model, the study estimates migrant stocks in Germany originating from 19 source countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey, UK, and (former) Yugoslavia). Germany was chosen as the host country because of the size of the migrant communities in this country and the availability of robust time series data dating back to 1967.

We used the specification that yielded the best overall result in the EU Commission study.¹ As explanatory variables; income level in the country of origin (\mathbf{w}_{ht}) captures the cost of migration, employment rates $(\mathbf{e}_{ft})), (\mathbf{e}_{ht})$, the probability of finding jobs, and, income differences between the home and host countries $(\mathbf{w}_{ft})/\mathbf{w}_{ht})$, the material

m_{fht} = α_h + β_Im_{fh,t-1} + β₂m_{fh,t-2} + β₃ ln(w_{ft}/w_{ht}) + β₄ ln(w_{ht}) + β₅ln(e_{ft}) + β₆ ln(e_{ht}) + u_{fht}
 m_{fht}. The share of migrants from country h residing in country f (Germany) as a percent of home population
 w: Wage (income, proxied by GDP-PPP per capita)
 e: Employment rate (1-unemployment rate)

h, *f*, *t*: Home, foreign country and year, respectively.

Population data from World Development Indicators (2003), migrant stock data from the Federal German Statistical Office, per capita GDP from Maddison (2002) and Groningen Growth and Development Center, employment rates, from OECD Economic Outlook.

return to migration. To these, the lagged migrant stocks (**m***fh*,*t-***1**),(**m***fh*,*t-***2**) were added to measure the impact of "networking" among immigrants.

Introduction of free labor mobility in EU members was captured by the FREE dummy variable while GUEST denoted the 1967-1973 period when "guest worker" agreements were operational. To correct for the jumps in immigration due to refugees and asylum seekers, WAR in (former) Yugoslavia and INTERVENTION (1980 military) and INSURGENCY (1990-94 terror) in Turkey were used. Table 1 gives the estimation results for the 1967-2001 period indicating the coefficients of the explanatory factors and their significance levels.²

It was observed that all the estimated coefficients were significant and the overall explanatory power of the model (the fit) was very high. However, the small values of the coefficients indicated that income and employment rate differences did not have powerful effects in determining inter-European migration during the period under consideration.³

Independent Variables	Coefficients	S.E	P-value
•	Coefficients		P-value
M(-1)	1.23	0.019	0.000
M(-2)	-0.37	0.018	0.000
Ln(Wf/Wh)	0.05	0.006	0.000
Ln(Wh)	0.07	0.006	0.000
Ln(ef)	0.34	0.033	0.000
Ln(eh)	-0.10	0.008	0.000
FREE	0.01	0.001	0.000
GUEST	0.11	0.003	0.000
INTERVENTION	0.15	0.033	0.000
INSURGENCY	0.10	0.019	0.000
Adjusted R2 = 0.99			

Table 1. Regression Results - "All Europe" Sample, 1967-2001

Migration Forecasts for Turkey: 2004-2030

The coefficients obtained from the estimations for migration into Germany from the "all Europe" sample of 19 source countries (including Turkey) for the 1967-2001 period were used to make simulations for emigration from Turkey. Following similar studies, German per capita GDP was assumed to grow 2% annually and the employment rate

² The model is estimated using SUR. This method was chosen because of its superior performance with large databases in the EU Commission study. Common slopes were assumed for all countries but intercepts were allowed to be country specific.

³As the estimation is semi-logarithmic, a coefficient with an absolute value of 1 implies that a change in this variable would affect the dependent variable at the same rate of change. Values smaller than 1 imply smaller impacts.

stay at the 1991-2001 average level. Income and employment projections for Turkey were adopted from our ongoing study scrutinizing alternative growth scenarios for Turkey, analyzing demographic developments, urban and rural growth and productivity, internal migration (urbanization) and unemployment. The main scenario used here foresees a successful EU accession with sustained high growth and gradually declining unemployment⁴ (Table 2). UN population projections were adopted in all computations.

	0.065
	0.03
	0.02
Urban	0.13
Average	0.09
Urban	0.05
Average	0.04
	Urban Average Urban

Table 2. High Growth Scenario for Turkey, 2005-2030 (annual values))

Under these assumptions, projections were made for immigration from Turkey to Germany.⁵ According to latest available data covering the EU-15 area, Germany hosted 76 % of all immigrants in the EU originating from Turkey.⁶ Using this share as a benchmark, immigration estimates for Germany were inflated to represent the total for the EU-15 area.⁷

Two scenarios were simulated with these parameters. Both assumed that restrictions on labor mobility would be largely abolished in 2015. This rather optimistic assumption was adopted to arrive at an upper bound for immigration numbers.

The first simulation emulates for Turkey the actual experience of EU countries with free movement of labor (using the **FREE** dummy). This involves a considerable integration of these economies during the accession periods.


The second simulation emulates - repeats - for Turkey the experience of these countries (including Turkey) with guest worker agreements until 1973 (using the GUEST dummy). The purpose of simulating this inferior scenario is, again, to explore an upper bound for the migration potential.


⁴ See, "Growth, Employment and Active Policies", Bogazici University, June 2004, www.cee.boun.edu.tr.

⁵ The iterations include the decline in unemployment in Turkey (about 1 percentage point) resulting from migration to the EU.

⁶ The migrant stock data used in the simulations do not cover those who were naturalized in Germany. Data on naturalization of EU citizens were not available for Germany. Therefore naturalized immigrants could not be included in the estimations covering all European source countries. Data on naturalized immigrants originating from Turkey were available. This factor could be incorporated in forecasts based solely on the Turkish experience - reported further on in this study. Although naturalization entailed considerable numbers in the last decade, it did not affect the immigration projections significantly.

⁷ This assumes that all other EU-15 countries that host immigrants have the same "pull" effects as Germany.








Table 3. Co	mparison	of the	Two	Scenarios
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2004-2015	2015-2030	Total
460.000	613.000	1.073.000
564.000	1.274.000	1.838.000
2004	2015	2030
2.675.000	3.140.000	3.750.000
2.700.000	3.250.000	4.500.000
	460.000 564.000 2004 2.675.000	460.000 613.000 564.000 1.274.000 2004 2015 2.675.000 3.140.000

When the actual membership cum free labor mobility experience of the EU countries - an experience that Turkey has yet to live through - was taken as the benchmark, immigration forecasts from Turkey exhibited a rather smooth curve (Figure 1). The small hike of 2015 transformed into a declining flow. Total net migration barely reached 1.1 million by 2030 (Table3).

Instead of relying on the actual experience of the EU members with free labor mobility, when we emulated (and repeated) the guest worker episodes for Turkey in 2015, we observed a jump in migration, reaching moderate levels around 2020 (figure 2). Even under this inferior scenario, the total immigration projection to EU-15 from Turkey until 2030 was not drastic, about 1.8 million (Table 3). This inferior scenario depicts an accession process not properly utilized for structural adjustment and integration.


The authentic free movement of labor scenario (the first scenario) incorporated the socioeconomic improvements in the accession countries. These improvements relieved the migration pressures. Restrictions on labor became much less binding, hence, as they were removed, there was no major rush.

It should be emphasized that socioeconomic improvements were not simply higher incomes and more jobs. Otherwise the coefficients for these basic economic variables would have been much larger in the estimations. The improvements in accession countries covered dimensions such as social security, health, education and regional disparities.

Reference Group: 1967-2001 Spain, Portugal and Greece

We have verified the methodological accuracy of our estimations reported above (Tables 1 and 3) by comparing them with the findings of research conducted for the EU Commission on Central and Eastern Europe. We have also exchanged notes with these researchers at the October 2004 Istanbul conference where this paper was originally presented. Nevertheless, to test for sensitivity of sample selection, we repeated our parameter estimations by excluding rich countries such as Austria and Denmark. We confined our sample to the southern "cohesion" countries - Greece, Portugal and Spain (and Turkey) - that had characteristics resembling Turkey at the time of their accession.

Figure 3 depicts the immigration episodes from these countries and Turkey to Germany. To adjust for differences in country sizes, the net immigration figures were given as percentage of their respective populations. There were major flows from all these countries during the guest worker agreements. As restrictions on labor mobility were lifted, the decreasing Spanish migrant stock continued its tendency. In Greece and Portugal there was a modest hike in the number of migrants but it smoothened shortly after. In the more recent years, the stock was declining, indicating reverse net migration.




Note: The apparent decline in the Turkish migrant stock stemmed from naturalization. Number of migrants from Turkey who were naturalized in Germany was less than a thousand per year until 1984. 1984-1990 this annual figure reached 2 thousand. There was a steep climb during the 1990s. For 1990-2003, the annual figures were, respectively, 2, 4, 7, 13, 20, 32, 46, 42, 60, 104, 83, 77, 65, 56 (000).


Migration Forecasts for Turkey Based on Southern Europe: 2004-2030

Estimates for the "determinants" of migration were obtained using similar specification as with "all Europe" for the period 1967-2001. Using these parameters, again the **two simulation** exercises were repeated - the **FREE** and **GUEST** scenarios. In both simulations, Turkey was assumed to be on its baseline high growth path (Table 2). 2015 was retained as the regime switching date. Computations for Germany were adjusted for EU-15 in the same way as in the previous exercises.

The picture that emerged (Figure 4) closely resembled that with "all Europe" sample. When the free labor mobility experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain was emulated

for Turkey, a small hike occurred in migration that stabilized promptly at a low level. In this scenario, total net migration forecast until 2030 was not exceeding 1 million (Table 4).





Net Change in the Turkish Migrant Stock	2004-2015	2015-2030	Total
Scenario FREE	320.000	640.000	960.000
Scenario GUEST	440.000	1.480.000	1.920.000
Turkish Migrant Stock	2004	2015	2030
Scenario FREE	2.755.000	3.075.000	3.715.000
Scenario GUEST	2.755.000	3.195.000	4.677.000
Scenario GUEST	2.755.000	3.195.000	4.677.00

 Table 4. Comparison of the Two Scenarios

The experiment using the Southern Europe sample but mimicking the guest worker syndrome led to a major jump that normalized in due course (Figure 5). The total net migration estimate approached 2 million, doubling the previous forecast based on the actual membership experience of these countries. Nevertheless, even this inflated figure was considerably below sensational projections.

Turkey's Own Experience 1967-2001 As The Only Reference

How to inflate further the migration forecasts? "Turkey is not any other South European Country", "unlike Greece, Portugal and Spain, Turkey has a nomadic tradition". If these prejudices are taken for granted, Turkey's own experience would be the only benchmark.

The model was estimated for the period 1967-2001 for immigration from only Turkey to Germany. The coefficients of the explanatory variables denoting income and employment differences were again significant. So were the INTERVENTION and INSURGENCY dummies. The absolute values of the income and employment parameters were considerably greater than those obtained in estimations with the "all Europe" and "Southern Europe" samples. This was expected since Turkey has not had yet the socioeconomic transition that the current EU members have accomplished during their accession periods.

Using the parameters obtained from these estimations, migration projections were made for the 2004-2030 period, and they were adjusted upward for EU-15. Obviously, these parameter estimates and projections, unlike the previous ones, did not contain any information on actual EU membership or free labor mobility experience. The only labor mobility Turkey had in accordance with an agreement was the guest worker episode of the 1960s until 1973.

High Growth, EU Membership and Free Movement of Labor: Forecast 2004-2030

In our first simulation with the Turkish record as the only benchmark, we retained our baseline high growth scenario as depicted in Table 2. Following a successful accession period, Turkey becomes a EU member and free labor mobility is introduced in 2015. Given that Turkey's only experience with a labor arrangement was the guest worker episode, free movement of labor could only be introduced in the forecast as the repetition of this experience.

The resulting projection exhibited a major jump in migration that moderated gradually (Figure 6). The forecast for total net migration until 2030 reached 2.1 millions. This somewhat exceeded the higher scenario based on the South European experience (Table 5).





Table 5. Comparison of the Two Scenarios

Net Change in the Turkish Migrant Stock	2004-2015	2015-2030	Total
High Growth – Membership – Free Movement of Labor	246.000	1.888.000	2.134.000
Lower Growth - No Membership – No Free Movement of Labor	760.000	1.974.000	2.734.000
Turkish Migrant Stock	2004	2015	2030
High Growth – Membership – Free Movement of Labor	2.499.000	2.745.000	4.633.000
Lower Growth - No Membership – No Free Movement of Labor	2.506.000	3.267.000	5.241.000



Suspended EU Accession, Lower Growth and No Free Mobility of Labor: Forecast 2004-2030

Our last simulation depicts a scenario where Turkey's EU accession is suspended. High growth cannot be sustained and unemployment climbs. More specifically, the urban GDP grows at 4 % annually with 1.5 % productivity increase and rural GDP stagnates. Unemployment approaches to 20 %.⁸

In this scenario, the prevailing EU visa regulations are retained. This obviously curtails major jumps in migration. However, the slow pace in income growth and the deterioration in the labor market increase migration pressures considerably. An increasing number of the potential migrants penetrate the EU (Figure 7). The forecast for total net migration until 2030 in this scenario exceeded 2.7 million. The result is a warning that if the membership perspective is lost, EU may end up having more immigrants from Turkey despite strict restrictions on labor mobility. This paradoxical scenario is indeed realistic for three reasons.

Firstly, Turkey's growth record clearly shows very high rates can be achieved but cannot be sustained without political stability and inflow of foreign savings. Without the EU anchor provided by the membership perspective, a growth performance that will cope with unemployment is not feasible.

 $^{^8}$ In this lower growth scenario, average (urban + rural) unemployment reaches 17 % in 2015 and 22 % in 2030. Migration to the EU reduces these figures to 16 % and 19 %, respectively.

Secondly, unlike successful accession scenarios, not only growth in Turkey would be slower and unemployment higher, but also sensitivity of migration to income and unemployment differences would be greater.9

Thirdly, the prevailing restrictive visa system of the EU and the absence of labor mobility provisions cannot stop immigration. EU currently receives about 70,000 (gross) migrants from Turkey, annually. (Because of return migration, net migration is about half of this gross inflow figure.¹⁰) Most of them come with family unification and family formation. In the presence of a very large Turkish migrant community in the EU of about 3 million (with major trade, investment, tourism and educational links), all conceivable tight door policies short of totalitarian rules would be porous. A relative deterioration in Turkey would certainly increase this inflow considerably and reduce return migration.

Finally, it should be noted that the eventuality of political turmoil was not incorporated in the projections. With the lost EU perspective and climbing unemployment, this is more than a slim possibility. Estimations based on past record show that political and security problems lead to waves of migration.¹¹ Add that on top of the 2.7 million forecast!

Impact of The Aging of Turkish Population on Migration

In the current study, as the estimations were based on past population structures, the impact of the changes in the age composition of Turkish population was not specifically taken into consideration.¹² However, the propensity to migrate differs among age groups considerably and the very young Turkish population is bound to age.

A regional survey conducted in Turkey by Hacettepe University, Ankara, jointly with the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and Eurostat (2000) revealed that the migration tendency of people aged 55 and above was extremely low.¹³ Hubert Krieger's (2004) study based on Eurobarometer surveys corroborated these

⁹ Coefficients for income and employment differences have considerably higher values in the estimations with the

[&]quot;Turkish experience only" compared with that of the "all Europe" and "South European" samples. The reason is lesser convergence of the Turkish socioeconomic system.


¹⁰ We have crosschecked stock and flow data (OECD, SOPEMI) for current Turkish migrant inflow to EU-15. Due to missing data, we do not have exact figures. We infer that the gross inflow can be 60,000 to 90,000 and the gross outflow 30,000 to 40,000.

¹¹As reported in the first section of the study, in the estimations covering 1967-2001, dummy variables INTERVENTION (1980) and INSURGENCY (1990-94) were highly significant and improved the fit considerably.

¹² The estimations based on 1967-2001 data do implicitly incorporate the aging experienced in the sample countries. However, the projections implicitly assume the same average population structure as in the past. ¹³The regional coverage of this study was not representative for Turkey as a whole. Therefore, the age configuration

of propensity to migrate was not formally incorporated in our projections.

results. Turkish population is aging. According to the UN projections, the share of people aged 55 and above in Turkey will nearly double by 2030 (Figure 8). When this demographic development was crudely incorporated in our projections, it was found that total migration forecasts until 2030 had to be scaled down by about 300,000.



Conclusion

As Turkey becomes a EU member and enjoys free movement of labor, the net inflow of migrants will most likely be in the direction to the EU-15 in the foreseeable future. The projections for potential Turkish migration based on the experiences of various groups of countries differed. However, the magnitudes involved were by no means sensational, despite the fact that we wishfully assumed that free movement of labor would be introduced as early as 2015.

It should be emphasized that the EU cannot exercise a zero migration policy. Even under the currently prevailing strict regime, there is an annual net migration from Turkey to the EU-15 in the order of 35,000 people. What should be scared of is the consequences of a slowdown or suspension in Turkey's accession process. The economic impact of such an eventuality is lower growth and climbing unemployment in Turkey. The political impact would be a slowdown or reversal of the reform process. The outcome of the two would yield a drastically higher number of potential migrants. A considerable proportion of them would be finding their way into the EU. If Turkey loses the membership perspective, the EU may end up having more immigrants than a free movement of labor regime with Turkey. And the composition of this migration would be less conducive for the EU labor markets - and - for integration in the host societies.

The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a successful accession period with high growth and effective implementation of the reforms reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There is no a priori reason why Turkey would not go through a similar experience.

Reference Group: "All Europe"			
High Growth – Membership – Free Movement of Labor	2004-2015	2015-2030	Total
Scenario FREE	460.000	613.000	1.073.000
Scenario GUEST	564.000	1.274.000	1.838.000
Reference Group: Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey			
High Growth – Membership – Free Movement of Labor	2004-2015	2015-2030	Total
Scenario FREE	320.000	640.000	960.000
Scenario GUEST	440.000	1.480.000	1.920.000
Reference Group: Only the Turkish Experience			
	2004-2015	2015-2030	Total
High Growth – Membership – Free Movement of Labor	246.000	1.888.000	2.134.000
LOWER Growth NO Membership NO Free Movement of Labor	760.000	1.974.000	2.734.000

Table 6. Summary: Migration Forecasts From Turkey TO EU-15

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Demand for Highly Skilled Workforce in the European Union and New Migration Arrangements: The German Example

by Gülay Toksöz

Today, the governments of EU countries are following largely restrictive policies to stop or at least slow down the flow of immigration to their countries: At the same time, however, they are obliged, under pressure from employers' groups, to develop selective, short-term incentive immigration schemes in order to draw qualified immigrants to their countries, thereby eliminating in the swiftest possible manner the labour shortages which have appeared in certain sectors of the economy and ensuring an adequate supply of labour

Labour shortages may exist for a variety of reasons including: the low geographical mobility of employees; disparities between the level of workers' qualifications and the level of the qualifications required for the available jobs; working conditions which are not sufficiently attractive to the existing surplus labour; rising demand for qualified employees due to rapid technological development; fluctuations related to cyclical movements in demand, production and hence labour requirements, and demographic factors. Demographic changes cause reductions in the workforce and labour shortages in the long run due to their impact on the working-age population, while the other factors cause short- and medium-run shortages.

Different governments have adopted different policies in their efforts to find solutions for labour shortages. Some give priority to ensuring that people of working age who are not economically active are brought into employment, and to increasing the employment prospects of the unemployed. Others have considered complementing these strategies with new arrangements for the labour migration. Domestically, middle aged housewives constitute the greatest potential, but most of these have below-average levels of education. The other important target group is unemployed young people (OECD 2003:104-106). The mobilisation of these groups and their equipment with qualifications and skills consistent with the requirements of the labour market is a long and costly process. By contrast, migration provides an already trained workforce ready for use immediately.

The segmented structure of the labour market also makes the migration of labour

unavoidable in the short and the medium run. Globalisation has increased the polarisation in the labour market, on the one hand creating many new highly-paid jobs while on the other replacing many old blue- and white-collar occupations with low-paid jobs in services, particularly healthcare, hotels and catering. The migration of highly skilled employees is necessary to fill shortages in hi-tech fields, while the migration of low qualified workers is needed for the low-quality jobs which the indigenous or settled migrant workforce is unwilling to accept. However migration policies generally take the form of the introduction of selection criteria and the acceptance of only qualified migrants. Although there are cases, as in Germany, of unqualified workers being accepted on a seasonal or temporary basis, the need for low-quality migrant labour is generally met in European countries through family reunions, asylum-seekers and illegal migration. The arrival of these groups is seen as uncontrollable, but there are tough rules to block the entry of other migrants. The EU countries do not want to open again the doors they closed to unqualified labour in the 1970s, and they overlook the benefits which migration programmes for unqualified labour might have in the fight against illegal migration and people smuggling. At the other side arrangements to attract qualified immigrants are imposed on the public within the framework of employers' demands and the requirements of the economy, with the arguments that these immigrants will be more easily integrated into society and will contribute to economic growth.

An examination of the professions in demand in developed countries and for which immigration is facilitated shows that in all countries information experts come out on top, followed by nurses and doctors, engineers and architects (McLaughlan, Salt 2002:8). Figures cited concerning the shortage of experts in the information technologies sector and used to support immigration policy recommendations for various countries are as follows: Australia – 27,500 people between 2001-2006, Austria – 13,000 people between 2001-2003, Belgium - 5,000 people in 2001, Finland - 2,500-5,000 people between 2000-200, the Netherlands - 10,770 people in 2001 and 3,400 people in 2002, Norway – 45,000 people in 2001-2003. Employers in the Netherlands and France also complain of difficulties in finding employees for low quality jobs.

Arrangements for Qualified Labour

The general approach taken by European governments towards the migration of qualified employees is to maintain the existing system of work permits. However, new migration systems have been developed for the information technologies and health sectors and in the case of in-firm transfers for the employees of multi-national companies. High-level executives of multinationals are usually free of work permit obligations in all countries.

The mechanisms and policy initiatives adopted by governments to attract foreign qualified employees may be grouped into five categories:

- Schemes to attract highly skilled experts such as the HSMP (Highly Skilled Migrants Programme) in effect in Britain, the "Green Card" system in Germany and H 1B visas in the USA,
- Adjustments made in the existing work permits systems to afford easier access to the labour market for highly qualified personnel as in the Netherlands, France, Norway and Ireland,
- Arrangements which grant employers and foreign employees immunity from work permit rules in the case of in-corporation transfers or which make the acquisition of work permits easier. as in The Netherlands and Ireland (E.g. Anyone who has received an offer of qualified employment from an Irish company may obtain a work permit from any Irish Consulate),
- Arrangements which lessen the tax burden on people earning high salaries. Such arrangements have been in effect in The Netherlands and Scandinavia for a long time (In The Netherlands, highly qualified foreign employees benefit from a 30% reduction in income tax over a period of 10 years). and policies which encourage the return of qualified employees as in Ireland,
- Work permits given to foreign students who have completed degrees in the field of information and have been able to find employment in their fields of specialisation, as in Britain and Germany (Mc Laughlan and Salt 2002:3-4, Mahroum 2001).

The strategies developed by governments are generally aimed at alleviating sectorspecific shortages, and the information technologies sector (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Canada, Australia, USA, Denmark) or the health sector together with the information technologies sector (Norway, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Britain, France) come foremost in terms of shortages. An examination of the total numbers and proportions of foreigners employed in the education, health and information sectors in Western European countries indicates that the greatest number of foreign teachers in secondary and higher education are employed in Britain; their numbers totalling 72,600 and making up 5.9% of total employment in the field. In Switzerland, these figures are 19,800 and 13% respectively, and in other countries the proportions are around 3%. In the USA the number of foreign teachers is 587,300 or 8.3% of the total. In terms of foreign health personnel Britain again comes out on top with 91,300 foreign employees (7.8%), while 30,700 foreign health staff (19.3%) work in Switzerland. The proportions fluctuate between 1% and 6% in the other European countries. In terms of absolute numbers Germany comes second with 70,500 people. In the USA the number of people employed in this field is 1,164.800, or 13.2% of the total. Of these, 257,500 are doctors and other expert personnel. In the information technologies sector, the numbers of foreign experts and their ratios to the total number

of experts employed are as follows: the United Kingdom - 50,000 (6.4%), Switzerland – 30,700 (19.3%), Germany – 41,600 (5.7%). In the USA, they number 644,600 and make up 18.3% of the profession (OECD 2003:66). These numbers display the undisputed superiority of the USA in attracting foreign highly skilled experts. Experts from developing countries prefer the USA for their career development since it is regarded as the centre of scientific and technological development, and it has encouraged migration in this field for decades. From the point of view of the EU, the language factor puts EU countries often fall behind those on offer in the USA, helping to make the latter country a primary target of migration.

Germany is among the countries where certain schemes have been launched to attract highly qualified experts. The "Green Card" initiative launched in 2000 to alleviate the shortage of experts in the information technologies sector may be given as an example. This initiative is aimed at inviting experts from outside the EU and providing them with work permits for a maximum of five years to alleviate the shortage of qualified computer and information experts in a short space of time. However, although it was projected that 50,000 information technology experts would come to Germany within five years of the introduction of the "Green Card", the number of work permits distributed under this programme in the 2.5 years up until the end of 2002 was only 12,586 (ibv, 09/03:1147).¹ The fact that only half as many experts arrived as had been projected has been linked to the limited, five-year duration of the work permits. However, it has also been suggested that the demand for expert labour in the sector was conjunctural, and that the real requirement was below the projected 250,000 people. Moreover, the heavy financial burden on medium size enterprises due to the minimum yearly wage of €51,000 may also have contributed to the low number of experts arriving from abroad. (Kölling 2003: 153, Beauftragte 2002:310)

The reason why the EU countries have turned their attention to third countries outside the EU for the procurement of qualified labour is that despite high migration opportunities, migration within the EU has remained at a low level. In the mid-1990s, only 5 million (less than 1.5%) out of 370 million EU nationals were residing in a country other than their own, and of these only 3 million were economically active. One of the factors contributing to low mobility was the complicated processes and difficulties experienced in the recognition of diplomas and qualifications. At the end of the 1980s, general guidelines were set out as part of the work on simplifying the

¹ 84.5% of those who came to Germany under this programme had completed a degree in the fields of information and communications technology. In terms of country of origin, India came first (23./%) followed by Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic States (13.4%), Romania (7.3%), the former Yugoslavia (5.2%) and the Czech and Slovak Republics (6.9%) (ibv, 09/03). It is observed that experts from Turkey do not prefer Germany.

process and the primary criterion has become the number of years of higher or postsecondary education required to obtain a certain skill. Work on the recognition of diplomas for academic purposes began in the mid-1970s and continues today under the ERASMUS and SOCRATES programmes, which seek to simplify procedures for student and academic exchanges and recognition. Although data on the number of Europeans with higher education who travel outside of their own country for employment on the basis of the recognition of their diplomas is limited, the numbers are clearly low. By 1994, the number of people who had moved to another country between within the framework of the first general directive issued in 1991 was only 11,000. Among these, teachers came first, followed by physiotherapists, engineers, members of the legal professions and accountants. Despite all the efforts made, the labour markets of countries other than their own do not possess any specific attractions for most members of national workforces within the EU, including those with high qualifications. Social and cultural differences, the institutional structures of the professions and social networks emerge as factors inhibiting mobility even if diplomas were to be recognised (Peixoto 2001:39). People generally prefer to remain in their own country when employment opportunities exist.

With the change of regime in the Eastern Bloc countries in the 1990s, the Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland, have once again become an important source of migrants, and with EU enlargement this trend will continue. According to some calculations the potential immigration level from the East to the West is around 700,000 every year. Research carried out on potential immigrants show that young people with good education are willing to go west without their families and to return to their countries after working and saving for a short period of time (Fassman 2000:203). However, when the segmented nature of the Western European labour markets is taken into account, it is seen that work opportunities rather exist for those willing to work in the low-paid, unqualified, informal sector but that certain obstacles exist for those with good education wishing to work as professionals. The problem of qualifications and skills achieved in another country not being readily accepted - and consequently of diplomas not being recognised - has not been fully solved within the EU, and matters become worse when third countries are involved. For this reason, the fact that migrant employees have to accept jobs which essentially represent backward steps in their careers makes them stay in their own countries if well paid jobs more suitable to the level of their qualifications become available. Further, factors such as the costs incurred in migration and the prospects of cultural isolation and separation from family reduce the number of would-be migrants who actually act on their inclination to migrate. Immigration levels may be expected to fall in line with improving economic conditions and rising employment opportunities in the new member countries of the EU (Hönekopp, Werner 2000: 5-6).

However the tendency to migrate from the Eastern European countries which are not members of the EU will continue, and the main target countries will become Eastern European countries which have become members of the EU. Aware of the income and wage differences between its member countries, the EU has imposed a seven-year transition period for free movement of people on the new member countries, with a view to preventing a sudden wave of migration. The end of this period coincides with the end of the period when the fall in the birth rates in the countries in question will affect their labour markets and the tendency to migrate will be curtailed (Fassman 2000:205-206). For immigration which will occur in the short term, the cultural and social similarities between Eastern and Western European countries will make the toleration of immigration easier and these countries are expected to be the primary supply of immigrants to Northern European countries. However in the medium and the long run, the potential of Eastern European countries to meet the workforce shortages which will be experienced in Western European countries is low.

Arrangements in Germany

After a long debate, the process which began in Germany with the "Green Card" system led to the passage of the Immigration Law in July 2004, which aims at attracting to Germany qualified employees for all sectors and not just for the information technologies sector. The full name of the law is the Law on the Direction and Limitation of Immigration and on Arrangements for the Residence and Integration of Union and Other Nationals. It was originally drafted in line with the view of the SDP-Greens coalition that immigration policy should be shaped according to the needs of the labour market, but it was only passed in July 2004 after long debates and disputes among the political parties led to a compromise text on which all of them agreed. The Law will be effective as of 01.01.2005. The Law classifies scientists, academics, experts and high-level executives possessing specific professional expertise as qualified personnel, but it only allows foreign qualified personnel to immigrate if they have received a definite offer of employment from a company. Those wanting to migrate to Germany to set up an independent enterprise are required to make an investment of at least _1 million or to create employment for at least 10 people. If neither of these requirements are met, the investment proposal will be decided on after examination by the respective public authority or professional or trade chamber. The residence permits of students who have successfully completed their education in Germany will be extendable for a year to enable them to search for jobs in their own fields. It will be possible for foreign students to receive vocational training at firms in Germany under bilateral agreements with foreign states (www.integrationsbeauftragte.de, Presse Mitteilung vom 01.07.2004).

In Germany, the demand for labour is closely related to its level of qualification. In

the last twenty years the demand for qualifications for employment has constantly risen and those with low levels of formal vocational training occupy correspondingly poor positions in the labour market. As a result, levels of unemployment among university graduates and among those who have received professional training have remained low and stable, whereas unemployment levels among unqualified workers have constantly risen. Between 1991 and 1998 the number of university, college and vocational high school graduates in employment rose by 1.3 million. In 1998, the number of these graduates who were unemployed was only 52,000. In particular, professions related to computers and information technologies are unaffected by unemployment, and employment in this field continues to rise. Between 1995 and 1998 when employment in Germany fell by approximately one million people, the information professions were generally unaffected and in the services sector there was an increase of 100,000 in employment in this field. On the other hand, 1.2 million jobs were lost among workers without vocational training. About 600,000 of these people joined the ranks of the unemployed, and gradually slipped into the still reserve due to the lack of demand for their labour. In 1998, unqualified labour accounted for 16% of total employment but 39% of total unemployment. (Dostal, 1999:455, Reinberg, 1999:435, 437). Enterprises have the greatest difficulty filling vacancies for engineers, mathematicians and computer experts, and small enterprises which find it difficult to pay high salaries constitute the group of enterprises which suffer most as a result of this situation (Kölling 2003:150).

With the new Immigration Law, Germany aims to reduce its workforce shortages with the help of qualified migrant labour from countries outside the EU. An examination of the potential of the settled migrant population to alleviate this labour shortage shows that the gap between the qualifications demanded in the labour market and the qualifications of the settled migrant labour supply is widening. Resident migrant young people who complete their compulsory education at 16 enter the labour market as unqualified labour because they are generally unable to find places in vocational training. They are heavily affected by unemployment, and even if they eventually find jobs, they become only semi-qualified labour. In a labour market which generates an unequal employment structure, a structural transformation is needed if equality is to be achieved in the employment of immigrants. More of them need to be employed in qualified jobs in social security institutions, banking and insurance, trade and services, and fewer of them in manufacturing, construction and general services. It is not difficult to predict that unless the access of young migrants to professional and vocational training and adult migrants to in-service training is improved, and unless they are educated for qualified jobs in the services sector, the present division of the labour market will continue and the situation of the under-qualified, low-earning migrant worker who has taken the place of the former unqualified industrial worker

will become permanent. The arrival of highly qualified new migrants will only increase inequality amongst migrants.

The Migration Patterns of Qualified Labour from Turkey

Although the education level of the workforce in Turkey has risen over the years, it is still low. As the annual growth rate of employment is below the rate of growth of the working age population, unemployment is rising and due to the growth of the still reserve the rate of people joining the workforce is falling (Ansal et al 2000:127-129). The entry of women into the urban workforce is especially low, reflecting many factors including socio-cultural obstacles, the inadequacy of public services with respect to child and elderly care and the low demand for female labour. In the period ahead, high unemployment will become a very serious issue because of rural-urban migration, the higher entry of women to the workforce due to rising education levels and the low prospects of attaining a level of growth sufficient to create an adequate level of employment. Governments are not moving towards a solution for unemployment, but are following IMF-oriented, contractionary policies aimed at reducing inflation and increasing the primary fiscal surplus, and relying on the arrival of the foreign investment which they hope will come from the EU.

The high levels of unemployment in Turkey increase the emigration potential. This potential is not only valid for unqualified labour but also for qualified labour. The crises-ridden and unstable structure of the Turkish economy and the problem of unemployment and low salary levels strengthen the inclination of people who are well educated and highly qualified but cannot find suitable jobs to emigrate. Up until now, the brain drain from Turkey has mostly taken the form of the non-return of those going to the USA for post-graduate education. Although there are no definite figures regarding the brain drain, the number of students abroad gives some idea. In 2000, there were 15,084 students registered on degree programmes, 2,942 on postgraduate programmes and 1.424 on PhD programmes abroad. Of these 25.8% were in the USA, 20.7% in Germany and 19.7% in the Turkic Republics. These student numbers given by the Ministry of Education are thought to be lower than the actual number, which is around 50,000 (SPO 2000:31). Economic instability makes students hesitate to return to Turkey and advantageous working conditions and career opportunities abroad encourage them to stay there. According to some studies, the likelihood of returning is between 30 and 50 per cent (Tansel, Güngör 2003, Gençler, Çolak 2002, Kurtuluş 1999). Students in the information sector, educated in the face of difficult conditions, are particularly quick to take up opportunities to work abroad when, upon graduation, they find themselves unable to find jobs matching their own qualifications and preferences, thus exacerbating the brain drain

The inclination of developed countries to meet their demand for qualified labour through migration from developing countries has undoubtedly had its effects on Turkey already. From now on, the brain drain may be expected to accelerate as people move to the EU as well as the USA. But governments in Turkey view the brain drain as a way of relieving unemployment and are not developing policies to combat this problem.

Turkey is undergoing a period of demographic transition. The share of the young population in the total is gradually falling with birth rates stabilising at around 1,300.000 per annum, however the proportion of the population of working age is rising rapidly and is expected to reach 60 million people in 2025 (Behar et al 1999:60). As the share of the service sector in the economy is rising, this sector will be able to soak up an important part of the increase in the workforce. The remaining group will face a serious risk of unemployment unless the fall in agricultural employment is met by an increase in industrial employment. Some will exit the labour pool altogether, leading to a fall in the level of workforce participation (op cit: 154-5). This population, if productively used, may become a window of opportunity for Turkey in the years ahead, but it could just as easily spell disaster. At this point, emigration offers an important solution to prevent this from occurring.

A planned education of the young population, taking into account both the requirements of labour markets in Turkey and those of in the EU, accompanied by education in English as well as other European languages, may turn those who cannot be employed in-country into a productive resource in Europe rather than an unproductive workforce surplus. If high school graduates, among whom unemployment is particularly high, can be trained as semi-skilled personnel for the information technologies sector, this may improve their chances of being employed in European countries as well as increasing the competitiveness of Turkey in terms of attracting operations which European countries, especially Britain, are planning to move to countries with cheaper labour forces. In the case of emigration, it is important to ensure that those who go abroad do so temporarily, and that they eventually return to Turkey after gaining experience, generating savings and developing economic contacts, and to adopt different policies for groups with different levels of qualifications. In order to encourage the return of qualified individuals who leave the country as part of the brain drain, the economic and professional difficulties which made these people leave in the first place need to be addressed, The allocation of more resources to research and development will be beneficial in ensuring that the emigration of scientists is only temporary. It is important to establish networks of experts which will keep those who remain abroad constantly aware of developments at home and through which they can contribute to Turkey. At the same time, Turkey could usefully exert efforts to become a centre of attraction for qualified labour – particularly migrants of Turkish origin - from the EU and other third countries in certain fields of advanced technology.

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The Changing Structure of The Turkish External Emigration

by Mümtaz Peker

The purpose of this essay is to discuss the changing structure of external emigration on the basis of a 40 to 50 year period of our country which has started to experience the second phase of the demographic transition theory during the decade of 1950 to 1960.

The experiences of the European countries which have lived through the second phase of the demographic transition theory before us provide for us certain clues:

- European countries lived through this phase in a longer time duration, unlike Turkey's shorter experience;
- The life-span (birth-death rates) and population increase rates of these countries while experiencing this phase have never been as high as the rates experienced by Turkey;
- As a result of the pressure exerted by the population increase, a considerable amount of external emigration compared to their total populations took place from the European countries to abroad and these people transferred resources and income back to their home countries;
- The phenomenon of this population pressure which was experienced for the first time in history and what sort of measures could be taken against it were discussed within the institutions that give guidance to the society. Consequently, under the security provided by private ownership, special emphasis was given to education from the point of view of quality and publication. The society in general accepted the fact that without education, the most favourable conditions expected from civilisation and political freedom would not be realised (Malthus, 1974, p. 274).

A. Emigration of Labour:

In our country the external emigration which started in 1960's as a result of the population pressure, attracted in its initial stages only the unskilled young population. Neither the families, nor the public institutions have invested in the education of these young people who chose external emigration, the importance of which was foreseen by Malthus. This emigrating labour force, the majority of which had only

5-year primary education, had no professional or vocational skills. They were volunteering to do the low-paid jobs which were not done by "others" at the point of arrival, or which were difficult and heavy tasks for the "others". Based on the education and skills that these emigrating labourers had at their point of departure, they possessed a "limited expectation level" instead of a "wider world horizon". Depending upon the realisation of their limited expectations, they first brought over their wives and their children as additional part of the emigration.

During the first stage at the point of arrival the emigrating labourers had problems of identity, adaptation, stress, sheltering needs and also problems of communication with their relatives at the point of departure. As the period of employment at the point of arrival extended to longer periods, different inclinations started to emerge for the emigrating labourers. Unexpected problems began to emerge as a result of the Europeans beginning to complain that, "We asked for labourers, but people came over, with their needs and problems". When the emigrating labourers, on the one hand, started to realise inter-family population transfers, and on the other hand, demanded to use their savings for upward mobility, the process of permanency was initiated. Some of them, however, were unsuccessful in their "search for hope". Others were resigned to subsist on what they earned, and they began to search for new opportunities in Turkey in parallel with their savings.

The generations which experienced the permanent residency process started to define their identities differently. The question as to whether these people shall be a bridge or a barrier between Turkey and the EU is becoming important from the point of view of us and the "others".

The flow of emigrating labourers at first was operated through corporate channels in relation to the economic development of Europe. It continued in an illegal manner through protecting/supporting and family/compatriot institutional channels depending upon the intensity of economic crisis at the point of arrival.

The contribution of emigrating labourers to our country surfaced as a most unexpected income from the outside world, so much so that the transfer of guest workers' foreign currencies increased rapidly from 1960's onwards. During the period from 1972 to 75, the balance of payments of Turkey showed a foreign trade surplus for the first time due to the guest workers' foreign currency transfers. However, because of inability to bring out the necessary legislation and to exercise control in respect of the guest workers' foreign currencies, a historical opportunity was lost. The emigrated labourers having failed to satisfy their expectations in terms of private or organised initiatives, began to invest in Europe to different opportunities. This was the first signal for their transformation to permanency.

The increase in the numbers of those who came through protecting/supporting channel led to the illegal activities in different centres of Europe. For example, the suspense novel called "Empire of Wolves" by J. C. Grange exposes the world of illegal emigrants, the gettos they live in and the narcotics traffic they dwell on and connects these issues with Turks and Turkey.

The emigrating labourers exposed their compatriots to the European mode of consumer spending and habits. Increasingly our countrymen began to live this type of consumerisation on one to one basis. In other words, a rapid consumer culturalisation was experienced with their instigation.

At this point if an interim evaluation can be made, the emigrating labourers before they migrated were working in areas like agriculture, services and minor entrepreneurships where there was an excess of labour in our country. Their withdrawal from the economy has not resulted in any significant loss during those years in the country's total production. However, the transfer of the savings of guest workers from their countries they worked in to the points of their departure created an unexpected outside income for our country. Consequently, we can deduce the conclusion that the emigrating labourers helped to close the gap between their points of departure and the points of arrival.

B. Start of Brain Drain:

The drop observed in Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in our country beginning in 1973 prompted a different debate. It was F. C. Shorter who started, with his optimistic approach, the expectations that this drop would contribute positively to our social and economic life. According to him, the producer dependent population numbers in the society has dropped, while investment capacity of the parents into their children have increased. On the other hand, the rapid rate of increase in labour force and producer groups during 1980's and 90's has caused increases in production levels. Finally, Shorter quoting from the economist Dowrick, connected our country's rapid economic growth at this period to the "drop in birth rate which forms, by way of labour, a temporary but important strength" Furthermore, he evaluated this situation as an historic opportunity for Turkey.

Basing his argument on the same positive point of view, C. Behar reconsidered the matter in his article called "The Opportunity Window of Turkey". Behar pointed out that the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) which was 2.7 in 1993, had dropped to 2.5 in 1998, and he assumed that it would drop to the level of 2 children between 2005 an 2010. Behar argued that the rapid population increase period of Turkey has been left behind,

and he explained this situation through Barlow's "opportunity window" concept. He considered that this would present an historic opportunity for the economy to develop more rapidly as it had done in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore (TUSIADF, 1999, pp. 40-44).

Barlow's proposal is as follows: during the period when the fertility slows down and the productive age population is rapidly growing, the success of the economy would be greater provided that this young population shall have the opportunity for productive work.

The questions to be posed from the point of view of our country emerges at this point:

- How can a drop in fertility rate similar to the one during the period between 1978 and 1998 occur again?
- Can we provide the opportunity for employment to the working age population, especially the young people?
- What type of measures we are taking for the employment of skilled portion of the population?

Let us try to answer the second and the third questions by taking the optimistic projections published for 1999 as a basis. With the indicators of 1998 taken as reference, the table below indicates how has our country developed.

Years	Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	Gross National Product (GNP)	Capital Accumulation	Savings/GDP with 1987 prices	Savings/GDP with current prices
1998	100.0	100.0	100.0	29.0	24.6
1999	96.5	93.9	84.3	25.6	21.9
2000	102.6	99.9	98.6	27.9	22.4
2001	92.8	90.3	67.5	20.7	18.2
2002	100.2	97.5	66.7	18.9	16.6
2003	106.1	103.2	73.4	19.7	15.5

Table 1. National Income and Capital Accumulation in Turkey (1998-2003)

Source: Boratav, 2004

The answer is simple. Turkey has become poorer from 1999 to 2003.

Another indicator for Turkey is Household Surveys (HS) for the period of 1999 to 2003, which indicates that during this period the consumption of families has decreased (Table 2). The families have opted for replacing many goods that they consume with others during this period. Consequently, by holding the consumption level same they have chosen to spend same amount of money. Roughly in 2001 the consumption basket of families is 13,1 per cent less compared to the basket in 2000. The consumers have

tried to preserve the same consumption volume rather than choosing a smaller consumption basket. However, during the later years they have been able to return to the level of 2000 (Özler, 2004).

Years	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Volume index (January 2000-100)	92.0	103.8	90.2	92.6	95.7
Growth rate (%)	-	12.9	-13.1	2.6	3.3

Table 2. Household Survey Index for 1999-2003

Source: Özler, 2004

The constant phenomenon of getting smaller or narrowing on the basic of the firm and the family immensely irritated the working population, especially, the skilled and educated young population took its share from this. When observing the other aspects of this matter two points become clear. The real salaries in the private companies of production industry from 2000 to 2003 retreated up to 20 per cent. During this period, the unemployment rate for working age population increased. For example, it rose to 15,2 % at Istanbul, 16,6 % at İzmir and 24 % at Adana. The unemployment rose especially among the educated and skilled youth (Sönmez, 2004).

This is the starting point from the point of view of Turkey. What happened to the behaviour and expectations of the young population when Turkey became poorer? This question can be answered by different survey results. The university preference patterns of students within the top 3 % bracket who choose engineering economics and business administration departments of universities changed during 1990 to 2002 period. At the beginning of this period while the students used to prefer Boğaziçi University, Middle East Technical University and Istanbul Technical University, the pattern changed to foundation universities (Koç, Bilkent and Sabancı). The senior students at public and private universities which take in students from the top 3 % express their expectations for the future a s planning to work abroad. Their desires are either to continue their graduate education abroad or to work at a foreign firm. Their behaviour is interesting: they have applied through internet.

In the İzmir survey the students explained the reasons for their expectations during a joint meeting I arranged as follows:

- It is difficult for us to become prominent in Turkey with the education that we received;
- In order to find a job in Turkey we have to be part of, what is called, an "old boys network";
- We want to go abroad in order to widen our horizon;
- Can we live with the salaries the we shall earn when we work in Turkey?

We can assume that the young people have been under the influence of the crises. For this reason, let us go back in time slightly. We need to observe the thoughts and behaviour of the people at working age. When the age was checked (the younger age groups which is under 40) they were anxious to find jobs abroad.

The reasons for the technical personnel to want to work abroad were:

- Not to be satisfied with the salaries received from public or private sectors (the example given for public was that the workers versus the blue coloured job holders were receiving higher salaries than themselves)
- Not to be pleased or satisfied with the job done
- Impossibility of realising their expectations and hopes for the future with the level of salaries they receive.

This sort of replies have indicated that young architect and engineers are moving towards a pessimistic culture (Turkish Chamber of Engineers and Architects-TMMOB, 1994). It cannot be concluded that the technical personnel are the single exceptional example. Similar behaviour pattern is observable for the doctors, economists and the business administrators.

1. Is the brain drain a product of the system?

When the brain drain is taken as a dependent variant, the education offered in the country, level of realisation related to the future at the arrival and departure points, we find out that the network of social relationships and their expectations both in Turkey and abroad takes priority.

Explanatory variants are:

i-Education: The educational system in specific areas of the source countries for immigration, although defined as universal, nevertheless are planned in general according to the needs of the immigrant receiving ones.

As a result of this, instead of training middle level staff, prestigious higher education is preferred. During training stage, the start of directing the youth and attachment to the country that receives emigration is connected to the language of education. The charisma and attraction of the immigrant receiving countries are presented as "level of contemporary civilisation" (Fişek, 2004).

The developed scientific environment and opportunities are cultivated unconsciously

by the emigrant receiving countries: The example I am illustrating on the screen which shows an advertising for a search for the presidents and CEO's of 15 leading cooperations of the USA indicate the need for two things in order for the engineers and scientists who are well educated by the new technologies for perpetrating the "American dream". These very high requirements are clearly indicated in the commercial.

In a similar manner the German Chancellor Schröder, with his "Germany of Novelties" concept is underlining the following; "The fate of Germany depends upon whether she can create the society of knowledge and can use its educational potential for this purpose, or not. To develop and support both these points is our essential objective".

In the source countries which give the brain drain the institutionalisation to employ the youth who have received such education is still at primitive stage. For this reason, the opportunities for the youth to continue their studies in their own countries is very limited.

ii-The working environment:

The share allocated from the gross national product for research-and-development shows meaningful differences from the point of view of brain drain emigrating and receiving countries. For example, while the annual spending on research-and-development is 280 billion dollars in the USA and 132 billion dollars in Japan, it is realised at the levels of 0.98 billion dollars in Turkey, 0,7 billion in Greece, and 0,01 billion in Azerbaijan.

Put in a different way, the research-and-development spendings in countries with similar populations such as France, Germany and England are to 20 times more than Turkey's (Sevgi, L. N., 2004).

The value given to the working population in countries given away emigrants and those receiving it is different in a meaningful way. The opportunities and the guarantee for the future offered to the young brains forms an unequalled example to attract them. Within the working environment the opportunities to make discoveries and to manufacture new technologies out of existing knowledge, as well as the possibilities to be more superior than the "other" are very wide in countries that receive emigration. It is very difficult to find such opportunities in countries which give away emigration.

iii-The Social Relationship Experienced: The continuous effect of hitting the bottom in countries which give away emigration pacifies the individual. Consequently, the motivation to improve the condition of the country, to push forward, or to embrace new developments become weaker. On the other hand, the complete reverse happens in the countries which receive emigration.

2-How far the Globalisation?

Today the advanced technology owes its rapid expansion to the brain drain, because the opportunities in emigration receiving countries and in countries giving away emigration are being traced through the brain drain. Beyond educational equipment and laboratory research, and transfer of the advanced technology performs as important guiding function by influencing the society's conscience. Thus, from medicine to stock exchange, from agriculture to computer programming the advanced technology is expanding into many areas in the countries which give away emigration. The young people are being attracted in international companies which implement this sort of policy.

3-Was Malthus Right?

Malthus said "Civilised political freedom can only be realised through education. A country which cannot succeed in this, is bound to disappear".

In countries which give away emigration the administrators generally do not sympathise with the young people to express themselves from the scientific, political and humanities point of view. The interesting excuse is made in the following manner; "such type of intelligentsia do not love their minority enough". On the other hand, the educated and skilled youth are seriously effected, hurt and became inpatient from such pronouncement. For them the important thing is to compete with the "other", to prove themselves and benefit from the world's good life freely. They do not have language problems to express themselves, nor the inability to use the communication opportunities which shall provide this life for them. Therefore, the young people keep asking; "Who has the priority? Why are these who enter the pace with protecting/providing relationship behind them are being so much protected and honoured ?" The answer is because to manage the one in the background is a rare opportunity for the administrators of the county which gives away emigration. It is easy to mold them within this protecting/providing relationship. What is more very soon they begin to think just like them.

C. The other side of the Brain Drain:

The loosing countries in the emigration race in general the change at the point of arrival is discussed. In the brain drain, however, we must look at the point of departure

and try to discover what happens and what is lost there? Those who participate in the brain drain are people who have been raised with most concentrated demographics investment both from the point of view of their families, and also the public spending of the country which gives away emigration. Their expectations and world horizons at the point of departure have been constantly evaluating the opportunities at the point of arrival. Their objective is to be better than the others at the point of arrival and to finish the race in front. After joining the emigration, they do not have the problem of transforming resources to their parents at the point of departure, or they do not worry about being pulled down by problems back home. On the contrary, when they have problems of family or individually, the root family solves the problems and push them forward by their feet.

The second important loss of the countries which give brain drain is resulting from the contributions made by discoveries by emigrants at the point of arrival. As is well known, every kind of new technology, information and similar results of these discoveries are marketed within a certain period of time. The benefits of this increases the economic difference between the points of departure and arrival.

D. How do the Families View Emigration ?

In addition to all these losses, what is the view point of the families that contribute to the brain drain? The parents in these families are within the 50 to 60 age bracket. I have talked to one to one basis with 5 such families. Those I have interviewed consisted of parents who have valued their children psychologically and indicated that the had transferred necessary resources to them during their development stages. These families have raised their children at the level of highest standards. The parents brought different aspects of the subject during these interviews. The mother compared her emigrated child with others who have stayed in Turkey and have received the same level of education.

In the survey I wanted the mothers to evaluate and comment on roughly the comparison of job satisfaction between her emigrated child and the friends who have stayed in Turkey and from the income level of realization of expectations and self-confidence points of view. All the mothers interviewed (whose emigrated children were all sons) concluded positive view point for their sons on the basis of above questions. To check if there is any misconception in this, I interviewed the mothers whose children have stayed back in Turkey. What was interesting was that these mothers evaluated the emigrated children more positively than their own and have higher opinion about the sons of the others abroad. The fathers' comparison is more decidedly on the economic basis. The first element of the comparison forms the foreign currency gains the country makes when the son completes his military service for short duration in return for payment of fees. Secondly, the fathers underline the contribution their sons make to Turkey's economy by transferring resources when they establish companies in Turkey in partnership with their friends and invest capital. One example was o father's declaration that his son, after graduating from Boğaziçi University and completing his Ph.D. in the USA, had started to work in the World Bank and that such a personal rise and savings would have take much longer if the son had worked in Turkey.

The relationships, behaviour, reactions of these who emigrated as workers and professional at the point of arrival are different. Thus, the way each introduces Turkey to the others at the point of arrival is different. Those who have emigrated as part of brain drain have presented Turkey positively, and their fathers especially, have declared that the friends of their sons have come to Turkey for long quality holidays and made large spending but those who were there as plain workers had less favourable impressions. Their yearning was that the Turkish government should send workers abroad who have had some education and language training.

The families had one more common view that as long as we need new knowledge, technologies and resources to overcome our problems in this country, it would be much easier for us to provide the country with "skilled and educated experts" through brain drain. They gave examples of their children about their willingness to transfer knowledge and experience to Turkey. In this way we would be able to reach easily and without much expense to the knowledge which we could not create in our country.

If we summarise, the pressure groups that will be formed with positive energy that will be created by emigrants joining brain drain at the point of arrival within the working and cultural environment, certain problems of our country may be resolved more quickly. Then the "other face" of the European countries may arrive at the judgement that, "There is obviously a different Turkey than what we see here".

Conclusion:

Continuous change and resolutions which had the basis of labour prepared the humanity to today's conditions, such as the single God religions and their ideologies ant the end products of the Neolithic (Agricultural) Revolution. The nationalism, on the other hand, became prominent as a by product, of the Industrial Revolution. Today those who receive the best available education are planting the seeds of a new revolution through communication and computerisation. The young people wish throughout the world "to establish the human rights and to breath democracy". They posses the education to source this through civilised and political freedoms.

We will be able to provide the most benefits out of those who have taken part in brain drain migration by searching for ways of reaching them through co-operation achieved by working on concepts of human rights and democracy ideology, rather than creating a conflict on the basis of generation gap or other reasons.

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"Turkey's Pre-Accession and Immigration Issues"

by Kemal Kirişçi

Introduction

Traditionally, Turkey has been known as a country of emigration. Starting from the early 1960s and well into the 1970s, large numbers of Turkish nationals migrated to western European countries, particularly West Germany. This emigration continued well into recent times through family reunification schemes and the asylum track. Currently, there are also growing concerns in Europe that if Turkey were to become a member of the EU, there would be a massive wave of immigration from Turkey to the more prosperous members of the union.

What is less well known is that Turkey has long been a country of immigration and asylum. From 1923 to 1997, more than 1.6 million people immigrated to Turkey, mostly from Balkan countries. In the 1930s there were many Jewish and German intellectuals who sought temporary asylum in Turkey. Turkey's neutral status during the Second World War led to ten-thousands of Jews from German occupied lands in Europe to flee to Turkey and transit to Palestine while many nationals from neighboring Balkan countries and Italians from the Dodecanese islands sought temporary asylum in Turkey. During the Cold War, thousands of asylum seekers fled to Turkey from Communist states in Eastern Europe. The overwhelming majority were recognized as refugees, and were resettled to third countries such as Canada and the United States by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the late 1980s, this pattern began to change as increasing numbers of asylum seekers began to arrive from Iran and Iraq, as well as other developing nations. Turkey also experienced a mass influx of almost half a million mostly Kurdish refugees from Iraq in 1988 and 1991, as well as mass influxes of Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) and Turks in 1989, 1992-1995, and 1999, not to mention Ahiska (also known as Meshketian) Turks ending up in Turkey after failing to return to their homelands in Georgia from areas in Central Asia that they were deported to by Joseph Stalin during World War II. This was a period (1988-1999) during which Turkey was host to, almost, one million asylum seekers and refugees. This is in some contrast to the approximately 420,000 asylum seekers EU countries from Turkey that continued to perpetuate the image of Turkey as a country of emigration.

More recently, over the last fifteen years or so, has become a country of transit to the European Union for irregular migrants from Asian countries such Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. Turkey itself too is becoming a destination for irregular migrants from former Soviet Bloc countries, and a magnet for irregular immigrants. The changing patterns of immigration into Turkey and Turkey's efforts to become a member of the European Union are creating pressures for an overhaul of its immigration and asylum policies. However, efforts to overhaul the system are trapped between two conflicting pressures. Turkey is, on the one hand, under pressure to improve its asylum system to match EU and international standards on the other hand it is expected to combat irregular transit migration as immigration into Turkey is also having an impact on the Turkish state's own definition of Turkish national identity.

Asylum

Turkey is among the original signatories of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However, Turkey is today among a very small number of countries that maintains a "geographical limitation" to the agreement's applicability as defined in Article 1.B(1)(a) of the Convention. Accordingly, Turkey does not grant refugee status to asylum seekers coming from outside Europe, and maintains a two-tiered asylum policy.

The first tier of this policy is centered on Europe and is deeply rooted in Turkey's role as a Western ally neighboring the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period, in close cooperation with UNHCR, Turkey received refugees from the Communist Bloc countries in Europe, including the Soviet Union. Such refugees, during their stay in Turkey, enjoyed all the rights provided for in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Only a very small number were allowed to stay on in Turkey, often as a result of marriages with Turkish nationals. The others were resettled out of Turkey. Although it is very difficult to obtain accurate statistics on their numbers, the Ministry of Interior has indicated that some 13,500 asylum seekers benefited from the protection of the 1951 Convention between 1970 and 1996. Statistics for previous years are not available. Additionally, during the 1990s there were almost 40,000 Bosnians and Kosovars that were granted temporary asylum in Turkey. The majority have returned. The second tier of Turkey's asylum policy deals with people from outside Europe. The new policy emerged in 1980 in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, and subsequent instability in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Upheaval in these areas led to a steady increase in the number of asylum seekers coming from outside Europe. For a long time, the government allowed UNHCR considerable leeway to temporarily shelter these asylum seekers with the tacit understanding that they would be resettled out of Turkey if UNHCR recognized them as refugees, and that those whose claims were rejected would be deported. However, the growth in the number of illegal entries into Turkey and in the number of rejected asylum seekers stranded in Turkey strained this practice. The situation was also aggravated by the 1988 and 1991 mass influxes of Kurdish refugees amounting to almost half a million. To cope with this overload, the government introduced the 1994 Asylum Regulation, which reflects the ascendance of national security concerns over refugee rights. Its application led to an increase in the number of violations of the principle of "non-refoulement" (the return of asylum seekers to situations in which they may be threatened) and attracted widespread criticism from refugee advocacy and human rights circles.

However, starting in 1997, UNHCR and the Turkish government returned to the closer cooperation that had characterized their relationship up until 1994. This cooperation was also subsequently supported by EU governments. As a result of this cooperation that emphasized particularly training in asylum law helped to reduce cases of violations of the principle of "non-refoulement". More significantly, administrative decisions concerning deportation orders on asylum seekers have been opened to judicial review since 1997. There have been a number of local court rulings on appeals lodged by asylum seekers suspending government issued deportation orders. These orders have been accompanied by a similar ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (Jabari vs. Turkey, 2000) too. One important consequence of these rulings has also been a government decision to introduce some improvements to the 1994 Asylum Regulation to reduce potential cases of deportations of asylum seekers or recognized refugees.

More than 35,000 asylum applications have been lodged with the Turkish authorities between 1995 and April 2004, approximately between 4,000 to 4,500 applications per year. In cooperation with the UNHCR Turkey has granted temporary asylum to more than 17,800 during this period. However, in accordance with the "geographical limitation", Turkey expects those asylum seekers that have been granted refugee status to be resettled out of Turkey. According to government statistics between 1995 and April 2004, just under 17,400 were resettled outside of Turkey, mostly to North American and Scandinavian countries as well as Australia and New Zealand. Those whose applications are rejected are supposed to be deported to their country of origin, but

many go underground and stay in Turkey or try to move on to European countries illegally.

In accordance with the Accession Partnership (AP) strategy for Turkey of March 2003 and the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) of July 2004 Turkey is expected to harmonize its asylum policies with that of the EU.¹ In accordance with these two documents Turkey will have to put into place institutional and legal structure that will have to enable to do its own status determination as well as lift the "geographical limitation". These changes are supposed to take place by the end of 2005. Considerable progress has already taken place however the finalization of these changes is still very dependent on whether the European Council in December 2004 will indeed decide to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Should the decision of the Council be a positive one it is highly likely that Turkey will come under increasing pressure to implement the EU *acquis* on asylum and in particular in respect to the "first country of asylum". Furthermore, the current practice of resettling asylum seekers recognized as *bona fide* refugees out of Turkey will come under increasing pressure. Consequently, Turkey will need to put into place legislative and institutional changes to enable refugees to stay on and integrate into Turkish society.

Irregular Migration

The founders of the modern Turkish state were concerned about creating a homogenous sense of national identity in an otherwise ethnically and culturally diverse country. Exclusive priority was given to encouraging and accepting immigrants who were either Muslim Turkish speakers to start with, or who were officially considered to belong to ethnic groups that would easily melt into a Turkish identity such as Albanians, Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, and Tatars from the Balkans. The immigrants were successfully assimilated into the "Turkish" national identity. The major piece of legislation that governed this policy, the Law on Settlement of 1934, actually restricted immigration to Turkey to persons of "Turkish descent and culture." Hence, only a small number of immigrants came from outside the Balkans and the above ethnic and religious groups. The Gagauz Turks, for example, were not encouraged to immigrate to Turkey, largely due to them being Christian. The period of government-supported major immigration into Turkey lasted until about the early 1970s, after which immigration began to be discouraged on the grounds that Turkey's population had grown enough and that land to distribute to immigrants had become scarce.

¹ These documents can be reached respectively from

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/AccessionPartnership2003.pdf and http://www.abgs.gov.tr/up2003/up.htm

Since the early 1990s, Turkey has been witnessing new forms of immigration. These include students from variety of countries as well as nationals of EU countries who have officially sanctioned presence in Turkey with proper residence and work permits. EU nationals include individuals engaged in professional activities and their families particularly in Istanbul, as well as European retirees in some of the Mediterranean resorts. They, too, constitute a relatively new phenomenon in terms of immigration into Turkey, and their numbers are estimated at 100,000-120,000. As a result of a liberal visa policy followed by Turkish governments the 1990s was characterized by the phenomenon of "suit case" trade bringing nationals of particularly former Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc countries to Turkey on repeated trips. This has led to some of these people to stay on in the country, embark on more permanent business connections as well as marriages. There have also been among these people those who take up jobs illegally on a temporary or "pendular" form in various sectors of the Turkish economy. There are no reliable figures but there are such illegal immigrants from as diverse countries as Armenia and the Ukraine. Furthermore, there is also a growing number of sportsmen and women from a diverse range of countries who are acquiring growing public attention. It is against this background as well as in respect to efforts to harmonize Turkish policy and practice with that of the EU acquis that the government in 2003 adopted new labor law for foreigners to facilitate and streamline the acquisition of work permits. The government has also prepared a draft law to replace the Settlement Law from 1934 governing immigration into Turkey. However, interestingly the draft law continues to restrict immigration to Turkey to people of "Turkish descent and culture". This of course is a situation that is out of line of the realities facing Turkey as well as being out of step with the merging "common immigration" policy of the EU. Nevertheless, these new immigration trends are testing the Turkish state's definition and conception of Turkish nationality. In the meantime the Turkish public is becoming increasingly accustomed to seeing in the Turkish national athletics, basketball, volleyball etc... teams individuals with names that are not necessarily of "Turkish descent and culture".

There is also a form of transit *irregular* migration involving nationals of neighboring countries such as Iraq and Iran as well as nationals from more distant countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan etc... These are people that often resort to the services of human smugglers and pay large fees to get themselves smuggled into western European countries. In the case of Turkey they are more likely to enter Turkey through its Eastern borders, travel through Turkey and try to enter Greece illegally across the land border the Aegean Sea. There are also occasionally boats that try to smuggle people directly on to Italy and France. These boats carrying illegal migrants now and then sink leading to human tragedies. It is very difficult to estimate the numbers of such irregular transit

migrants in Turkey and figures that are cited are in variably speculative ones. However, according to government statistics there were more than 477,000 such persons apprehended between 1995-2004 (June).

Turkey has been under intense pressure from the EU to combat illegal transit migration and harmonize its practices with that of the EU. In August 2002, in an effort to align Turkish legislation to international standards laid by the UN Conventions of 2000 concerning trafficking and smuggling of humans, the government introduced new articles to the Penal Code criminalizing human smuggling and trafficking, and instituted stricter controls at borders and ports. Turkey has also had to sign and negotiate readmission agreements with third countries from where many of the illegal migrants come from. It is generally recognized that some success has been achieved in this area as the number of illegal migrants apprehended have dropped over the last two years as illegal migration routes have moved elsewhere. However, the emphasis put on combating irregular migration in EU-Turkish relations and the general trend in EU countries to adopt restrictive measures towards immigration has created a climate that puts improvements in the realm of asylum law into jeopardy. Many of the asylum seekers that arrive in Turkey enter the country illegally or among illegal migrants. This creates a situation which makes it difficult to maintain among officials the necessary sensitivity to distinguish and treat asylum seekers differently from among illegal migrants that are apprehended.

Trafficking in human beings is yet another form of migration that has come to attract considerable governmental and public attention. The new legislation incorporating the UN Conventions on human smuggling and trafficking has made trafficking a serious crime and training programs have been run to make the police, the Gendarmerie and the judiciary more sensitive. Most strikingly the Interior Ministry officials together with the Gendarmerie were able to make arrangements with a non-governmental organization, Human Resources Development Foundation (Insan Kaynaklarını Gelistirme Vakfi-IKGV) and the Directorate General of the Status of Woman to provide social assistance to victims of trafficking until their return to their countries of origin could be arranged. The IKGV has also instituted a mechanism which enables it to receive instant information about trafficked women apprehended by the Police. The Police, together with IKGV, cooperate closely with the authorities and non-governmental organizations of the country of origin of trafficked women to ensure a safe repatriation. The cooperation between the Turkish state and this particular non-governmental organization is significant in terms of the transformation that Turkey is going through and constitutes an example of the close cooperation that is developing between bureaucracy and civil society in Turkey. Furthermore, the Interior Ministry has also instituted the practice of granting humanitarian residence permits up to six months

for victims of trafficking. These developments did not go unnoticed in the US when the US State Department's *Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report* for 2003 upgraded Turkey from the "tier three" group of countries threatened with sanctions for their failure to combat trafficking.²

Conclusion

Turkey has always been both an emigration as well as immigration country. However, over the last decade or so the nature of immigration into Turkey has changed very significantly. In particular, the question of asylum, immigration and irregular transit migration are having an important impact on Turkish policy and impact. Turkish legislation and practice is changing and these issues have come to have a growing impact on Turkish-EU relations. This is an inevitable function of Turkey's interest in becoming a member of the EU but also of Turkey's geographic location at the crossroads of countries of origin in Asia and asylum in Western Europe. Turkey is coming under growing pressure to cooperate with the EU and control the flow of transit illegal migrants and introduce an asylum system that can allow recognized refugees to stay in Turkey. Turkey's asylum policy in the past used to be criticized from a human rights perspective. Ironically, since Turkey's performance improved significantly Turkey is also being asked to take a security driven approach especially towards irregular transit migration if not also asylum. In the context of asylum most importantly Turkey has accepted to eventually lift the "geographical limitation" to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This is a very significant and revolutionary change as it reflects the Turkish state changing attitude towards Turkish national identity. Traditionally, immigration into Turkey was strictly restricted to people of "Turkish descent and culture". The lifting of the "geographical limitation" will change this. The improvement in asylum practice in Turkey is also reflection of the growing influence of a "human rights" agenda over "national security". This is also reflected in Turkish authorities' preparedness to work more closely with the international community and civil society. The "hearts and minds" of the Turkish bureaucracy is being transformed.

In the case of irregular transit migration, Turkey is under particular pressure to stem it. An important objective is to prevent irregular transit migration from becoming a path for accessing asylum procedures in the EU. In this respect Turkey faces an important challenge. Turkey is expected to both stem irregular transit migration but also at the same time be able to weed out potential asylum seekers from outright economically motivated illegal migrants and process their applications. The need for Turkey to leave behind a relatively liberal visa policy and replace it with the much

²These reports can be accessed from: www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/.

tighter EU visa regime is meant to serve a similar end of stemming illegal migration into the EU. Turkish legislators showed their commitment to controlling illegal migration by including in the most recent set of EU reforms provision to facilitate efforts to combat illegal migration. At the same time the government has made considerable effort to stem transit migration.

Traditionally, the question of who can enter a country and who can become integrated as a citizen of a country has been at the very heart of national sovereignty. Is Turkey ready to take that step? If it is, then the Turkish government will need to continue and extend its cooperation with EU officials and experts much more closely and professionally. The issue of protecting the Union's geography from unregulated movements of people is a very central aspect of the enlargement process. Hence, the EU is going to give utmost care to assessing the candidate countries capacity to live up to the standards of the Union. Turkey's geography is going to make these issues all the more sensitive for the EU.

This leaves Turkey facing quite a few tough dilemmas and consequences. The cost of meeting the EU requirements in the area of asylum and illegal migration is quite significant in the economic as well as bureaucratic, social and political sense of the term. Undoubtedly, making the necessary adjustments may be seen as a worthwhile price to pay as part and parcel of the grander exercise of transforming Turkey into a more democratic, pluralistic country driven by rule of law. It is quite possible that some of the more administrative and economic aspects of the costs may be cushioned by EU financial and technical support. Yet, Turkish decision makers do face a major dilemma: What if Turkey at the end of all the adjustments is not admitted to the European Union as a member? This could leave Turkey facing major difficulties all on its own without the benefits of EU membership and more importantly the sense of security that comes with that membership. In the more immediate future the level of cooperation and the current positive climate in EU-Turkish relation in these areas will also be very dependent on the decision that will emerge from the European Council meeting in December 2004 concerning the beginning of accession talks.

Another dilemma that faces Turkey is the immediate future. The EU governments, especially in the area of controlling or stemming irregular transit migration, seem to be asking Turkey to perform tasks that would be questioned by many liberal circles in Europe. At times EU governments seem to demand from Turkey a tough performance bordering on authoritarianism in order to appease conservative anti-immigration circles in Europe while taking a more liberal approach toward those irregular migrants that make it to Europe. In this way, EU governments are not only able to satisfy liberal

circles but also meet the growing needs of cheap labor in Europe at a time when demographic trends in Europe suggest that Europe's population is decreasing. This pattern of behavior appears to be translating itself into a situation where Europe may increasingly introduce controlled and closely supervised immigration to meet labor needs while keeping the economically, socially, or politically disadvantaged out of the EU geography. In this way, after having served as the bastion of Western Europe's defense during the Cold War against the Soviet Union thanks to its geo-strategically important location, this time Turkey would serve yet another security objective by becoming a buffer zone for keeping the unwanted and/or uncontrolled movement of people into the EU.

Lastly and paradoxically, at a time when the EU seems to be adopting policies that are reminiscent of a "fortress Europe", Turkey is being encouraged to adopt policies and practices that are opening up Turkey to growing immigration. Turkish society is already becoming more accustomed to the presence in Turkey as immigrants or as new citizens people that would not have fallen within the traditional definition of the Turkish national identity. At a time of globalization this may well be an inevitable process. Yet, it is highly likely that if the EU continues to engage Turkey toward eventual membership the propensity of immigration into Turkey will further increase. This will mean that there will be more and more people in Turkey that will not fall within the traditional definition of who a "Turk" is. Over the last years partly as function of the reforms to meet the EU Copenhagen criteria the Turkish state slowly but surely is transforming its conception of Turkish national identity from one that emphasized national homogeneity and the Turkish language to one that recognizes the reality of the cultural diversity and pluralism in the Turkish society. Is the Turkish state ready to redefine its conception of Turkish national identity to incorporate the inevitable results of increased immigration? Is Turkish society ready to do it? The answers to these questions are still moot as the debate on these issues both in the government as well as societal ranks is just starting.

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EU population ageing: Challenge and policy responses

by Constantinos Fotakis

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Before starting my presentation, please allow me to congratulate the organisers of this conference for this very stimulating and well organised event.

One of the major successes of the second half of the 20th century has been the increasing longevity reflecting the improved conditions of health and welfare standards of the EU population. However, extended longevity coupled with an important decline in fertility over the last 30 years, has resulted in a fast transition towards a much older population that, according to demographic projections, will last for several decades. The demographic trend challenges policies, institutions and attitudes established in the past when the demographic perspective was very different. The issue is of particular relevance for the European employment and social policy. According to Eurostat, the EU-25 working age population will start falling at the beginning of the next decade. This decline coincides with a fast increase of the 65+ group, representing the group of retired. This new situation will characterise the next 3 to 4 decades as the working age population cannot be affected by any possible change in fertility and mortality in the medium term.

International migration plays an increasingly important role in population growth. Recorded immigration rose annually in most of the EU-15 Member States between 1999 and 2001. In addition, net migration although still relatively low, it becomes progressively positive in the majority of the new Member States.

In addition to ageing, globalisation appears as another key driver of change. Trade is at the centre of globalisation: 20% of the world's GDP is exported; trade has also the strongest international regime through the WTO and the present WTO round will lead to a further increase in global economic interdependence. However, inequalities are enormous: East Asia success is matched by the total failure in Africa in terms of trade. Increase in foreign direct investment has been particularly spectacular however, mostly within the developed world. Financial flows are of concern, in particular in the developing world where rapid movements have affected growth negatively. Rising immigration push is again a key future of the globalised economy induced by inequalities in income and growth between countries and regions.

It appears that Europe must choose between 2 scenarios:

- a passive scenario which involves high risks of delocalizations and decline ;
- a proactive strategy to modernise economic and social policies which in tern will allow to benefit from the opportunities offered by globalisation to continue playing a positive role in the development of the world economy while maintaining its high standards in living conditions and social cohesion .


The debate on migration is part of this challenge. In my presentation I will try to focus at two main arguments:

If Europe wants to be more prosperous in the medium and longer run, it will need more immigrants. However the growth of immigration alone could not provide a positive contribution unless it is integrated within a more holistic economic and social policy approach capable of tackling the intensity and the complexity of the challenge.


There are 3 things to remember:



But let me first present a general picture of this ageing process with the help of the so-called age pyramid of EU25.



What are the main drivers of demographic ageing? Firstly, the continuous growth of life expectancy




Life expectancy increased by 8 years from 1960 to 2000 and mortality shifted to more mature ages. Moreover, due to progress in living standards and health conditions, we can say that today in Europe the 50-60 year olds of today are, in most cases, in the same good health as the 40-50 year olds of 40 years ago.

Secondly, the trend towards low fertility

Fertility rates increased in most of Europe up to the mid-1960s and sharply declined afterwards. Trends towards some recovery in some Member States, most significantly France, had a limited impact on the overall rate which increased only marginally from 1999-2001 from 1.45 to 1.47.

Present enlargement will have a very temporary rejuvenating effect but it will not change the process. The new Member States had a sort of baby boom in the 1970s and 1980s (notably Poland) but the decline in birth rates afterwards was also very marked. They are now down to fertility rates ranging from 1.3 to 1.1 which are levels similar or even lower than those of the Mediterranean Member States.


Without entering in the extremely complicated social and cultural context resulting in postponement of births and in smaller family sizes, I should note that in recent EB surveys we observe a gap between the actual number and the desired number of children women have.



We also know that France and the Nordic Member States have higher fertility rates partly because of better provisions for combining child care and work, and partly because of family friendly policies however, international experience shows that family friendly policies or the absence of those policies have a different effect on fertility from country to country.

The growth of immigration

Last but not anymore least, migration represents a strong but at the same time very volatile component of the EU demographic landscape. Immigration is caused both by "pull" and "push" factors. The past 10-15 years have seen important annual increases in the size of recorded migration into the EU as well as in estimates of unrecorded and illegal immigration. During the 1990s, positive net migration became the largest component of population change in most Member States. Over the last 5 years the net inflow of international migrants (immigration minus emigration) in the EU-15 is estimated at a level of just over 1 million people annually. The period also witnessed a broadening and diversification in the typology of migrants, of the patterns of flows and of the mix of sending and receiving countries. Changes affecting asylum seeking resulted in peak numbers of applications in 1992 and 1997, largely as a result of the wars in former Yugoslavia and of armed conflicts around the world.




Without migration, Germany, Greece, Italy, Slovenia and Slovak Republic would have experienced a population loss. Despite a positive migration rate, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary are already experiencing a population decline due to high negative natural increases.

But what is the combined impact of these demographic changes in the age-structure of the EU population?

In 2010-2020 the baby boom generation - an important source of economic growth in the past 3 decades in most EU countries- will be in the 55-65 year age bracket and in 2030 the totality of the baby boom generation will have passed 65. The pace of this ageing process differs from country to country. Germany and the Netherlands are the front runners, while Portugal is the last.


As a result of the ageing trend, the age structure of the population will change:

• The youngest age group will decline by 11% from 2000 to 2015 and continue to do so by 6% until 2030. In the short run this implies an opportunity for substantial improvements in education and child care.




- The young age group in the labour market will decline at an even quicker pace and will particularly do so in the Southern and the new Member States. Due to the smaller size of the young generations, the inflows of young and more educated people to the labour market will be smaller compared to those of the previous 20 years.
- The older age group (50-64) in the labour market will increase by 21% until 2015 with obvious implications for labour market functioning, life-long learning and retirement policies.
- The age group above 65 will increase by 22 and 27% respectively with a strong impact on the old age dependency ratio as we will see later.
- Finally, the age group of the 80+ will increase very strongly moving from 13 to 20 million people in 2015 and to 27 million in 2030 with new demands for health and care, as well as leisure services.

These basic trends underline the importance of the period 2006-2010 – last and quite narrow window of opportunity for the EU before the working age population begins to shrink. This ageing trend will dominate the next 3 to 4 decades as the working age population cannot be affected by any possible change in fertility and mortality in the medium term.




More specifically, the EU-25 working age population will start falling at the beginning of the next decade. This decline coincides with a fast increase of the 65+ group, representing the group of retired.




There are 2 main policy implications from this trend.


• Firstly, the ratio of the population over 65 to the working age population will increase from 25% in 2002 to 27% in 2010, 32% in 2020, 40% in 2030 and 48% in 2040. Then, it will remain at this level for the following years. Such a trend change will have a remarkable impact on pension sustainability for the over 65.



• Secondly, given the demographic decline of the working age population, even growth of employment rates beyond the EU target of 70%, set by the Lisbon process for the end of this decade, could not prevent employment decline in volume before 2020. A fall in the total volume of employment may in turn have a negative effect on economic growth.



Population trends and their implications to employment volume and growth may weaken the position of the EU against USA as it is already the case with Japan.




What are the key policy priorities for the EU?




What are the existing labour reserves at EU level?

Employment could still increase for some years as the result of the following reasons:

- There is, in several Member States, ample room for a substantial increase in female participation.
- There is pressure for delaying the exit age from the labour market clearly articulated at the Barcelona European Council asking Member States to delay the average age at which people leave the labour market by 5 years (from de facto around 60 to 65 years). However, the EU will need to overcome huge barriers to reach this target, notably: cultural and social attitudes, economic structures and prejudice which favour early exit.
- There is, in many Member States, ample room for a substantial increase in the employment rate of the young (under 26), compared to the U.S.A. for example.
- Last but not least, the potential of migratory inflows if well managed through adequate migration and integration policies. From the analysis of the demographic trends, it appears that even doubling simultaneously both present levels of immigration flows and fertility rates could not be enough to compensate for the ageing of the labour force.



But a permanent immigration net inflow of 1 million per year would have a considerable slow down effect on the demographic decline of the working age population. Of course success will depend on labour market integration and the social inclusion of immigrants in the host societies. Present performance in most member States in terms of integration concerning the active participation of immigrants in the economic and social life is not very successful. The relatively low employment rate of the immigrants compared to the native workers provides one aspect of this much broader issue. The good performance observed in the Mediterranean States mainly reflects their early stage in the immigration process as well as the relatively low employment rate of the native working age population in these countries.



Can migration offset the implications of demographic ageing on the labour market and social protection?

Net migration already accounts for a significant proportion of population change in the EU. For example, without migration, Germany, Greece and Italy would have experienced a population loss.

However, immigration alone, even well managed, can only partly offset the impact of demographic implications in the workforce and pensions. Even doubling present levels of immigration flows could not be enough.


The EU still need to focus on adequate employment policies and pensions reforms to achieve sustainable labour markets and pensions systems.

The implementation of the Lisbon Strategy

In March 2000, the European Council in Lisbon set out a ten-year strategy including the concrete and ambitious policy objective to make the EU the world's most dynamic and competitive economy combining economic growth and social cohesion. Demographic ageing is seen in this context as one of the key challenges for the EU.

In 2003, with a view to reinforcing the Lisbon objectives, the Commission proposed to introduce a more tight policy coordination through a new streamlined approach of mutually reinforced economic, employment and social policies involving the definition of common objectives fully consistent and interconnected with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the Employment Guidelines.

Today, after 4 years of implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, many critical observers also stress the gap between the objectives and the achievements which in turn raises questions about its implementation.



But this delay should not undermine the progress made so far.

At the first half of its implementation the Lisbon strategy focused mainly on:

- specifying the Lisbon Summit Conclusions into policy instruments of the European Union (directives, community programmes, action plans, recommendations) and on
- introducing the basic mechanisms for implementation at EU and Member-State level (Spring European Council, involvement of the European Parliament and the other European institutions, the social partners and the organized civil society at European level, development of the open method of coordination tools)

With the Mid-Term Review in 2005, a 2nd phase should now begin, putting the focus on the implementation at national level, including the new Member States. This new focus will require a stronger interface between the European and the national levels of governance in order to increase the coherence and the consistency between the instruments adopted at European level with the instruments the National governments implement at national level.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It appears today that if Europe wants to be more prosperous in the medium and longer run, it will need more immigrants. However the growth of immigration alone could not provide a positive contribution unless it is integrated within a more holistic economic and social policy approach capable of tackling the intensity and the complexity of the challenge. The issues discussed in this conference underline the importance of policy making on the immigration front. It is not simply a security issue, nor a question as to how to deal with refugees and asylum seekers. It is a question about the economic and social future, about the composition and cohesion of our societies.

Constantinos Fotakis

Currently Head of the Unit "Social and Demographic Analysis" in the Directorate of Employment and Social Affairs of European Commission. Currently he is the head of the unit. Formerly he worked several years as Country Desk Officer in the European Social Fund. MA in Economics, at York University in Toronto BA in Economics, Athens Economic University Integration processes of migrants in the European Union and policies relating to integration.

by Rinus Penninx

1. Introduction.

Most of the contributions to this conference have been focused on demographic developments within Turkey in the recent past and the near future. Demography is a `hard science' in the sense that it is able to predict pretty accurate how many individuals there will be in certain populations and what their basic characteristics such as age and sex will be. Such 'hard' data, however, become softer, when the question is asked where these individuals will be in the future; in other words, migration trends for the future, particularly these of international migration, are much more difficult to predict, because they are dependent on many non-demographic variables. Things become even more difficult, when the question is posed, how the demographically forecasted individuals, particularly the international migrants among them, will identify themselves or will be categorized by the countries of settlement. Will they, although born as Turks, in the future always be Turks, or will part of them not only become integrated in the countries of settlement, but possibly also be full fledged citizens of these countries? The answers to such questions cannot be found in demography, nor in the domain of international migration studies (delineated as the study of mobility across political borders), but should be sought in the domain of study of processes of integration of immigrants into societies of settlement and policies related to processes of integration. In this contribution I will focus on the last mentioned domain.

Integration of immigrants is a hotly debated topic nowadays, particularly in Northwest-European countries and cities. The background of this contentious debate is historically different in various countries. In the Netherlands, for example, a tradition of specific `integration policies' under the heading of `minorities policies' has been built up already since the beginning of 1980s. These policies, however, are now heavily under fire in a strongly politicized climate. Integration has been declared to have failed and particularly so-called multicultural aspects are rejected. A comparable development can be found in Sweden, where early integration policies have become politicized in a comparable way as in the Netherlands (see the contributions of Hammar and Tamas in Jandl & Stacher 2004). In other Northwest-European countries, like the FRG, the topic of immigrants was politicized much earlier, preventing integration policies from coming into existence; only very recently a political compromise was reached on a new Law on Immigration and Integration (Suessmuth-report 2001).

On the EU-level integration policies are quite new. There is a somewhat longer history of trying to establish a common immigration policy for EU-countries: the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, coming into force in May 1999, laid the legal foundation for a harmonization of asylum and communitarian immigration policies in the EU. The Tampere Summit in 1999 developed a political programme and a work plan to arrive gradually at a harmonized, common immigration policy. The Communication on a Community Immigration Policy (November 22nd, 2000) has set the framework for such policies (EC 2000) and in the first four years after the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty 23 binding regulations have been accepted; eleven of these 23 relate to borders and visa, six to illegal immigration and expulsion, five to asylum, and one to legal migration (Groenendijk and Minderhoud 2004, 139 ff). The topics reflect the still dominant preoccupation with control-oriented migration regulation at the EU-level. Integration appeared only as a topic since mid-2003, when the Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment of June 3rd (EC 2003)) was published. Under the Greek presidency at the Thessaloniki summit of June 2003 this document was accepted as a basis for developing a EU-integration policy, however, not as a communitarian policy (like immigration policy), but as a 'Third Pillar'-policy, which means essentially that any common initiative can only be implemented by unanimous decisions of the Council of Ministers.

The topic of integration processes and policies is thus neglected in the past and at the same time on its way to the top of the political agenda at the local, national and EU-level. In this contribution I want to clear up some of the confusion in the debates about integration processes and policies by developing a conceptual framework and by drawing lessons from past experience. I will do that by taking the following steps:

- 1. Firstly, I will make some basic observations on what I call the logic of integration processes. I will explore the nature of such processes, its conceptualization and lessons from empirical research. The reason for this is based on the assumption that if a policy wants to steer such a process, it should have a thorough, science-based knowledge of processes of integration and exclusion in order to decide with which instruments it can possibly intervene, in which part of the process, at what particular moment.
- 2. Such knowledge is a solid starting point for policymaking, but it is not enough. The process of policymaking and implementation has its own logic, which does not

necessarily run parallel to the logic of integration processes. That's why I will turn to some basic notions of the logic of policy making as a second step.

- 3. In the third step I will ask the question: if we have a sound knowledge of integration processes, and if we have managed to formulate adequate policies to steer, or at least smoothen that process, who has to implement policies (actors) and at what level? How do policies at the local, national and EU-level relate to each other?
- 4. The fourth step is still more concrete: what strategies should be followed in implementing policies to be successful?

2. The logic of integration processes and exclusion

At the moment immigrants settle in a new society they have to acquire a place, both in the physical sense (a house, a job and income, access to educational and health facilities, etc), but also in the social and cultural sense. Particularly if newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as physically, culturally and/or religiously `different', they aspire to become accepted also in these respects. It is from these observations that I deduce a basic and at the same time comprehensive *definition of integration: the process of becoming an accepted part of society*.

This elementary definition of integration is – on purpose – open in two ways. Firstly, it emphasizes the processual character rather than defining an end situation; it suggests furthermore that any integration process (and thus policies) should look at three dimensions or domains: the legal/political domain, the socio-economic domain and the cultural/religious domain. Secondly, it is open because it does not state the particular requirements for acceptance by the receiving society (in contradistinction to the normative models that have been developed by political theorists: assimilation, multiculturalism, pluralism, etc.), thereby leaving room for contextual variations and for different temporal (in-between) and final outcomes. That makes the definition more useful both for the empirical study of these processes, but also for policy discussions in diverging national and city contexts.

There are thus at least two parties involved in integration processes: the immigrants, with their particular characteris-tics, efforts and adaptation; and the receiving society with its reactions to the newcomers. The interaction between these two determines the direction and the ultimate outcome of the integration process. They are, however, unequal partners. The receiving society – its institutional struc-ture and the way it reacts to newcomers – is much more decisive for the outcome of the process. This process of integration does not – as is often supposed - only take place at the level of the individual immigrant, whose integration is measured in terms of his/her housing, job, education, and social and cultural adaptation to the new society. It also takes place

at the collective level of the immigrant group. Immigrant organisations mobilize resources and express the ambitions of the group. These organisations may also integrate: that is, they may become an accepted part of civil society and a potential partner in integration policies - or they may isolate themselves or be excluded. And thirdly, integration processes take place at the institutional level. Two types of institutions are relevant here. The first are general public institutions of the receiving societies, such as the educational system or institutional arrangements in the labour market. Laws, regulati-ons and executive organisations as well as unwritten rules and practices are part of such institutions. These public institutions may promote integration processes of immigrants, but they may also hinder access or equal outcome for newcomers, or they may even completely exclude them. The functioning of these general public institutions, and the possible adjustment of them in view of growing diversity, is of supremely importance: on this level, integration and exclusion are mirror images (see Penninx 2001). The second type of institutions is specific to immigrant groups themselves, such as their religious or cultural institutions. Like immigrant organizations, they may become an accepted part of society at the same level as comparable institutions of native groups, or they may isolate themselves or remain unrecognized and excluded. (For a more elaborate explanation of this argument of levels of integration see Penninx 2000).

Finally, I want to highlight another important element of the logic of integration processes: the time factor. Processes of integration of newcomers are long term by their nature. At the individual level, an adult immigrant may adapt significantly in the cognitive dimension of his behaviour: it is both pragmatic and pays off rather immediately if you learn how things are done, by whom etc. Adaptation of adults in the aesthetic and normative dimensions of their behaviour, however, tends to be less easy: knowledge may change, but feelings and likings, and evaluations of good and evil are pretty persistent within an individual's lifetime. This is a general rule for mankind, but it becomes more manifest in those who change environments through migration. The situation of the descendants of this `first generation' of migrants differs normally in this respect. Through primary relations within their family and the network of the immigrant community they are familiarized with the immigrant community, and possibly with its background elsewhere. At the same time, however, they become thoroughly acquainted with culture and language of the society of settlement through informal contacts in the neighbourhood from their early childhood on and particularly through their participation in general institutions, the educational one in the first place. If such a double process of socialization takes place under favourable conditions (in which policies play a major role) this second generation develops a way of life and lifestyle in which they combine the roles, identities and loyalties of these different worlds and situations. Ways to do this are manifold, which makes for more and more differentiation within the original immigrant group. At the group level this means that the litmus test for integration, and for the success or failure of policies in this field, is the position of the second generation (cfr. Vermeulen & Penninx 2000).

In view of the foregoing observations, outcomes from this complex and interactive process of integration cannot be expected to be homogeneous: Diversity will be with us, whether we want it or not. Studies that compare the integration of immigrant groups within the same institutional and policy context show that different immigrant groups follow different patterns of incorporation and integration (for example Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). On the other hand, the experience of immigrants of the same ethnic background in different national or local contexts also lead to very diverse patterns (for example Penninx and Roosblad 2000; Rath et al. 2001).

3. The logic of policy and policy making

Let us now take our second step. In order to formulate and implement effective policies we need not only a thorough insight in the logic of integration processes, we also have to get such policies politically approved and backed up. The logic of politics and policymaking, however, is one of a different kind and often problematic in relation to immigrants.

A key condition for effective integration policy is transparency of admission of immigrants and their residential and legal status. Expectations of, and actual longterm-residence should be expressed in an adequate legal position and opportunities to participate in all domains of society, including politics and policymaking, especially in policies that affect their position. The existing political system, however, often blocks such participation. This conundrum is apply shown by the literature, both on the national level (think of the political fate of the Suessmuth-report (2001) in the FRG since 2001), and on the level of cities (see for example Mahnig on Berlin, Paris and Zurich in Penninx et al. 2004): decisions on integration policies and their content and orientation, are taken in a political system in which the majority vote decides. In such a system majority-minority relations and the actual or perceived clash of interests connected to them, are played out both on the national level and in cities. This may lead to outright exclusion of part of the immigrants (aliens) from the formal political system, or it may – in case they are (partially) included - marginalize their voice. Perceptions of immigrants turn out to be important in such a process, often more than facts. This is the more so, if the issues of immigration and the position of immigrants become politicized questions, like in the Netherlands and Rotterdam in recent years. This mechanism leads either to the absence of integration policies and avoidance of issues related to immigrants in some countries and cities, or to lop-sided and patronizing policies reflecting mainly majority interests and disregarding needs

and voice of immigrants in others.

At the moment that integration policies are accepted another aspect of the logic of policymaking emerges in the implementation phase. In contradistinction to the long-term-nature of integration processes mentioned earlier, the political process in democratic societies requires policies to bear fruits within much shorter – in between election – terms. Unrealistic promises and demands derived from such a `democratic impatience' (Vermeulen and Penninx 1994) - that is the political desire to have quick solutions for problems and processes of a long-term character - often leads to backlashes. The recent vigorous debate on the (supposed) failure of integration policies in the Netherlands is a good example.

More difficult than this democratic impatience, however, is the situation in which the political climate (of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments, translated in political movements and politicization of the topics of immigration and integration) prevent well argued policy proposals from being accepted. Unfortunately, this has become the case in several European countries and cities. It means that much more attention should be given to the question of how to frame immigration and integration policies politically in such a way, that these are acceptable and accepted by the ruling political system.

The foregoing observations relate to the political process that may or may not lead to integration policies. I add now some observations on the form and content of such policies, if they have been established. I indicated earlier that integration policies are by necessity context bound. It is implicated in the answer to the question IN WHAT immigrants are supposed to integrate. This embeddedness has an ideological component and an institutional one.

On the level of states differences between countries the ideological component is expressed in the political `problem definition' of immigrants and their integration, and the ensuing strategies to be applied in these policies. Simplified one can distinguish two prototypical models. (See a.o. Bauböck 1994; Bauböck et al. 1996; Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Favell 2000; Freeman 1995; Guiraudon 1998; Hammar 1985; Soysal 1994).

The first one defines the immigrant principally as an alien and outsider, who is only temporarily part of society. That society is emphatically not defining itself as an immigration country and migrants are therefore temporary `guests'. At best measures may be taken to make that temporary stay comfortable and profitable for both parties and to facilitate their anticipated return, but there is no logical ground for inclusive policies that would incorporate these immigrants as citizens or political actors. Such

an exclusionary definition leads to either `non-policy' or `guestworker policy' (see Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004). Forms and instruments of such policies are variant and accidental, being mostly ad-hoc reactions to concrete problems. In contradistinction to such exclusionary policies, we also find definitions that in principle include immigrants in the course of time. In the way this inclusion is envisaged, however, two distinct political definitions of immigrants and their integration can be discerned. The first one is prototypically formulated in the French, republican vision, in which – as a consequence of its vision on the state, its relation to citizens, the ensuing political system and institutional arrangements in the public sphere – the distinction between citizens and aliens is crucial: alien immigrants should preferably become citizens and thus become recognized as individual political actors. Immigrant collectivities, however, are not recognized as such. French republican terminology avoids notions like ethnicity, ethnic minorities and multiculturalism that suggest collectiveness and difference of any sort, be it related to origin, culture, religion or class. (Formal) equality on the individual level is the overriding political principle. In this sense this definition principally depoliticizes the issue of immigrants and their integration (which does not prevent immigration and perceived `non-integration' becoming overriding issues of established parties).

The second prototypical inclusionary vision is the Anglo-American one, in which also immigrants are supposed to have or take up citizenship individually, but having done so, the political system leaves much room for collective manifestation and action of immigrants. Ethnicity and ethnic minorities are perceived as relevant notions, even to the extent that the total population in censuses for example, is officially registered as such. Although also in this political vision equality is an important principle, there is the additional notion that the realization of substantive equality may in practice be related to membership of cultural, ethnic, immigrant or disadvantaged groups. Political struggle between groups on issues of multiculturalism is thus an explicit part of politics (irrespective of the outcomes of such political struggles).

The internal logic of these prototypical visions leads to different strategies employed in integration policies. The first French republican system leads principally to strategies that choose for general policies, equality within the given system as priority, avoidance of designating fixed target groups and non-recognition of collective manifestations and immigrant organizations as important actors. The inherent problem of such a definition is that of mobilizing and engaging forces from within immigrant groups (which are feared as counteracting integration) in the implementation of policies. The Anglo-American vision tends to be more inclined to designate target groups and formulate group-specific policies, even to the extent that positive discrimination or affirmative action may be part of such policies; it is more prone to recognize, if not stimulate, forms of representation of such groups, for example by extending subsidies directly to immigrant organizations, or indirectly by subsidizing certain activities of such groups; this vision is also more inclined to combine equality with cultural difference, implying recognition of cultural and religious aspects of integration processes. On purpose I have outlined these two models of inclusion as prototypical, contrasting ones in order to illustrate their internal logic. In practice we see many variations and eclectic bricolage of the elements of both visions in the definitions and instruments of policies of European countries and cities (For more elaborate analyses of national and local integration policies in Europe see Penninx 2004 and Penninx et al. 2004). They may even change within one country or city in the course of time: See the Netherlands in the last decade, or the city of Amsterdam.

But apart from such specific migrant-related ideologies also institutional characteristics of states and societies matter. In the socio-economic sphere, for example, integration mechanisms in societies with a strong liberal market orientation (and limited welfare and social facilities) differ from those in caring welfare states that are more based on solidarity and redistribute a much greater part of the national income. Also in the cultural and religious domain historical peculiarities of institutional arrangements create significant differences in the feasibility of policies in certain domains. By consequence the scope, actors and instruments of policy differ.

This context-bound nature was illustrated by Vermeulen (1997) who compares immigrant policies in five Europe-an countries since the 1960s, specifically relating to a) integration and labour market policies; b) policies relating to immigrant languages, and c) policies in relation to religious systems introduced by immigrants. That study shows basically that the actual content of integration policies is to a great extent dependent on, or inspired by the pre-existent institutional arrangements in these domains within the different countries. For a country that traditionally had different recognized languages within its territory (or religions for that matter), it is in principle easier to make additional provisions for newcomers in this domain. In the same vein Vermeulen and Slipper (2003) analyse the practice of multicultural policies in Canada, Australia and the USA. Multiculturalism differs not only in terms of its historical development in each of these countries, the practice of it turns out to be clearly context bound. Both studies pertain to the national level of states, but the same rule holds for the level of cities (see Alexander 2003; Penninx et al. 2004; Rogers and Tillie 2001). These observations on the logic op policymaking lead to two lessons. The first is that to get policies established we need an adequate definition that makes such policies politically acceptable and endorsed. What is needed is a balanced framework that does not hide problems to be solved, but primarily stresses the common interests of all. There is much to be gained here: not only avoiding crises, that are shown to be inevitable, if problems are consistently neglected, but also restoring and promoting cohesiveness of cities and states that makes it possible to reap the potential fruits of immigration and immigrants. Acceptance of immigrants and their active participation is an essential condition in such a framework. Negotiated new forms of diversity will result from it. On this front there is still much work to do, for all actors but for politicians primarily.

A second lesson is that the viability of integration policies in the long term depends heavily on realistic targets to be attained and an adequate analysis of the institutional setting and its possibilities to build such policies on. Such a – less ideology-driven –practical approach, combined with active participation of immigrants and their organizations, will not only avoid backlash effects among the majority population, it will also result in a practice in which immigrants are involved and feel recognized.

4. Levels of integration policies and actors involved.

Integration processes from the point of view of immigrants themselves are taking place primarily at a local level, and since circumstances there may vary significantly, local policies for integration that build on interaction between immigrants and local society should have the highest priority.

Also from the perspective of the city there is a priority argument. The city receives newcomers of all sorts and of different origins who bring with them different cultures, religions and lifestyles. Their integration into the social embroidery of the city is not a natural process: social segregation, social exclusion and marginalization of (certain of these) immigrant groups is luring, threatening the social cohesion in these cities. If cities have a special problematique and a specific responsibility, different from that of the national authorities, at the same time the local city level offers special opportunities. The city and their neighbourhoods are the places where important things happen that affect the daily lives of all residents, including immigrants. It is also the level where loyalty of newcomers and old residents can be gained, or for that matter, lost. So local policies should be given more instruments and room to act in locally adequate ways. National policies, and by implication also European integration policies, should set general frameworks, rules and instruments, primarily facilitating local actors. In view of this division of tasks and taking into account the political will of the European Commission in the field of EU-integration policies as expressed in the Communication of 2003 and the consent of the Thessaloniki Summit, what could we expect from EUpolicies? What special tasks could the EU/EC take on in favour of policies at the national and local level? In my view these can be listed briefly as follows. A first function (or task) of the EU is 'framesetting'. The EC has to frame both (im-)migration and integration, and the nexus between the two, in a different way than

is done predominantly at the national level in most EU-countries until now: from defensive and mainly control-centered policy to a pro-active, future-oriented, comprehensive approach to immigration; towards a balanced approach between (realistic) problem-orientation and possible present and future gains of immigration, thus furthering acceptance of immigration; accentuating the necessity of common action in both the immigration and integration domain. The EC is in principle in a position to bent negative competition and "burden shifting" practices among EUmember states towards an approach that focuses on common interests. The framesetting task is one that should be done in the first place within the political and bureaucratic setting of the EU/EC and between 'Brussels' and the national authorities and policy makers, which implies tough and long negotiations. But using Sarah Spencer's (2003) formulation, the EC/EU should also take "active responsibility for leading a balanced, informed, public debate about the reasons migrants are in Europe by putting into the public domain information about the contribution they make and barriers they experience, acknowledging public fears, and correcting misinformation". This wider task is of great importance, because it prepares the ground for policy making in civil society and among the population at large and mobilizes a counterforce against populist anti-immigrant political exploitation. The two Communications (EC 2000 and 2003) mentioned earlier can be regarded as important first steps in the efforts of the European Commission to set a sound frame for policy action.

A second function or task that follows from framesetting is normsetting. What I mean here is, that the above mentioned general frame should be worked out in a number of norm-setting regulations, directives, or even laws that pinpoint basic starting points for integration policies. Such norms pertain to:

- a) The definition of the target group of integration policies. Important normsetting regulations should be developed, among others as to the following questions:
 - which immigrants are regarded, at what particular point in time as a resident for whom comprehensive integration policies are applicable? (Here again immigration/admission policies and integration policies should clearly be co-ordinated.)
 - how should admission policies distinguish between temporary migrants and long-terms residents, and if migrants are initially admitted temporarily, when does `temporariness' end?
 - What status should be accorded to family members and marriage partners of established immigrants?
- b) The scope of integration policies. If the ultimate aim would be in principle full access of long-term residents to all public institutions and facilities of the society of settlement then in the course of time a system of norms could be developed

systematically (through political negotiation) for the three basic dimensions of citizenship: the socio-economic, the legal-political, and the cultural/religious dimension

c) Anti-discrimination policies. In fact this is the negative corrolary of the positive normsetting under B. It is a necessary element in policies, but it also has severe limitations. I have explained elsewhere (Penninx 2000) in a paper on Social Exclusion, that any anti-discrimination norm assumes a positive normsetting in the first place, against which is being discriminated. Since, and as long as, positive normsetting differs in national contexts, the practical use of anti-discrimination norms also differs between countries.

Thirdly, apart from framesetting and normsetting discussed above, the EC has in practice instruments to promote activities related to the development of integration policies. Specific budget lines of General Directorates in charge of certain policy domains (Justice and Home Affairs for immigration, asylum and reception of asylum seekers and refugees; Social Affairs and Employment for integration and antidiscrimination) can be used to mobilize forces, for example to set up systems for collecting systematically information (both internally and externally), to have certain policy questions researched externally, etcetera. Also a special fund has been created to involve non-governmental agencies in reception of asylum seekers and refugees (European Refugee Fund). In 2003 a programme to promote integration projects and the dissemination of their good practices was started: the (still) small INTI-programme. It is expected that the INTI-programme will expand significantly in the coming years. The significance of such EC-financing activity for the development of integration policies can be high, if such activities enable local actors in integration policies to develop and implement strategic projects, if succesful pilot projects are analysed and reported systematically, and these results disseminated as examples of good practices.

5. Strategies for local polices

Let me now turn to my last point: some strategic recommendations particularly for development and implementation of local policies. A first important strategy is that of *monitoring* outcomes both of general public institutions and of specific integration policies. Monitoring is a device for developing awareness, to establish an empirically based diagnosis and thereby an instrument for steering policies. The basic assumption involved here is that the position of newcomers in a society is determined to a great extent by the (mostly unintended) differential impact of general public institutions. Because of the socio-economic status, their immigration-related characteristics, and sometimes their cultural/religious characteristics, the outcomes for immigrants may be unequal. For example higher unemployment and thus (if access is permitted)

overrepresentation in social welfare or disabled benefit regulations, as is the case in the Netherlands; or lower educational attainments of immigrant children; or concentration/segregation through housing policies and regulations. Turning this reasoning around means that monitoring outcomes leads to awareness of the functioning of general public institutions for immigrants, and when the procedures through which the unequal outcomes are scrutinized, it will lead to a clear diagnosis. (On the level of the EU the Annual Report of states (decided at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003) is intended to have this same function as an instrument for progressive policy making.

A second important element for local policies is to provide newcomers with basic tools that they need to acquire a place in society independently: a toolkit of training in the language of the society of settlement, basic knowledge of that society, civic training, etc. The basic idea (and the lesson from earlier policies related to temporary migrants and guest workers) here is that immigrants should be given the necessary tools to find a place in the new society; tools that prepare them for full participation. Several countries and cities are developing policies in this field. It is important, however, to look at such efforts as simply facilitating integration processes, and avoid normative claims (making natives of immigrants). Preferably such activities should take place in connection with trajectories for labour market or further education. A third important feature of sound policies is that they should mobilize resources within immigrant groups for integration policies. Too much policy conception is `topdown', addressing individual immigrants, while much of the policy implementation has to rely on mobilizing forces within immigrant groups to be successful. A number of good examples of using the potential within groups have been developed and are developing: for example mentor-projects of immigrant students who monitor younger co-ethnics during their secondary education; immigrant organizations mobilizing their rank and file for training and language courses, or for labour market projects; participation of women immigrants, etc.

Finally, (local) integration policies should be comprehensive in the dimensions and domains covered, thereby signifying that they do not only represent concern of the native majority, but also build on needs from the perspective of the immigrants. The economic and the social domains, particularly labour market, education, housing and health are priority domains. Policies in the political and cultural domain (including religion), however, are indispensable over the long term for integration. The forms that such local policies may take depend in practice very much on the existing institutional arrangements in receiving societies and cities, and on the political willingness to change these to become gradually more inclusive.

Two concluding remarks

In spite of the ideological differences mentioned earlier, we will find out that – in implementing seriously integration policies - the settlement process itself will act as a force towards convergence of policies, particularly as it presents itself at the local level (See Penninx et al. 2004). Whatever the institutional arrangements may be, local authorities have to find answers to the same questions, such as how to provide immigrants with adequate housing and jobs, but also how to react to their demands to fulfill religious obligations or facilities to use and teach their mother tongues. They also have to deal with very similar reactions of the native population to immigrants, and processes of discrimination and social exclusion.

Secondly, if (local) integration policies will follow strategies and tactics that engage immigrants as partners in the integration process at different levels, if it will combine `top down' activation elements with `bottom up' mobilization, it will automatically define the process of integration as `open', within the rules of liberal-democratic societies, leaving room for a more divers, but cohesive society as a result. The diversity reached in this way is neither predetermined nor static, but negotiated, shared and ever changing.

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His recent publications in English include `Newcomers: Immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands 1550-1995 (with Jan Lucassen), Het Spinhuis Publishers 1997; `Immigrant Integration: the Dutch case (with Hans Vermeulen), Het Spinhuis Publishers 2000; `Trade Unions, Immigration and Immigrants in Europe 1960-1993' (with Judith Roosblad), Berghahn Books 2000; and `Western Europe and its Islam (with Jan Rath, Kees Groenendijk and Astrid Meyer), Brill 2001.

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CONFERENCE EVALUATION

by Tarhan Erdem

I consider myself fortunate to have participated in this meeting. The organization of the meeting and the seriousness of its execution facilitated and multiplied its benefits.

The speakers generally projected the next 20 to 30 years, and in one case a speaker acting on forecasts for the next 70 years, identified the problems in Europe and Turkey, and debated alternative solutions.

As is well known, the tendency of the population to increase or decrease, though it does not illustrate large variations in short spans of time, nevertheless produces conflicting results depending upon the composition of societies and the policies that are implemented, the realization of projected assessments vary in a major manner. One colleague (I think he was Mr. Ahmet İçduygu) proposed to renew the estimates regularly and to change policies accordingly.

We are unable to determine our population within acceptable margin of error, yet. The contradictions among the census results of 1990, 1997 and 2000 indicate the scale of errors. Our bureaucracy which has fallen behind the progress of the society will need more time before we can expect it to announce correct population data.

Therefore, I consider it important that especially the policies which depend on our country's population estimates have to be revised following every census.

Esteemed Dr. Attila Hancioğlu illustrated the population movements of our country with numerous tables. One of the results reached by our valuable scientist colleague was the fact that 10 % of total population in the country had changed their place of residence during the period between 1998 to 2003. This is a very important finding. In Turkey instead of the whole family migrating together, the husband moves to the city first, and then brings on the rest of his family. If we should consider this character of urban pull together with the figure of 10 % once again, it would become clear that

more than 2 million people each year would be affected by the internal migration.

The rural push from the village to the city has been continuing with the same intensity for the last 40 to 50 years. Although the ratios may be slackening, the number of people on the move does not change much. Within the last 40 years, the urban population has increased five fold from 9 million to 45 million.

The scale and complexity of housing, infrastructure, public services problems created by these numbers is quite clear.

The public administration has failed in developing clear and stable policies for these problems, which have continued to grow; and the delay has triggered extension of the problems into other areas.

Those arriving into the cities have built day and night squatter housing on land belonging either to other people, or to the Treasury, in order to meet their sheltering needs. This solution has created innumerable uncertainties with respect to property rights, infrastructure and law-and-order, while pushing civic administration to desperation.

Each government has brought out legislation that has legalized former squatter houses, while introducing penalizing measures for those wanting to create new slum areas and for those condoning this action. The new Penal Code which became law 15 days ago contains similar articles.

A lot of observers for the last 50 years have commented that such legislation would be fruitless. Rather than trying to stop migration and prohibit squatter houses, we should have planned social housing for the needs of rising population. Instead, our intellectuals have generally asked for the prevention of slums and for forcing the rural migrants back to their villages. Migration is such an important topic altogether that may be it should be the discussed in another conference.

Perhaps we should discuss the problems created by migration at another conference.

I would like to congratulate the Turkish Family Planning Foundation for organizing this meeting, and I offer my thanks to all.

Tarhan Erdem

An engineer who is presently the Executive Director of Kondo Research Company, formerly member of the parliament.

The EU in Search of İts Identity

The discussion about the probable development of the EU is continuing with full speed. This discussion obviously will closely affect Turkey's candidacy and its probable scope of migration. In this respect one can speak of three different options: a) The EU as a *problem-solving entity* based on derived legitimacy and a narrow economic citizenship. b) The second which sees the EU as a value-based *community* premised on social and cultural citizenship. c) The third invokes *a rights-based,post-national* union based on full-fledged political citizenship.¹

Another definition can be given within the framework of Alternative Projects of Europe. The first definition is proposed by the Conservatives in a way that defines Europeanness as a static, retrospective, holistic, essentialist, and culturally prescribed entity. The conservative holistic idea aims to build a culturally prescribed Europe based on the Christian mythology, shared meanings and values, historical myths and memories. Holistic Europe does not intend to include any other culture or religion devoid of European/Christian legacy. Hence neither Turkey nor Islam has a place in this project. The second project is proposed by the Social Democrats, Liberals, Socialists and Greens underlining the understanding that 'Europe ' refers to a fluid, ongoing dynamic, prospective, syncretic and nonessentialist process of becoming. The advocates of syncretic Europe promote coexistence with Turkey and Islam underlining the understanding that the the EU is by origin a peace project.

The cultural Europe project complies with the latest Republican idea of ' unity-overdiversity ' in a way that declines heterogeinity and opposes the potential of the European Project as a peace project. However, the political Europe project goes along with the idea of ' unity-in-diversity ' aiming to construct a meta-European identity embracing cultural and religious differences."² The recent crisis in regard of the composition of the European Council indicates that the preferences of the EU Parliament are defitinively in direction of accepting the coexistence of diverse cultures, religions and away from any kind of cultural discrimination.

Cultural Component of Discrimination

Although the general acceptance of a more open, other-directed democratic understanding is gaining ground, the evaluation of various non-EU residents presents an anachronistic trend. Investigating multi-level discrimination of Muslim women in Europe, J.Blaschke notes that during the last decade, new cultural boundaries have developed, which are demonstrated by religious symbols.³ Until the 1990s, immigrants in Europe were more or less identified by their general cultural symbol formations, which were understood as having national origins. Since the early and mid-1990s, however, religion has played the major role in distinguishing people from the Eastern periphery of the continent. Immigrants from Turkey, for example, are not Turkish anymore, but Muslim people, people from the Indus valey are not Pakistanis, but believers in Islam and so on. The general development of cultural diversity in Europe might be understood as a turn from national distinctions toward religious boundary formations. This type of classification reveals the difficulty to translate the dictum ' unity-in-diversity ' because the aim of the EU is not to abolish all kind of national allegiance but to increase the readiness of combatting discrimination based on race, sex, religion, ethnicity, nationality. The existence of transnational social spheres does not indicate the total disappearance of national identities. Replacing an overarching religious identity to national belongingness is counterproductive to all integrationist attempts. It serves only to reinforce unpenetrable inner circles.

Outlook of Turks to Europe

Although a rich literature about the Turkish migration to Europe is existing, only recently has there been research propjects trying to explore the diversity of orientation existing among the Turks in Europe. Ayha Kaya and Ferhat Kentel from Bilgi University,Istanbul have attempted to delineate the major typologies among the Turkish diaspora in Germany and France. According their findings three major groupings of Euro-Turks have emerged in the migratory process of the last four decades.

- 1. Bridging Groups (more than 40 %). They comprise those who are equally affiliated with both homeland and 'host'land. Young generations with cosmopolitan and syncretic cultureal identities (multilingual) fall into this category
- 2. Breaching Groups. (around 40 %) .Those who still have a strong orientation in the homeland, including extreme religious, nationalist persons/groups.
- 3. Assimilated Groups (around 20 %). Those who are assimilated to the majority societies, usually economically more prosperous.

The research has pointed out that Euro-Turks do not pose a threat to the political and social system of their countries of settlement, but rather have the willingness to incorporate themselves into the system. The research has shown once more that the stereotype of the "Turks " is no more valid. A signifcant part of former Turkish immigrants have become economically, socially and culturally integrated active agents

in their countries of settlement. However both Germany and France have so far shun to accord these denizens the right to participate in local elections such as in the case of the Netherlands, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries. Here a bold and constructive political act might be the major tool for better integration. The most efficient supportive mechanism in this direction is to devise better forms of information about the educational opportunities of the young generations. The readiness to enter as a foreigner or recent new citizen in the "Information Society " of tomorrow depends uniquely from the willingness of the EU countries to develop better functioning links with parents, schools and educational, vocational centres.

Expectations

The signature of the EU Constitution in Rome has opened a new phase in the implementation of hunan rights within the borders of Europe. The major target is to foster the respect for the integrety and dignity of the indivdual. Any deliberation about the relevance human rights has absolutely to avoid the construction of a hierarchical conception of these rights. The right to worship, the right of freedom of conscience should not be granted any superior value than all the other human rights. So far a number of policies in EU member states have not served to the inclusion of their residents but created open and disguised forms of exlusion.

The EU of tommorrow has to equip all its citizens and residents with communicative power, which in turn will enable them to participate in matters discussed in the publis sphere.

The EU of tomorrow will need differently educated, differently raised young people, persons who believe in the merit of active citizenship. Away from cultural relativism the makers of new Europe must try to merge distinctly national, European and universal values into a whole.

Prof. Dr. Nermin Abadan-Unat

Professor Abadan-Unat has a long history as a devout advocate of women's rights in Turkey. She graduated from Law School at Istanbul University and did her graduate studies as a Fullbright student at the University of Minnesota, 1952-1953. Taught Political Science from 1953-1989 at the School of Political Science, Ankara University. She specializes in mass communication, electoral studies as well as women's studies and international migration. At present she is professor of Political Science at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul where she also teaches in the Women's Research and Education Center. Taught as guest professor at the Universities of Munich, City University of New York, University of Denver, and the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA).

¹Erik Oddvak and John Erik Fossum, Europe in Search of Legitimacy:Strategies of Legitimation Assessed ,International Political Science Review, Vol.25,Nr.4,October 2004,P.456

² J.E.Fossum, "Rthe European Union in Search of an Identity", European Journal of Political Theory, 2(3);319-40 ³ Jochen Blaschke, Ed. Multi-Level Discrimination of Muslim Women in Europe, Parabolis Ed. Berlin: 2004, 2 nd revised ed. P.538-39

What Turkey Could Bring to the EU

by Bahadır Kaleağası

Turkey's membership in the European Union is a gradually evolving process. The main tasks towards membership are to transform Turkey's potential into political, economic, social and cultural assets for Europe's future; to solve today's problems; and to set, if still necessary, transitional periods for some aspects of the membership. Today, the historical responsibility for both the EU and Turkey is to launch, as soon as possible, the accession negotiations.

The EU has a demanding agenda: institutional reforms, enlargement process, economic competitiveness, viability of the social system and the political and security stakes at the global level. In this context, Turkey's priorities and the EU's challenges in the 21st century converge more than ever before.

1. Europe's Global Economic Competitiveness (Lisbon Strategy)

Consequently Turkey's accession to the EU, further enlargement of the European internal market will benefit European citizens. This will invigorate the benefits and opportunities for business and consumers. The business sector will reap the dynamic benefits of this enlargement through economies of scale, enhanced competition and expanded market access, and a rising information society. Turkey's accession will contribute to Europe's global competitiveness.

The EU economy is undergoing a relative crisis. Member states are far from achieving the goals set by the Lisbon Strategy (European Concil, March 2000). European business community in each and every occasion voices the urgent need for economic reforms necessary to reinforce the competitiveness and growth in the EU.

Turkish business community fully supports the EU's Lisbon agenda and underlines the potential contributions of the country's membership to Europe's global competitiveness:

• Turkish economy is the world's 18th largest one in the world. It exports mainly

industrial goods (%90). Its service sector accounts for 65 percent of its gross domestic prdoduct, and the public procurement market amounts to more than 30 billion euros. Full integration into the EU of such a dynamic economy will boost economic growth in the EU.

- Turkey's full integration will bring the fresh impetus to the internal market with its dynamism, large market demand, entrepreneurial culture and trade creation potential.
- Benefits offered through this full integration to the European businesses will spill over to the EU citizens through more and better job opportunities, more competitive prices and better investment opportunities.
- Successful institutional reforms in Turkey, together with positive international business reaction to the opening of negotiations, will enable a rapid convergence path toward the EU average values for main economic indicators such as GDP per capital and labour productivity.
- If Turkey takes measures to realize its full productivity potential, she could create 6 million additional jobs by 2015 and achieve annual GDP growth as high as 8.5 percent. This would bring the GDP per capita in Turkey to around 55% of the EU average per capita income.¹

2. Social Europe

To avoid paying more taxes and drawing fewer pensions in an ever-older Europe, countries can create together the right synergy to sustain the European Social model.

Europe is facing a significant problem of an aging population. The fertility rate has fallen since 1965 while life expectancy has increased. With the current demographic trends, Europe's population is deemed to decrease sharply. New member states with lower fertility rates than the rest of EU make the continent even older.

The problem of the EU's aging population translates into shrinking markets, less taxable income and lower revenues from social contributions. This means, for example, more working years, higher taxes, less pensions for a shorter period of time. According to a recent UN study, "the EU would need an average of 6.1 million immigrants a year from 2015 to 2040 to maintain a ratio of three working-age adults for each retiree"². To maintain the European social model, the EU needs to increase its labour productivity and its employment rate quickly and substantially.

¹Turkey's Quest for Stable Growth, Mc Kinsey Quarterly, 2003 Number 4 Global Directions

²www.un.org

- Demographically, Turkey is a window of opportunity for Europe. With a population of 70 million people, Turkey has more than 30 percent of its population below 15 years old (with a decreasing trend) and its demographic growth is expected to be stabilised by 2030 at about 85 million people.
- Turkey's young, dynamic and qualified human resource is the social insurance of Europe. A Turkey engaged in the EU accession process will benefit from higher economic development as well as better and more European education. Consequently, Turkey's human capital will be upgraded to meet Europe's standards and needs.

3. Constitutional Debate

Here is a chance and challenge for Europe: A stronger Union requires more effort, better governance and radical restructuring of European institutions.

As has been the case in previous enlargement waves, dynamism brought by the prospect of new members creates the necessity and opportunity to restructure the EU institutions and its decision-making set-up.

- Turkey follows-up the debate on EU's reform. Turkish delegates participated to the work undertaken by the Convention on the future of Europe and the Intergovernmental Conference. Turkey is aware that in an EU marked flexible integration envisaged by the Constitutional Treaty, its accession may initially be faster.
- The Constitutional Treaty is a good opportunity to restructure the EU's institutional and decision-making set-up with the purpose of making an ever-stronger Union, ready to assume its global responsibilities and ready for further enlargement.
- The EU is a unique example of integration between sovereign member states going far beyond intergovernmental cooperation. Turkey aspires to join this community of common values. Therefore, the country strongly supports the adoption of a Constitutional Treaty which is a unique opportunity for the common future of people believing in human dignity, democracy, liberty, justice, equality, the rule of law, respect for human rights and peace.³

4. EU as a Global Player

As an enlarging Union of over 450 million people, producing a quarter of the world's GNP, the EU is inevitably a global player committed to sharing the responsibility for

³ The Constitutional Treaty was signed in Rome, in a ceremony with the participation of the heads of state and government of the EU members and the candidate countries including Turkey on 29 October 2004, a date that marks also the 81st anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic.

global security and building a better world.

Turkey shares the commitment of the European countries to deal peacefully with disputes through cooperation under a multilateral institutional framework. She also shares the EU's aspiration to create a zone of security and prosperity for European people internally and on the world stage. Furthermore, Turkey is aware that tackling today's complex security struggles, contemporary global problems and the intensive security agenda necessitates close cooperation more than ever before. Turkey, which has always positioned its foreign and security policy in line with that of the Union, is ready to play her part to make the EU a stronger global player:

- As a secular democracy with a predominantly Muslim population, Turkey offers the anti-thesis for the clash of civilizations scenario. Turkey's acceptance will give a positive message to the Muslim world and relieve the feelings of alienation of 12 million Muslims living in Europe as EU citizens.
- Turkey will make the EU stronger in its fight against terrorism, illegal immigration, xenophobia and racism, organised crime, trafficking of drugs, arms, human beings...
- Turkey's geo-strategic position will enable the EU to be in a pivotal position to exert its influence and spread its values in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East with a view of establishing stability, peace, democracy as well as market economy in these regions.
- As stable democratic country with close political, cultural and commercial ties to countries possesing the world's largest natural gas and oil sources in the Caspian Sea and Near East Turkey will contribute to the security of the EU's energy policies.
- Turkey's frontiers are the security frontiers of Europe within the NATO framework. As a reliable NATO ally and as a member of the EU, Turkey will consolidate the military and civilian aspects of the EU's common foreign and security policy.

The Turkish business community has firmly supported Turkey's EU membership perspective. We believe that Turkey is ready to start the accession negotiations. We are conscious that the negotiation process will take long time. In the meantime:

- Firstly, we will ever determinately be mobilised to solve any problem that the membership perspective puts on the foreground of the agenda.
- Secondly, we will be successful in transforming Turkey's potential into political, economic, social, cultural and security assets for the future of Europe's.
- And thirdly, we will closely watch and contribute to the EU's evolution towards a globally competitive economy and institutionally efficient political entity.

Sources of information:

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
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PHOTOGRAPHS FROM CONFERENCE





















European Union



Ministry of Health



Reproductive Health Programme in Turkey





Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry





Turkish Family Health and Planning Foundation